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10 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1917–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lyons v. Stategreen2 sentences2007This court followed this principle when it reversed a sentence where it appeared that the "defendant was being punished for maintaining his innocence." Lyons v. State, 730 So.2d 833, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). 2007In dicta, we indicated that a defendant "may not be additionally punished for failing to show remorse." Id. | 1 | 1 |
Salim Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corporationgreen2 sentences2004In Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court followed the test set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998): The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).. 2004Because "dismissal sounds the `death knell of the lawsuit,' courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious." Id. at 1118 . | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Burkegreen1 sentence2004In Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court followed the test set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998): The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).. | 1 | 1 |
Bondu v. Gurvichgreen2 sentences1989In Bondu v Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986), the Court followed this principle and noted: “Since it is not the function of an amendment to the pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights as ‘to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begin,’ Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist. v Volusia County, 355 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff’d. 372 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1979), the motion for leave to amend was c 1989In Bondu v Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986), the Court followed this principle and noted: “Since it is not the function of an amendment to the pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights as ‘to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begin,’ Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist. v Volusia County, 355 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff’d. 372 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1979), the motion for leave to amend was c | 1 | 1 |
Daytona Beach Racing, Etc. v. Volusia Cty.green1 sentence1989In Bondu v Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986), the Court followed this principle and noted: “Since it is not the function of an amendment to the pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights as ‘to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begin,’ Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist. v Volusia County, 355 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff’d. 372 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1979), the motion for leave to amend was c | 1 | 1 |
Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co.green1 sentence1989In Bondu v Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986), the Court followed this principle and noted: “Since it is not the function of an amendment to the pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights as ‘to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begin,’ Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist. v Volusia County, 355 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff’d. 372 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1979), the motion for leave to amend was c | 1 | 1 |
Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Volusia Countygreen1 sentence1989In Bondu v Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986), the Court followed this principle and noted: “Since it is not the function of an amendment to the pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights as ‘to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begin,’ Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist. v Volusia County, 355 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff’d. 372 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1979), the motion for leave to amend was c | 1 | 1 |
Nickels v. Stategreen2 sentences1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. 1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. | 1 | 1 |
Daviss. v. Stategreen1 sentence1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. | 1 | 1 |
Davis Youngue v. Stategreen1 sentence1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Stategreen2 sentences1938L. 569.” Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions. ■ The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354 , 71 So. 331 : “In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 , we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used 1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. Stategreen2 sentences1938L. 569.” Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions. ■ The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354 , 71 So. 331 : “In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 , we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used 1938See McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 .” The cases of Davis v. State, 90 Fla. 322 , 105 So. 843 , and Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 , cited by plaintiffs in error, do not appear to be in point, as the accused was previously warned in both of these cases and it was unnecessary to decide this question. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jacob v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2004In Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court followed the test set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998): The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Keim v. United States
green
2 sentences1999The trial court followed the principle established in Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 , 35 Ct.Cl. 628 , 20 S.Ct. 574 , 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) and Shurtleff v. U.S., 189 U.S. 311 , 23 S.Ct. 535 , 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903), that a power to appoint, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, carries with it the power to remove. 1999The trial court followed the principle established in Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 , 35 Ct.Cl. 628 , 20 S.Ct. 574 , 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) and Shurtleff v. U.S., 189 U.S. 311 , 23 S.Ct. 535 , 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903), that a power to appoint, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, carries with it the power to remove. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Shurtleff v. United States
green
2 sentences1999The trial court followed the principle established in Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 , 35 Ct.Cl. 628 , 20 S.Ct. 574 , 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) and Shurtleff v. U.S., 189 U.S. 311 , 23 S.Ct. 535 , 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903), that a power to appoint, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, carries with it the power to remove. 1999The trial court followed the principle established in Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 , 35 Ct.Cl. 628 , 20 S.Ct. 574 , 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) and Shurtleff v. U.S., 189 U.S. 311 , 23 S.Ct. 535 , 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903), that a power to appoint, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, carries with it the power to remove. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Keim v. United States
green
1 sentence1999The trial court followed the principle established in Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 , 35 Ct.Cl. 628 , 20 S.Ct. 574 , 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) and Shurtleff v. U.S., 189 U.S. 311 , 23 S.Ct. 535 , 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903), that a power to appoint, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, carries with it the power to remove. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Jones v. Bowman
neutral
1 sentence1991Moreover, it is legally irrelevant that the court followed standard practice, see, e.g., Jones v Bowman, 479 So.2d 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Glickstein, J., concurring), and had a court reporter present to record the conversation. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton
green
1 sentence1983Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton, 298 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 248 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio
green
1 sentence1983Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton, 298 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 248 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence1982At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court followed the standard established in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), and found "[t]hat [appellant] has shown that the specific omission of trial counsels' failing to take pre-trial depositions upon oral examination of the State's main witnesses was a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel." The trial judge concluded, however, "[t]hat [appellant] has not shown that this specific deficiency ... when considered under the circumstances of this individual case, was substantial enough to demonstrate a prej | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Green v. Roth
green
1 sentence1981This court followed that rule in Green v. Roth, 192 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), in holding that a corporate defendant did not waive its challenge to the personal jurisdiction of the court by joining with other defendants in a motion to dismiss a lis pendens and a motion to increase the bond posted by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Edwards v. State
neutral
2 sentences1938L. 569.” Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions. ■ The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354 , 71 So. 331 : “In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 , we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used 1938L. 569.” Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions. ■ The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354 , 71 So. 331 : “In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 , we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Phillips v. State
neutral
1 sentence1938L. 569.” Then follows a review of the earlier cases, pointing out that the cases in which this Court had held a warning or caution necessary were dealing with judicial confessions. ■ The Court followed this rule in Edwards v. State, 71 Fla. 354 , 71 So. 331 : “In the recent case of McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250 , 70 So. 24 , we reviewed our former decisions, and held that a voluntary confession to an officer is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that it was not preceded by a warning or caution that the one in custody need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Stockton v. Powell
green
1 sentence1917The case of Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1 , 10 South. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.