54 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1873–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tompkins v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2003Tompkins v. Williams, 62 S.W.2d 70 , 71 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgm't adopted); accord State v. City of Austin , 331 S.W.2d 737 , 742 (Tex. 1960). 1939App.) 62 S. W. (2d) 70 , it was held that an order by a City Council similar to the ordinance here involved for the payment of a claim for personal injuries was not a final judicial act. | 2 | 5 |
State v. City of Austingreen2 sentences2003Tompkins v. Williams, 62 S.W.2d 70 , 71 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgm't adopted); accord State v. City of Austin , 331 S.W.2d 737 , 742 (Tex. 1960). 2003Tompkins v. Williams, 62 S.W.2d 70 , 71 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgm't adopted); accord State v. City of Austin , 331 S.W.2d 737 , 742 (Tex. 1960); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. | 2 | 3 |
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen2 sentences1995The general and controlling standard required to prove bad faith in the denial or delay of payment of an insured’s claim has been set forth in Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988). 1988Aranda v. Insurance Company of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1988); Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.1987); Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.1983). | 1 | 2 |
Estates of Elkins v. County of Dallasgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Estates of Elkins, 146 S.W.3d at 829 . 11 (a) The payment defense In their first issue, Appellants claim to have raised a fact issue on the affirmative defense of payment. | 1 | 1 |
Goldman, Mark & Caroline v. Olmstead, Jeffrey & Summer, Sandra Hewett, NRT Texas, LLCgreen1 sentence2023Code Ann. § 1101.610 ; contra Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 357 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (stating, in a case not turning on interpretation of Section 1101.601, that “the occupations code sets out a procedure by which a person injured by a license holder’s violation of section 1101.652(a)(3) can be made whole through the payment of a claim from” the fund). 10 TREC also contends that Murphy’s pleadings do not support payment from the fund because the pleadings’ factual allegations support only a breach of contract claim, and the fund does not pay judgments based on breach of c | 1 | 1 |
Rehak Creative Services, Inc. and Robert Rehak v. Ann L. Witt, Ellen Witt, Raymond Witt and Ann Witt Campaigngreen1 sentence2015Prima facie evidence is “evidence that, until its effect is overcome by other evidence, will suffice as proof of a fact in issue.” Rehak Creative Servs. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex. App.— Houston [l4th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Denson v. Dallas County Credit Uniongreen1 sentence2014Co. v. Hill-Shields, No. 05-99-01615-CV, 2001 WL 21510 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 10, 2001, no pet.)); illegality (Denson v. Dallas County Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); equitable estoppel (Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 188 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)); and promissory estoppel (Mann v. NCNB Texas Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp.green1 sentence2014Co. v. Hill-Shields, No. 05-99-01615-CV, 2001 WL 21510 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 10, 2001, no pet.)); illegality (Denson v. Dallas County Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); equitable estoppel (Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 188 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)); and promissory estoppel (Mann v. NCNB Texas Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Allstate Texas Lloyd'sgreen1 sentence2014Bank, N.A., 244 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)); accord and satisfaction (Richardson v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 235 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)); unjust enrichment (pleaded here as a payment defense, see Garner, 244 S.W.3d at 861 ); cancellation of debt (Reliance Mortg. | 1 | 1 |
Garner v. Fidelity Bank N.A.green2 sentences2014Bank, N.A., 244 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)); accord and satisfaction (Richardson v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 235 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)); unjust enrichment (pleaded here as a payment defense, see Garner, 244 S.W.3d at 861 ); cancellation of debt (Reliance Mortg. 2014Bank, N.A., 244 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)); accord and satisfaction (Richardson v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 235 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)); unjust enrichment (pleaded here as a payment defense, see Garner, 244 S.W.3d at 861 ); cancellation of debt (Reliance Mortg. | 1 | 1 |
Tovar v. Stategreen1 sentence2013App. 1999) (noting that the members of certain professions may be required to meet “special skill and attention” and “if the law is broken there will be a suspicion that it was a deliberate breach due to self-interest”) (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 235 (2d ed. 1961)); Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584, 586-88 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Morissette v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Thirdly, appellant was not in ‘good standing’ with the State Bar at the time he represented John Lemke because he was in default in the payment of his bar dues resulting in the suspension of his law license.”) (footnote omitted). 69 See Catch Me If You Can (Dreamworks 2002), the Steven Spielberg movie in which Leonardo Di Caprio played the role of Frank Abagnale, Jr., who swindled millions as he falsely acted as a Pan Am pilot, a doctor, and a prosecutor. 70 See Plurality Op. at 13 n.11. 71 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952) (noting that “public welfare offenses” regulate | 1 | 1 |
Aguirre v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Thirdly, appellant was not in ‘good standing’ with the State Bar at the time he represented John Lemke because he was in default in the payment of his bar dues resulting in the suspension of his law license.”) (footnote omitted). 69 See Catch Me If You Can (Dreamworks 2002), the Steven Spielberg movie in which Leonardo Di Caprio played the role of Frank Abagnale, Jr., who swindled millions as he falsely acted as a Pan Am pilot, a doctor, and a prosecutor. 70 See Plurality Op. at 13 n.11. 71 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952) (noting that “public welfare offenses” regulate | 1 | 1 |
Siefkas v. Siefkasgreen1 sentence2002He characterizes this payment requirement as “permanent maintenance.” However, a divorce court may order a spouse to make post-decree payments for the benefit of his former spouse for life if such payments “are directly re *16 ferable to the rights and equities of the parties in community property at the time of divorce.” Siefkas v. Siefkas, 902 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); accord McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (required monthly post-divorce insurance premium payments do not constitute improper “permanent alimony”); Bunker v. Bunker, | 1 | 1 |
Bunker v. Bunkergreen1 sentence2002He characterizes this payment requirement as “permanent maintenance.” However, a divorce court may order a spouse to make post-decree payments for the benefit of his former spouse for life if such payments “are directly re *16 ferable to the rights and equities of the parties in community property at the time of divorce.” Siefkas v. Siefkas, 902 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); accord McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (required monthly post-divorce insurance premium payments do not constitute improper “permanent alimony”); Bunker v. Bunker, | 1 | 1 |
McBean v. McBeangreen1 sentence2002He characterizes this payment requirement as “permanent maintenance.” However, a divorce court may order a spouse to make post-decree payments for the benefit of his former spouse for life if such payments “are directly re *16 ferable to the rights and equities of the parties in community property at the time of divorce.” Siefkas v. Siefkas, 902 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); accord McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (required monthly post-divorce insurance premium payments do not constitute improper “permanent alimony”); Bunker v. Bunker, | 1 | 1 |
Rumley v. Allstate Indemnity Co.green1 sentence1997Co., 924 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1996, no writ), the court stated that as a third-party claimant, Mrs. Rumley had no standing to assert extra-contractual and statutory claims against the insurance company for denial and delay in the payment of her claim. | 1 | 1 |
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank of Dallasgreen2 sentences1996Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank of Dallas, 675 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 85-6 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 1996Fidelity & Casualty Co., 675 S.W.2d at 319 ; Aetna Life, 497 S.W.2d at 85-86 . | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bankgreen2 sentences1996Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank of Dallas, 675 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 85-6 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 1996Fidelity & Casualty Co., 675 S.W.2d at 319 ; Aetna Life, 497 S.W.2d at 85-86 . | 1 | 1 |
Texaco Inc. v. Calvertgreen1 sentence1988Furthermore, “The franchise tax does not burden any specific asset of the corporation, but instead ... [the] tax is a payment for the privilege of transacting business within Texas.” Texaco, Inc. v. Calvert, 526 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Harris County v. Dowlearngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Muse, Currie and Kohen v. Drakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Piggott v. Schram & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Trinity & Sabine Railway Co. v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 655-56 . 2014Id. at 655–56. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Osherow v. Ernst & Young, LLP (In Re Intelogic Trace, Inc.)
green
2 sentences2010Noting the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2000), appellants recognize that res judicata of a compulsory counterclaim may apply to claims made in bankruptcy. 2010Noting the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d 382 (5[th] Cir. 2000), appellants recognize that res judicata of a compulsory counterclaim may apply to claims made in bankruptcy. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Blinn v. McDonald
green
2 sentences1928Newton v. Newton, supra; Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604 , 46 S. W. 787 ; 48 S. W. 571 ; 50 S. W. 931 ; Hughes v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. 1925Therefore we will not discuss that feature of the case further than to say the sustaining of this exception is in accordance with the holding of a similar state of facts in the case of Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604 , 46 S. W. 787 , 48 S. W. 571 , 50 S. W. 931 , viz. on the ground that appellant’s cause of action against appellee individually was limited to enforce a lien on the property of testator, that came into appellee’s hands, and therefore the petition should have alleged what specific property of testator came into her hands, and should have sought only .the enforcement of the lien-the | 2 | 1925–1928 |
Schauer & Co. v. Beitel's
neutral
2 sentences1928Newton v. Newton, supra; Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604 , 46 S. W. 787 ; 48 S. W. 571 ; 50 S. W. 931 ; Hughes v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. 1925Therefore we will not discuss that feature of the case further than to say the sustaining of this exception is in accordance with the holding of a similar state of facts in the case of Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604 , 46 S. W. 787 , 48 S. W. 571 , 50 S. W. 931 , viz. on the ground that appellant’s cause of action against appellee individually was limited to enforce a lien on the property of testator, that came into appellee’s hands, and therefore the petition should have alleged what specific property of testator came into her hands, and should have sought only .the enforcement of the lien-the | 2 | 1925–1928 |
Janek v. Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C.
green
1 sentence2015This part of the underlying case is governed by this Court’s decision in Janek v. Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 451 S.W.3d 97 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Henry v. Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas
green
2 sentences2000Henry, 895 S.W.2d at 812-13 . 2000Henry, 895 S.W.2d at 812-13 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stracener v. United Services Automobile Ass'n
green
2 sentences1993Texas Case Law Both parties in this case rely upon the decision in Stracener v. United Services Automobile Association, 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.1989). 1 In that case, the Court held that the phrase “payment of claims” in paragraph (2)(b) “includes the payment of the claim of the injured party seeking to recover the proceeds of underinsured motorist coverage. 1993Therefore, a negligent party is underinsured whenever the available proceeds of his liability insurance are insufficient to compensate for the injured party’s actual damages.” 777 S.W.2d at 379-80 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Dallas Cty. App. Dist.
green
1 sentence1990App. Dist., 732 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ), submit that they substantially complied with the payment requirement of section 42.08. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1988Aranda v. Insurance Company of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1988); Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.1987); Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.1983). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Massey v. Armco Steel Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
First National Bank in Graham v. Sledge
green
1 sentence1988(Emphasis added.) We conclude that a derivative claimant’s failure to include the statutory warning now provided by section 53.056(d) 11 does not invalidate his lien, 12 though it does bring about a reduction of the amount of his lien claim against the owner and his property, measured by the aggregate sum of the payments thereafter made by the owner to the original contractor. 13 Cf. First National Bank in Graham v. Sledge, 653 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.1983). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Herrington v. Luce green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. Palmer green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| American Fire and Casualty Company v. Davis green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Malley v. American Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Pearce v. Stokes green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Detroit Bank v. United States green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| International Harvester Co. of America v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Van v. Webb green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Austin Nat. Bank v. Sheppard green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Templeton v. Ferguson green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Jones v. Williams neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Kaufman County v. Gaston green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Mercer v. McMurry neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| B., H., M. Co. v. L., E. S. neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Schoolher, Bernstein & Co. v. Hutchins neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| McKee v. Coffin green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Western Pennsylvania Railroad v. Johnston neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| I. & G. N. R'y Co. v. Benitos neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Cobb & Gregory v. Parker neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Texas Co. v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Goldfrank, Frank & Co. v. Young green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Carter Bros. & Co. v. Hightower green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| International Building & Loan Ass'n v. Biering green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Brown v. Ruse green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Callaghan v. Salliway green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Brown v. Reese green | 1 | 1893–1893 |
| Grace v. Wade & Mains green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.