followed rule in New York

2002Moreover, a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair one (see, People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 ), and the fact that the defense strategy of an insanity defense was unsuccessful is not an automatic indication of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness (see, People v Baldi, supra at 146).

2002This was followed by defense counsel’s cogent closing argument in which (1) he reviewed the proof supporting the defense position that defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime that prevented defendant from knowing or appreciating the nature and consequences of his conduct or that such conduct was wrong, (2) he referred to defendant’s statements to the police and in the stipulation of facts that his horrible acts were “intentional,” that he was “a cold blooded murderer” and his reasons for acting as he did, and (3) he posed to the jury the question “are t

1998(State v Molitor, supra, 210 Wis 2d, at 422 , 565 NW2d, at 252 .) In Molitor , the court followed the analysis of the California Court of Appeal in People v Whitham (supra) and People v Gear (supra).

1998(State v Molitor, supra, 210 Wis 2d, at 422 , 565 NW2d, at 252 .) In Molitor , the court followed the analysis of the California Court of Appeal in People v Whitham (supra) and People v Gear (supra).

1981(Emphasis added.) This court followed that rule in the case of Mitchell v Insurance Co. of North Amer. ( 40 AD2d 873, 874 ), stating that “the effectiveness of a judgment may not be impeached in another lawsuit * * * and a prior default judgment bars a subsequent suit on issues which were or could have been determined in the earlier action (Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N. Y. 170 ; Goldfarb v. Cranin, 35 Misc 2d 126 ).” It must therefore be concluded that since the Paces presented the subject matter of the instant suit as a defense to Hall’s foreclosure action, they could have fully litigated it in the

1981(Emphasis added.) This court followed that rule in the case of Mitchell v Insurance Co. of North Amer. ( 40 AD2d 873, 874 ), stating that “the effectiveness of a judgment may not be impeached in another lawsuit * * * and a prior default judgment bars a subsequent suit on issues which were or could have been determined in the earlier action (Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N. Y. 170 ; Goldfarb v. Cranin, 35 Misc 2d 126 ).” It must therefore be concluded that since the Paces presented the subject matter of the instant suit as a defense to Hall’s foreclosure action, they could have fully litigated it in the

1981(Emphasis added.) This court followed that rule in the case of Mitchell v Insurance Co. of North Amer. ( 40 AD2d 873, 874 ), stating that “the effectiveness of a judgment may not be impeached in another lawsuit * * * and a prior default judgment bars a subsequent suit on issues which were or could have been determined in the earlier action (Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N. Y. 170 ; Goldfarb v. Cranin, 35 Misc 2d 126 ).” It must therefore be concluded that since the Paces presented the subject matter of the instant suit as a defense to Hall’s foreclosure action, they could have fully litigated it in the

1955In this respect, the court followed the principle laid down in Matter of Morton (Miller) ( 284 N. Y. 167, 175 ): “ no written agreement may preclude an examination to determine whether the actual relationship is such as to bring the parties within the scope of the law.” (See, also, Matter of Electrolux Corp. [Miller], 288 N. Y. 440, 444 , and Matter of Realty Hotels [Corsi], 285 App. Div. 919 .) Secondly, the board in this case erred in rejecting the rider as having no significance.

1955In this respect, the court followed the principle laid down in Matter of Morton (Miller) ( 284 N. Y. 167, 175 ): “ no written agreement may preclude an examination to determine whether the actual relationship is such as to bring the parties within the scope of the law.” (See, also, Matter of Electrolux Corp. [Miller], 288 N. Y. 440, 444 , and Matter of Realty Hotels [Corsi], 285 App. Div. 919 .) Secondly, the board in this case erred in rejecting the rider as having no significance.

1955In this respect, the court followed the principle laid down in Matter of Morton (Miller) ( 284 N. Y. 167, 175 ): “ no written agreement may preclude an examination to determine whether the actual relationship is such as to bring the parties within the scope of the law.” (See, also, Matter of Electrolux Corp. [Miller], 288 N. Y. 440, 444 , and Matter of Realty Hotels [Corsi], 285 App. Div. 919 .) Secondly, the board in this case erred in rejecting the rider as having no significance.

1950This followed the rule enunciated in such cases as Van Voorhis v. Brintnall ( 86 N. Y. 18 ) and Thorp v. Thorp ( 90 N. Y. 602 ) that a mere statutory prohibition against remarriage need not be given full faith and credit and has no extraterritorial effect.

1950This followed the rule enunciated in such cases as Van Voorhis v. Brintnall ( 86 N. Y. 18 ) and Thorp v. Thorp ( 90 N. Y. 602 ) that a mere statutory prohibition against remarriage need not be given full faith and credit and has no extraterritorial effect.

1950The rule would appear to be different where the second marriage takes place in a State having a statute declaring such marriage void if contracted during a period of prohibition (see Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 270 App. Div. 631 ).

1949In Sanderson v. Norcross ( 242 Mass. 43 ) upon which the Surrogate in Matter of McCaffrey (supra) strongly relied, the Supreme Judicial Court undertook for the first time to consider the doctrine directly and was of opinion that its previous implicit recognition in Massachusetts and its general recognition elsewhere required its treatment “ as part of our law without further discussion.” (P. 45.) The New York case cited was Jackson v. Holloway (supra).

1949(Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394 [1811].) This was followed in principle in McPherson v. Clark ( 3 Bradf. 92, 98 ).

1949In Sanderson v. Norcross ( 242 Mass. 43 ) upon which the Surrogate in Matter of McCaffrey (supra) strongly relied, the Supreme Judicial Court undertook for the first time to consider the doctrine directly and was of opinion that its previous implicit recognition in Massachusetts and its general recognition elsewhere required its treatment “ as part of our law without further discussion.” (P. 45.) The New York case cited was Jackson v. Holloway (supra).

1949(Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394 [1811].) This was followed in principle in McPherson v. Clark ( 3 Bradf. 92, 98 ).

1949In Sanderson v. Norcross ( 242 Mass. 43 ) upon which the Surrogate in Matter of McCaffrey (supra) strongly relied, the Supreme Judicial Court undertook for the first time to consider the doctrine directly and was of opinion that its previous implicit recognition in Massachusetts and its general recognition elsewhere required its treatment “ as part of our law without further discussion.” (P. 45.) The New York case cited was Jackson v. Holloway (supra).

1929In the trial of this case the court followed the rule laid down in Kiernan v. Mayor ( 14 App. Div. 156 ), cited by Judge Cardozo in Stern v. Int.

1924The court followed the rule laid down in Merchants’ National Bank v. National Eagle Bank, 101 Mass. 281 .

1838The chief justice mentions a still stronger and more decisive case from 8 Mass. R. 491 , Sopkin v. Bumstead, which I will also state in his words : “ The assignee of the mortgagor paid the debt to the mortgagee, and the latter entered a discharge of the mortgage on record ; but the widow was held not entitled at law to her dower, because it would be to defeat the very purpose of the payment by the assignee, which was to give assurance to his own title.” In Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cowen, 475, the case of Collins v. Torry is recognized as holding that a purchase of the equity of redemption and* enj