payment claim in Oregon

1995That statute provides, in part: “In any action for damages for an injury or wrong to the person or property, or both, of another where the amount pleaded is $4,000 or less, and the plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant not less than 10 days before the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465(3) or

1995That statute provides, in part: “In any action for damages for an injury or wrong to the person or property, or both, of another where the amount pleaded is $4,000 or less, and the plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant not less than 10 days before the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465(3) or

2024However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action * * *, an amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.” (Emphases added.) “The policy behind ORS 20.080 ‘is to encourage settlement of small claims, to prevent insurance compa- nies and tortfeasors from refusing to pay just claims, and to discourage plaintiffs from inflating their claims.’ ” Bedford v. Merety Monger Trust, 251 Or App 778, 783 , 286 P3d 912 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 44

2024However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action * * *, an amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.” (Emphases added.) “The policy behind ORS 20.080 ‘is to encourage settlement of small claims, to prevent insurance compa- nies and tortfeasors from refusing to pay just claims, and to discourage plaintiffs from inflating their claims.’ ” Bedford v. Merety Monger Trust, 251 Or App 778, 783 , 286 P3d 912 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 44

1998The most recent significant interpretation is in City of Medford v. Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App 213 , 754 P2d 607 , rev den 306 Or 661 (1988), where we discussed the statute, the earlier case law construing it, and held that it applied to limitation provisions outside ORS chapter 12 as well as the provisions in that chapter.

1998The most recent significant interpretation is in City of Medford v. Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App 213 , 754 P2d 607 , rev den 306 Or 661 (1988), where we discussed the statute, the earlier case law construing it, and held that it applied to limitation provisions outside ORS chapter 12 as well as the provisions in that chapter.

2024However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465, or not more than 30 days after the transfer of the action under ORS 46.461, an amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.” Cite as 334 Or App 302 (2024) 305 next 30 days whether we might conclude this matter on the basis proposed.

2022In any action for damages, or counter claim for damages, for any injury or wrong to the person or prop- erty, or both, of another where the amount [recovered] in controversy is [five hundred dollars $500.] one thousand dol- lars ($1000.00) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, or a counter-claiming defendant, as part of the Cite as 319 Or App 816 (2022) 829 costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of such action if the court shall find that written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant

2022In any action for damages, or counter claim for damages, for any injury or wrong to the person or prop- erty, or both, of another where the amount [recovered] in controversy is [five hundred dollars $500.] one thousand dol- lars ($1000.00) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, or a counter-claiming defendant, as part of the Cite as 319 Or App 816 (2022) 829 costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of such action if the court shall find that written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant

2021Cite as 314 Or App 553 (2021) 559 pleaded is $10,000 or less, and the plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant, and on the defen- dant’s insurer, if known to the plaintiff, not less than 30 days before the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465, or not more than 30 days after the transfer of the ac

2021However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plain- tiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465, or not more than 30 days after the transfer of the action under ORS 46.461, an amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.” As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Swaim, 343 Or 423, 427-28 , 172 P3d 645 (2007), there are four require- ments for a plaintiff to be entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.080: (1) the plaintiff must have filed an action in whic

2021However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plain- tiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action or the filing of a formal complaint under ORS 46.465, or not more than 30 days after the transfer of the action under ORS 46.461, an amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.” As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Swaim, 343 Or 423, 427-28 , 172 P3d 645 (2007), there are four require- ments for a plaintiff to be entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.080: (1) the plaintiff must have filed an action in whic

2018Id . at 422-23, 108 S.Ct. 1886 .

2016The only exception to the payment requirement is “as provided in subsection (3) of this section [.]” Id.

2006Viewing that text in context, see PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (setting forth the proper methodology for statutory interpretation), we conclude that the required prelitigation demand must be made for the same claim and provided to the same defendant against whom the plaintiff prevailed at trial.

2006Viewing that text in context, see PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (setting forth the proper methodology for statutory interpretation), we conclude that the required prelitigation demand must be made for the same claim and provided to the same defendant against whom the plaintiff prevailed at trial.

2006The Court of Appeals noted that a demand letter under ORS 20.080(1) is analogous to a summons because it is directed to a party “over whom the court has not yet attained personal jurisdiction” and requires that party “to timely respond to the content of the demand or suffer adverse consequences * * *.” Woods, 202 Or App at 377 .

2000Plaintiff asserts that Castro v. Earl Scheib of Oregon, 65 Or App 179 , 670 P2d 226 (1983) supports his position that a demand on a defendant’s insurer satisfies ORS 20.080.

2000Plaintiff asserts that Castro v. Earl Scheib of Oregon, 65 Or App 179 , 670 P2d 226 (1983) supports his position that a demand on a defendant’s insurer satisfies ORS 20.080.

1989He contends that, in order to effectuate that purpose, we should analogize ORS 20.080 to the consumer protection measure in ORS 20.098(1), as we construed it in Hamer v. Mayeda, 64 Or App 705 , 669 P2d 811 (1983).

1989He contends that, in order to effectuate that purpose, we should analogize ORS 20.080 to the consumer protection measure in ORS 20.098(1), as we construed it in Hamer v. Mayeda, 64 Or App 705 , 669 P2d 811 (1983).

1978It is irrelevant both because it represents the judgment of a third party and because it is concerning a collateral matter.” 221 Or at 114 .

1974Damages recoverable under this section shall not exceed $25,000, and shall be limited to reasonable expenses paid or incurred for doctor, hospital or nursing services for the deceased and for his loss of earnings. “(2) In any such action if the plaintiff prevails, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, as a part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that the written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant either in the form of an action filed or a letter

1974Damages recoverable under this section shall not exceed $25,000, and shall be limited to reasonable expenses paid or incurred for doctor, hospital or nursing services for the deceased and for his loss of earnings. “(2) In any such action if the plaintiff prevails, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, as a part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that the written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant either in the form of an action filed or a letter

1974Damages recoverable under this section shall not exceed $25,000, and shall be limited to reasonable expenses paid or incurred for doctor, hospital or nursing services for the deceased and for his loss of earnings. “(2) In any such action if the plaintiff prevails, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, as a part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that the written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant either in the form of an action filed or a letter

1974Damages recoverable under this section shall not exceed $25,000, and shall be limited to reasonable expenses paid or incurred for doctor, hospital or nursing services for the deceased and for his loss of earnings. “(2) In any such action if the plaintiff prevails, there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff, as a part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court finds that the written demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant either in the form of an action filed or a letter

1948Clarke Lumber Co. sold and delivered to it certain fire insurance policies”, etc. The claimant invokes the following principles as stated in his brief: “Where debts have been incurred prior to the appointment of a receiver in the usual course of *529 business and for the protection and preservation of property and funds which should have been used to pay such debts were applied to other purposes, there is a diversion of funds and the holder of such a debt is entitled to a preference in the payment of his claim, even as against secured creditors.” In support of the foregoing the following cases

1948Clarke Lumber Co. sold and delivered to it certain fire insurance policies”, etc. The claimant invokes the following principles as stated in his brief: “Where debts have been incurred prior to the appointment of a receiver in the usual course of *529 business and for the protection and preservation of property and funds which should have been used to pay such debts were applied to other purposes, there is a diversion of funds and the holder of such a debt is entitled to a preference in the payment of his claim, even as against secured creditors.” In support of the foregoing the following cases

1948Cas. 705; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal & Iron Co., 16 Wash. 499 , 48 P. 333 .

1948Clarke Lumber Co. sold and delivered to it certain fire insurance policies”, etc. The claimant invokes the following principles as stated in his brief: “Where debts have been incurred prior to the appointment of a receiver in the usual course of *529 business and for the protection and preservation of property and funds which should have been used to pay such debts were applied to other purposes, there is a diversion of funds and the holder of such a debt is entitled to a preference in the payment of his claim, even as against secured creditors.” In support of the foregoing the following cases

1948Clarke Lumber Co. sold and delivered to it certain fire insurance policies”, etc. The claimant invokes the following principles as stated in his brief: “Where debts have been incurred prior to the appointment of a receiver in the usual course of *529 business and for the protection and preservation of property and funds which should have been used to pay such debts were applied to other purposes, there is a diversion of funds and the holder of such a debt is entitled to a preference in the payment of his claim, even as against secured creditors.” In support of the foregoing the following cases

1948Cas. 705; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal & Iron Co., 16 Wash. 499 , 48 P. 333 .

1942Such claims are not cut off where *Page 488 the conveyance is not for a valuable consideration; the claimant may follow the property into the hands of the purchaser." In accordance with the foregoing statement of the rule, the rights in real property of a purchaser for value without notice from the heir were held superior to those of a creditor whose claim did not accrue until after the estate had been settled in Berton v. Anderson , 56 Ark. 470 , 20 S.W. 250 , and Scoggin v. Hudgins , 78 Ark. 531 , 94 S.W. 684 , 115 Am.

1942Such claims are not cut off where *Page 488 the conveyance is not for a valuable consideration; the claimant may follow the property into the hands of the purchaser." In accordance with the foregoing statement of the rule, the rights in real property of a purchaser for value without notice from the heir were held superior to those of a creditor whose claim did not accrue until after the estate had been settled in Berton v. Anderson , 56 Ark. 470 , 20 S.W. 250 , and Scoggin v. Hudgins , 78 Ark. 531 , 94 S.W. 684 , 115 Am.

1942Such claims are not cut off where *Page 488 the conveyance is not for a valuable consideration; the claimant may follow the property into the hands of the purchaser." In accordance with the foregoing statement of the rule, the rights in real property of a purchaser for value without notice from the heir were held superior to those of a creditor whose claim did not accrue until after the estate had been settled in Berton v. Anderson , 56 Ark. 470 , 20 S.W. 250 , and Scoggin v. Hudgins , 78 Ark. 531 , 94 S.W. 684 , 115 Am.

1942Such claims are not cut off where *Page 488 the conveyance is not for a valuable consideration; the claimant may follow the property into the hands of the purchaser." In accordance with the foregoing statement of the rule, the rights in real property of a purchaser for value without notice from the heir were held superior to those of a creditor whose claim did not accrue until after the estate had been settled in Berton v. Anderson , 56 Ark. 470 , 20 S.W. 250 , and Scoggin v. Hudgins , 78 Ark. 531 , 94 S.W. 684 , 115 Am.

1940In support of the first assignment of error, defendants rely upon the- case of Oregon Liquor Control Commission v. Anderson Markets, 160 Or. 646 , 87 P. (2d) 206 .

1940In support of the first assignment of error, defendants rely upon the- case of Oregon Liquor Control Commission v. Anderson Markets, 160 Or. 646 , 87 P. (2d) 206 .

1937Our conclusion is, so far as this point is concerned, that the suit can be maintained.” The doctrine that equity will subject a nonresident’s property to the payment of a claim cognizable at law, without the claim first having been reduced to judgment, is supported by the following cases: Johnston v. Byars State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 ( 284 P. 862 ); First National Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487 ( 77 P. 1043 , 103 Am.

1937Our conclusion is, so far as this point is concerned, that the suit can be maintained.” The doctrine that equity will subject a nonresident’s property to the payment of a claim cognizable at law, without the claim first having been reduced to judgment, is supported by the following cases: Johnston v. Byars State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 ( 284 P. 862 ); First National Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487 ( 77 P. 1043 , 103 Am.

1937Our conclusion is, so far as this point is concerned, that the suit can be maintained.” The doctrine that equity will subject a nonresident’s property to the payment of a claim cognizable at law, without the claim first having been reduced to judgment, is supported by the following cases: Johnston v. Byars State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 ( 284 P. 862 ); First National Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487 ( 77 P. 1043 , 103 Am.

1937Our conclusion is, so far as this point is concerned, that the suit can be maintained.” The doctrine that equity will subject a nonresident’s property to the payment of a claim cognizable at law, without the claim first having been reduced to judgment, is supported by the following cases: Johnston v. Byars State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 ( 284 P. 862 ); First National Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487 ( 77 P. 1043 , 103 Am.