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34 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1916–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hutch v. Stategreen2 sentences2001“The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them in its application to the case.” Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. 2001"The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them in its application to the case." Hutch v. State , 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Langdale v. Villamilgreen1 sentence2015Furthermore, appellate courts can and do “take judicial notice of matters of public record, whether requested by a party or on its own motion, for the first time on appeal.” City of El Paso v. Fox, No. 08-12-00264-CV, 2014 WL 5023089, *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) (citing Langdale v. Villamil, 813 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.¯Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)); see, e.g., In re Estate of 3 Lockhill argued during the hearing that documents attached to the pleadings, but not introduced into evidence, could not be considered by the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
the City of El Paso v. John Foxgreen1 sentence2015Furthermore, appellate courts can and do “take judicial notice of matters of public record, whether requested by a party or on its own motion, for the first time on appeal.” City of El Paso v. Fox, No. 08-12-00264-CV, 2014 WL 5023089, *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) (citing Langdale v. Villamil, 813 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.¯Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)); see, e.g., In re Estate of 3 Lockhill argued during the hearing that documents attached to the pleadings, but not introduced into evidence, could not be considered by the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Lacy v. First National Bank of Livingstongreen1 sentence2015Given the trial court’s ruling, it appears that the trial court followed this rule of law.3 See also Estate of York, 934 S.W.2d at 851 (“The trial court can take judicial notice in the absence of a request from a party, and may be presumed to have taken notice of its own files.”) (internal citation omitted); Lacy v. First Nat’l Bank, 809 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Yorkgreen1 sentence2015Given the trial court’s ruling, it appears that the trial court followed this rule of law.3 See also Estate of York, 934 S.W.2d at 851 (“The trial court can take judicial notice in the absence of a request from a party, and may be presumed to have taken notice of its own files.”) (internal citation omitted); Lacy v. First Nat’l Bank, 809 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Gregg v. Stategreen1 sentence1986See id., at 766 (Onion, P.J., dissenting). [7] Cf. Gregg v. State, 667 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Cr.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Mattei v. Stategreen2 sentences1986United States v. Bachner, supra. Prior to Mattei, supra, it appears that this Court also followed this rule for all suppression issues. 1986See id., at 766 (Onion, P.J., dissenting). [7] Cf. Gregg v. State, 667 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Cr.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Gunst v. Pelhamgreen2 sentences1981In so holding, the court followed the rule announced in Gunst v. Pelham, 74 Tex. 586 , 12 S.W. 233, 234 (1889), a case involving a mortgage on real property. 1981In so holding, the court followed the rule announced in Gunst v. Pelham, 74 Tex. 586 , 12 S.W. 233, 234 (1889), a case involving a mortgage on real property. | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Teague Independent School Dist.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Callahan v. Walsh
green
2 sentences2015Callahan v. Walsh, 49 S.W.2d 945 owed under the loan; (5) that the debt was barred by (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1932, writ ref’d). 1985Callahan v. Walsh, 49 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1932, writ ref’d). | 2 | 1985–2015 |
Cada v. State
green
2 sentences2014Considering the effect of that specific statutory allegation on the hypothetically correct jury charge against which the sufficiency of evidence would be judged, the court followed its analysis in Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. Crim. 2013Considering the effect of that specific statutory allegation on the hypothetically correct jury charge against which the sufficiency of evidence would be judged, the court followed its analysis in Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), to hold that the indictment’s narrow allegation that the appropriation was without consent because of deception required the State to prove that specific allegation. 4 The court made clear, however, that absent a ―notice-based motion to quash,‖ the State was not required to allege the manner in which consent to appropriation of property was ineffect | 2 | 2013–2014 |
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2004This court followed this analysis in Bailey, 986 S.W.2d at 83-84 , and should follow it in this case. 2004This court followed this analysis in Bailey, 986 S.W.2d at 83-84 , and should follow it in this case. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Kirkpatrick v. Hurst
green
2 sentences2001In that case, the court followed the rule that “the statute of limitations commences to run against a minor on the date [he attains majority] since he can institute suit at any moment of that day.” Id. at 588 . 2000In that case, the court followed the rule that “the statute of limitations commences to run against a minor on the date [he attains majority] since he can institute suit at any moment of that day.” Id. at 588 . | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Franklin Life Insurance v. Wallace
green
2 sentences1933Co. v. Wallace, Administrator, 93 Ind., 7 , the court followed the rule and cited with approval the case of Girard Life Ins. 1933Co. v. Wallace, Administrator, 93 Ind. 7 , the court followed the rule and cited with approval the case of Girard Life Ins. | 2 | 1933–1933 |
ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Swinnea
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Mendez
green
1 sentence2016Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 357-58 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Admiral Insurance Co. v. Trident NGL, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 454-455 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Simmons v. Flores
green
2 sentences1993The Court followed the rule that “Generally, a person who leaves the keys in a car will not be liable for damage caused by one who steals the car.” Id. at 288 . 1993The Court followed the rule that "Generally, a person who leaves the keys in a car will not be liable for damage caused by one who steals the car." Id. at 288 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Frank Edward Bachner, A/K/A \Richard John Cassarella\"
green
2 sentences1986United States v. Bachner, supra. Prior to Mattei, supra, it appears that this Court also followed this rule for all suppression issues. 1986United States v. Bachner, supra. Prior to Mattei, supra, it appears that this Court also followed this rule for all suppression issues. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ex Parte Smith
green
2 sentences1981Smith v. State, 548 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Cr.App.1977), also decided since the new Penal Code, and cited in Montgomery , involved the use of a prior federal conviction to deny bail under Art. 1981Smith v. State, 548 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), also decided since the new Penal Code, and cited in Montgomery , involved the use of a prior federal conviction to deny bail under Art. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Montgomery v. State
green
2 sentences1981However, in Montgomery v. State, 571 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), decided since the effective date of the new Penal Code, a panel of this Court followed the rule announced under the old code; i. e., a felony under Federal law must be an offense which is denounced as a felony under Texas law. 1981However, in Montgomery v. State, 571 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), decided since the effective date of the new Penal Code, a panel of this Court followed the rule announced under the old code; i. e., a felony under Federal law must be an offense which is denounced as a felony under Texas law. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cooper v. Pitchess
green
1 sentence1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
In Re Cooper
green
2 sentences1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State of Kansas v. Holeb
green
2 sentences1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Greenbaum v. Darr
green
2 sentences1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Mitchell v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Piccott v. Florida
green
1 sentence1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Ex Parte Arrington
green
1 sentence1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Ex Parte Malone
green
1 sentence1978This court followed that rule, without articulating it, in Ex parte Malone, supra. In that case the indictment charged a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law and there were no allegations in the indictment that any acts were committed in Texas or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arkansas; however, this court stated: “The affidavits of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecuting witness show that although appellant’s acts were committed in this state, they intentionally resulted in a crime in Arkansas, which, under Sec. 6 of Art. 1008a (the predecessor to Article 51.13 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Sandoval Et Ux. v. Rattikin, Trustee green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Dorsey v. Temple
green
1 sentence1976This Court followed the rule *849 in Dorsey v. Temple, 103 S.W.2d 987 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1937, writ dism’d by agr.). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Sandoval v. Rattikin green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union
green
1 sentence1976Also see: Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref’d n. r. e.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901, 964 , 87 S.Ct. 199 , 17 L.Ed.2d 132 (1966). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clark green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Reynolds v. Looney green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Chimney Rock National Bank of Houston v. State Banking Board neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Anderson green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Boyd v. Robinson green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Cavanaugh v. Davis green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Woodward v. Ortiz green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Baker v. Rutherford green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co. neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Ellis v. Harrison green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Texas Electric & Ice Co. v. City of Vernon neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Taylor v. American Trust & Savings Bank green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Yturria Town & Improvement Co. v. Hidalgo County green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Tipton v. Railway Postal Clerks' Inv. Ass'n green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Cooper v. Carter neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| N.W. Eng'g v. Chadwick MacHinery green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.