payment claim in Virginia

2024In Viking Enterprise, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a payment claim where the contractor had merely appealed by filing a complaint in circuit court, without complying with the notice and bond provisions in Code § 15.2-1246. 277 Va. at 107-08 .

2004Under Count LTV for Equitable Indemnify, “RML demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $4 million, plus its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending Bay Point Condominium Association v. RML." The actual payment rule cited by Lowery from Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763 , 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495 , 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).

2004Under Count LTV for Equitable Indemnify, “RML demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $4 million, plus its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending Bay Point Condominium Association v. RML." The actual payment rule cited by Lowery from Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763 , 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495 , 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).

2004Under Count LTV for Equitable Indemnify, “RML demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $4 million, plus its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending Bay Point Condominium Association v. RML." The actual payment rule cited by Lowery from Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763 , 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495 , 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).

2004Under Count LTV for Equitable Indemnify, “RML demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $4 million, plus its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending Bay Point Condominium Association v. RML." The actual payment rule cited by Lowery from Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763 , 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495 , 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).

2004Co. v. Fulgham, 219 Va. 294 , 247 S.E.2d 404 (1978), the Court was confronted by a situation in which an insurance company erroneously made a payment of a claim on account of a mistake of law, the coverage vel non as to the injuries sustained.

2004Co. v. Fulgham, 219 Va. 294 , 247 S.E.2d 404 (1978), the Court was confronted by a situation in which an insurance company erroneously made a payment of a claim on account of a mistake of law, the coverage vel non as to the injuries sustained.

1998Id. citing U.C.C. § 3-418(c) (drawee bank cannot recover for payment of a forged check against “a person who took the instrument in good faith and for value or who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment or acceptance”).

1949Assuming, but not deciding, that there was such conflict of interest as would have justified the removal of the executor by the lower court (see Nickels v. Horsley, 126 Va. 54 , 100 S. E. 831 ), that objection has now been removed by this decision which requires the disallowance of the claim.

1949Assuming, but not deciding, that there was such conflict of interest as would have justified the removal of the executor by the lower court (see Nickels v. Horsley, 126 Va. 54 , 100 S. E. 831 ), that objection has now been removed by this decision which requires the disallowance of the claim.

1940The brief of the appellees makes this apt statement of this circumstance: “ * * * which clearly demonstrates the injustice that might result to the owner and other meritious creditors interested in the property which is the subject of the lien, if the law permitted a release of part of the security where a single contract is contended for, and permitted the lien creditor to fall back upon what remained, or what he might select for the payment of his claim.” In the case of McGrew et al. v. McCarty et al., 78 Ind. 496, 498 , involving a point in a mechanics lien case similar to that which we are

1939American Iron, etc., Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 , 34 S. Ct. 502 , 58 L.

1939American Iron, etc., Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 , 34 S. Ct. 502 , 58 L.

1918Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640 , 32 Sup. Ct. 580, 56 L.

1918Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640 , 32 Sup. Ct. 580, 56 L.

1900To the same effect see Englehardt v. Building Association, 148 N. Y. 281 .

1888In the case of Perkins v. Lane, 82 Va. (7 Hansbrough), this court, speaking by Lewis, P., said: “Those who invoke the jurisdiction of a court of chancery must do so within a reasonable time, instead of lying by until, by their supineness and negligence, there can no longer be a safe determination of the controversy.” See also Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87 ; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178 .

1888In the case of Perkins v. Lane, 82 Va. (7 Hansbrough), this court, speaking by Lewis, P., said: “Those who invoke the jurisdiction of a court of chancery must do so within a reasonable time, instead of lying by until, by their supineness and negligence, there can no longer be a safe determination of the controversy.” See also Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87 ; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178 .

1884Barnum v. Frost, 17 Gratt. 398 ; Young v. Warne, 2 Rob. 420 .

1854Hawker v. Moore, 40 W.