payment claim in Missouri

1974Section 472.150 may in some circumstances permit the validity of a claim to be questioned after the time for appeal from its allowance has expired (see In re Estate of Bacheller, 437 S.W.2d 132 (Mo.App.1968), but in such proceeding, the complaining party would have the burden of proof.

1958Stam v. Smith, 183 Mo. 464, 469 , 81 S.W. 1217 .” Maender v. Breck, Mo.App., 159 S.W.2d 310 , 312; 37 C.J.S.

1958Stam v. Smith, 183 Mo. 464, 469 , 81 S.W. 1217 .” Maender v. Breck, Mo.App., 159 S.W.2d 310 , 312; 37 C.J.S.

1956Speaking of the form of receipt given in the Adler case, the decision quotes, 291 N.Y.S. at page 441 , from Lee v. Barrett, 82 Misc. 475 , 144 N.Y.S. 941 , as follows: “ ‘This form of receipt has been construed by numerous federal authorities as being in the form of a loan and advancement to be recovered back, and does not subrogate the insurance company in place of the person to whom said money had been advanced or loaned.

1956Speaking of the form of receipt given in the Adler case, the decision quotes, 291 N.Y.S. at page 441 , from Lee v. Barrett, 82 Misc. 475 , 144 N.Y.S. 941 , as follows: “ ‘This form of receipt has been construed by numerous federal authorities as being in the form of a loan and advancement to be recovered back, and does not subrogate the insurance company in place of the person to whom said money had been advanced or loaned.

1956Speaking of the form of receipt given in the Adler case, the decision quotes, 291 N.Y.S. at page 441 , from Lee v. Barrett, 82 Misc. 475 , 144 N.Y.S. 941 , as follows: “ ‘This form of receipt has been construed by numerous federal authorities as being in the form of a loan and advancement to be recovered back, and does not subrogate the insurance company in place of the person to whom said money had been advanced or loaned.

1944The second clause of Section 48, Art. 4, forbids the payment of a claim under an illegal contract, meaning in this case any contract or lease entered into contrary to the terms and provisions of Sec. 9265, supra, and of Chapter 105, supra. See, Sager v. State Highway Commission, 349 Mo. 341 , 346, 160 S.W.2d 757 , 759. [5] Respondent contends that he is entitled to recover for breach of the terms of the lease contract even if it is void, because it appears from the evidence that the lessees went into possession of the described premises and paid the annual rents for the lease period.

1944The second clause of Section 48, Art. 4, forbids the payment of a claim under an illegal contract, meaning in this case any contract or lease entered into contrary to the terms and provisions of Sec. 9265, supra, and of Chapter 105, supra. See, Sager v. State Highway Commission, 349 Mo. 341 , 346, 160 S.W.2d 757 , 759. [5] Respondent contends that he is entitled to recover for breach of the terms of the lease contract even if it is void, because it appears from the evidence that the lessees went into possession of the described premises and paid the annual rents for the lease period.

1944Respondent says that, if the lease contract was void, a tenancy from year to year was established under the facts by operation of law and that "the courts have universally held that the stipulations of such contracts with respect to [607] repairs and as to the amount of rent reserved and as to the time set for termination of the tenancy are all and each of them valid and binding upon the parties and may be enforced as such." Ray v. Blackman, 120 Mo. App. 497 , 504, 97 S.W. 212, 214 ; 32 Am.

1944Respondent says that, if the lease contract was void, a tenancy from year to year was established under the facts by operation of law and that "the courts have universally held that the stipulations of such contracts with respect to [607] repairs and as to the amount of rent reserved and as to the time set for termination of the tenancy are all and each of them valid and binding upon the parties and may be enforced as such." Ray v. Blackman, 120 Mo. App. 497 , 504, 97 S.W. 212, 214 ; 32 Am.

1939By express language its funds may not be diverted to the payment of such claim, since it is forbidden to incur any expense for administration purposes, except of an annual appropriation by the Congress for that purpose ( 49 Stat. 1547 ); and the liability for suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it. [Price v. U. S., 174 U. S. 373 .] In Pine Hill Coal Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S. 191 at 196 , it is said: ‘Liability in any case is not to be imposed upon any Government without clear words. ’ ’ ’ The defendant also cites and relies largely upon a case from our Su

1939By express language its funds may not be diverted to the payment of such claim, since it is forbidden to incur any expense for administration purposes, except of an annual appropriation by the Congress for that purpose ( 49 Stat. 1547 ); and the liability for suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it. [Price v. U. S., 174 U. S. 373 .] In Pine Hill Coal Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S. 191 at 196 , it is said: ‘Liability in any case is not to be imposed upon any Government without clear words. ’ ’ ’ The defendant also cites and relies largely upon a case from our Su

1939By express language its funds may not be diverted to the payment of such claim, since it is forbidden to incur any expense for administration purposes, except of an annual appropriation by the Congress for that purpose ( 49 Stat. 1547 ); and the liability for suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it. [Price v. U. S., 174 U. S. 373 .] In Pine Hill Coal Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S. 191 at 196 , it is said: ‘Liability in any case is not to be imposed upon any Government without clear words. ’ ’ ’ The defendant also cites and relies largely upon a case from our Su

1935Plaintiff framed his petition upon this theory; and he tried his case upon this theory; and, by his petition, he must stand or fall. [Leavel v. Johnston, supra; Jonesboro, Lake City Eastern Railroad Co. v. United Iron Works Co., supra; Smoot v. Judd, supra; Bay v. Wank, supra; Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 .] He alleges therein, as his cause of action, that the defendants guaranteed him against any resulting loss on account of his deposit — and that he suffered the loss complained of — and that said bank is wholly insolvent and has no money, property, or assets which can be applied

1935Plaintiff framed his petition upon this theory; and he tried his case upon this theory; and, by his petition, he must stand or fall. [Leavel v. Johnston, supra; Jonesboro, Lake City Eastern Railroad Co. v. United Iron Works Co., supra; Smoot v. Judd, supra; Bay v. Wank, supra; Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 .] He alleges therein, as his cause of action, that the defendants guaranteed him against any resulting loss on account of his deposit — and that he suffered the loss complained of — and that said bank is wholly insolvent and has no money, property, or assets which can be applied

1935Plaintiff framed his petition upon this theory; and he tried his case upon this theory; and, by his petition, he must stand or fall. [Leavel v. Johnston, supra; Jonesboro, Lake City Eastern Railroad Co. v. United Iron Works Co., supra; Smoot v. Judd, supra; Bay v. Wank, supra; Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 .] He alleges therein, as his cause of action, that the defendants guaranteed him against any resulting loss on account of his deposit — and that he suffered the loss complained of — and that said bank is wholly insolvent and has no money, property, or assets which can be applied

1935Plaintiff framed his petition upon this theory; and he tried his case upon this theory; and, by his petition, he must stand or fall. [Leavel v. Johnston, supra; Jonesboro, Lake City Eastern Railroad Co. v. United Iron Works Co., supra; Smoot v. Judd, supra; Bay v. Wank, supra; Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 .] He alleges therein, as his cause of action, that the defendants guaranteed him against any resulting loss on account of his deposit — and that he suffered the loss complained of — and that said bank is wholly insolvent and has no money, property, or assets which can be applied

1913“A judgment for the widow under this statute should be no more than a judgment establishing the ■claim; or an order appropriating assets, ascertained lo be unappropriated, to the payment of the claim and ordering it paid. ’ ’ In Waters v. Herboth, 178 Mo. 166, 172 , in treating of what are now sections 114 and 115, supra, and .section 116 which allows to the widow additional personal property not. exceeding four hundred dollars in ■value as her absolute property, the Supreme Court said: “Those sections were not designed to affect the final distribution, but the idea was to allow the widow to h

1904That statement of the law overrules what was said in George v. Williamson, 26 Mo. 190 , wherein it was held that the creditor who sets aside the fraudulent transfer of his deceased debtor would have the benefit of the whole property to the exclusion of other creditors, if necessary to the payment of his claim.

1897Hohenshall v. Home Loan & Savings Association, 41 S. W.

1879Barrow v. Rhinelander, 3 Johns.

1871(See 17 Mo. 479 .) It was decided by this court in that case that the county could not be compelled to pay the warrant in question out of any other than the road and canal fund, and that the creditor could alone look to that fund for the payment of his claim.

1868In support of this position, we are referred to the case of Hannan v. Osborn, 4 Paige Ch. 336 .