10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Siebertgreen2 sentences2008Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The indictment also charged Coney with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, hut the trial court granted his motion for a directed verdict as to that count. 2 The court followed this instruction immediately with “[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.” 3 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 2.20.21. 4 Id. 5 245 Ga. 192 ( 264 SE2d 184 ) (1980). 6 Id. at 193 (2). 7 133 Ga. App. 775, 776 (2) ( 213 SE2d 7 ) (1975). 8 Id. 2008Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The indictment also charged Coney with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, hut the trial court granted his motion for a directed verdict as to that count. 2 The court followed this instruction immediately with “[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.” 3 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 2.20.21. 4 Id. 5 245 Ga. 192 ( 264 SE2d 184 ) (1980). 6 Id. at 193 (2). 7 133 Ga. App. 775, 776 (2) ( 213 SE2d 7 ) (1975). 8 Id. | 1 | 1 |
Maynor v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 1 | 1 |
Chase v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The indictment also charged Coney with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, hut the trial court granted his motion for a directed verdict as to that count. 2 The court followed this instruction immediately with “[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.” 3 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 2.20.21. 4 Id. 5 245 Ga. 192 ( 264 SE2d 184 ) (1980). 6 Id. at 193 (2). 7 133 Ga. App. 775, 776 (2) ( 213 SE2d 7 ) (1975). 8 Id. 2008Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The indictment also charged Coney with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, hut the trial court granted his motion for a directed verdict as to that count. 2 The court followed this instruction immediately with “[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.” 3 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 2.20.21. 4 Id. 5 245 Ga. 192 ( 264 SE2d 184 ) (1980). 6 Id. at 193 (2). 7 133 Ga. App. 775, 776 (2) ( 213 SE2d 7 ) (1975). 8 Id. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Watson Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1980However, in White v. Watson Enterprises, a 1973 case appearing at 129 Ga. App. 203, 205 (2) ( 199 SE2d 357 ), this court held: "Of course, the filing of a legally sufficient counterclaim in excess of plaintiff's claim ordinarily requires the denial of a motion for summary judgment." (Emphasis supplied.) The basis for this pronouncement was the Rubel case. 1980However, in White v. Watson Enterprises, a 1973 case appearing at 129 Ga. App. 203, 205 (2) ( 199 SE2d 357 ), this court held: "Of course, the filing of a legally sufficient counterclaim in excess of plaintiffs claim ordinarily requires the denial of a motion for summary judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) The basis for this pronouncement was the Rubel case. | 1 | 1 |
Tipton v. Hardengreen2 sentences1980Following the Rubel decision in 1968, this court followed the rule announced therein in the case of Tipton v. Harden, 128 Ga. App. 517, 519 (2) ( 197 SE2d 746 ), adhering to the principle that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a summary judgment in the face of a valid, pending counterclaim. 1980Following the Rubel decision in 1968, this court followed the rule announced therein in the case of Tipton v. Harden, 128 Ga. App. 517, 519 (2) ( 197 SE2d 746 ), adhering to the principle that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a summary judgment in the face of a valid, pending counterclaim. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Hooksgreen2 sentences1933Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 550 (8 Sup. Ct. 625, 31 L. ed. 537), a well-considered case, in which Mr. Justice Miller, quoting Chancellor Walworth in Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige, 122 , said: “‘It is only in cases where the person advancing money to pay the debt and a third party stands in the situation of a surety, or is compelled to pay it to protect his own rights, that a court of equity substitutes him in the place of the creditor, as a matter of course, without any agreement to that effect.-’” See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hooks, 133 Ga. 345, 349 ( 65 S. E. 780 ), where the rule wa 1933Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 550 (8 Sup. Ct. 625, 31 L. ed. 537), a well-considered case, in which Mr. Justice Miller, quoting Chancellor Walworth in Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige, 122 , said: “‘It is only in cases where the person advancing money to pay the debt and a third party stands in the situation of a surety, or is compelled to pay it to protect his own rights, that a court of equity substitutes him in the place of the creditor, as a matter of course, without any agreement to that effect.-’” See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hooks, 133 Ga. 345, 349 ( 65 S. E. 780 ), where the rule wa | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleportgreen1 sentence1933Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 550 (8 Sup. Ct. 625, 31 L. ed. 537), a well-considered case, in which Mr. Justice Miller, quoting Chancellor Walworth in Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige, 122 , said: “‘It is only in cases where the person advancing money to pay the debt and a third party stands in the situation of a surety, or is compelled to pay it to protect his own rights, that a court of equity substitutes him in the place of the creditor, as a matter of course, without any agreement to that effect.-’” See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hooks, 133 Ga. 345, 349 ( 65 S. E. 780 ), where the rule wa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brinson v. State
green
2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. Hardrick
green
2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Owen v. Mobley Construction Company
green
1 sentence1988The trial court followed the rule set forth in Owen, supra, and concluded that the last possible breach occurred on April 3, 1981, the date of the last notice of the advertised sale, and was barred by the six-year limitation for an action on a simple contract. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc.
red
2 sentences1987Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, 254 Ga. 300 ( 329 SE2d 149 ) (1985). 1987Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, 254 Ga. 300 ( 329 SE2d 149 ) (1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Loftin v. United States Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1982Co., 106 Ga. App. 287 ( 127 SE2d 53 ) (1962), quoted and cited with approval in Great American Ins. 1982Co., 106 Ga. App. 287 ( 127 SE2d 53 ) (1962), quoted and cited with approval in Great American Ins. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Stahl v. Russell
green
2 sentences1969The will, however, limited the bequest, which was in fee simple under the intestacy distribution, to a defeasible fee, in that it first provided that all property was to be divided between Frances and Ruby, but this is followed by a clause which, expressly excluding her husband, directs that anything left at their death shall go “to my people.” In Stahl v. Russell, 206 Ga. 699 ( 58 SE2d 135 ) the testator left an undivided interest in property to his sister expressly stating that she might sell or other wise convey the property and dispose of the proceeds according to her own will, but “any re 1969The will, however, limited the bequest, which was in fee simple under the intestacy distribution, to a defeasible fee, in that it first provided that all property was to be divided between Frances and Ruby, but this is followed by a clause which, expressly excluding her husband, directs that anything left at their death shall go “to my people.” In Stahl v. Russell, 206 Ga. 699 ( 58 SE2d 135 ) the testator left an undivided interest in property to his sister expressly stating that she might sell or other wise convey the property and dispose of the proceeds according to her own will, but “any re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Akers v. Decatur Street Bank
green
1 sentence1936Counsel for the plaintiff in error rely on the ruling in McLendon v. State, 16 Ga. App. 262 ( 85 S. E. 200 ), as follows: “An allegation in such an accusation that certain false and fraudulent representations were made ‘to the firm of Rice & Phelps, a partnership composed of W. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Baker v. State
green
1 sentence1936Counsel for the plaintiff in error rely on the ruling in McLendon v. State, 16 Ga. App. 262 ( 85 S. E. 200 ), as follows: “An allegation in such an accusation that certain false and fraudulent representations were made ‘to the firm of Rice & Phelps, a partnership composed of W. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
People v. Goodhart
neutral
2 sentences1936The court followed the rule in the Turley case, supra. Another decision in line is People v. Goodhart, 248 Ill. 373 ( 94 N. E. 148 ). 1936The court followed the rule in the Turley case, supra. Another decision in line is People v. Goodhart, 248 Ill. 373 ( 94 N. E. 148 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Smith v. Williams
green
1 sentence1935In the original opinion, this court followed the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782 (supra), that the measure of damages for a breach of warranty to personalty “is the purchase-money with interest and expenses properly incurred by the vendee in attempting to defend his title.” On a motion for rehearing, the plaintiff in error, the vendor, now raises the contention, which was not heretofore presented, that under the measure of damages as held he would be unable to deduct from the purchase-money the value of the use of the car while it remained in the hands of | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Taylor v. Central Railroad & Banking Co.
neutral
1 sentence1913In the case then under consideration this court followed the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Central Railroad Co., 79 Ga. 330 ( 55 S. E. 114 ), to the effect that the power of the courts to grant new trials is not limited as to the number of times it may be exercised, “but the presumption of the legality of such grant weakens upon each concurrent verdict.” It must be admitted that the rule denying to the trial judge the right to grant a second new trial upon conflicting evidence where the evidence decidedly preponderates in favor of the verdict is not altogether satisfactory. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.