13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1885–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dodge v. Eastgreen2 sentences2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily 2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily | 1 | 1 |
Lieske v. Swangreen2 sentences2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily 2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily | 1 | 1 |
Vessels v. Hickersongreen2 sentences2014It reasoned that the separation of powers doe-trine precludes a common law doctrine that operates to shorten a legislatively prescribed limitations period: "In deference to the separation of powers doctrine, we are wary of invoking an equitable principle, such as lach-es, where the legislative branch of government has already made a clear policy judgment." - Vessels, — P.3d at —, 2012 WL 503664 , at *15 18 We granted Hickerson's petition for review. 2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily | 1 | 1 |
Buckingham v. Orrgreen2 sentences2014The Partial Payment Doctrine Does Not Preclude a Laches Defense 119 The partial payment doctrine has been part of our common law jurisprudence since at least 1883 when we decided Buckingham v. Orr, 6 Colo. 587, 589-90 (Colo.1883). 2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily | 1 | 1 |
Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Dolores County Board of Commissionersgreen1 sentence2012See Shell, 948 P.2d at 1007 (court may apply equitable tolling principles where a defendant fails to provide statutorily imposed notice to plaintiff). [57 Hickerson argues that In re Estate of Ongaro, 973 P.2d 660 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 998 P.2d 1097 (Colo.2000), supports the proposition that the partial payment doctrine is a creature of equitable tolling. | 1 | 1 |
Drake v. Tynergreen1 sentence2012See id. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. DeWittgreen2 sentences2012See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo.App.2000) (one division of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow decisions of another division), aff'd, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo.2002). 2012See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo.App.2000) (one division of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow decisions of another division), aff'd, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Denver Water Department Credit Union v. Estate of Ongarogreen1 sentence2012See Shell, 948 P.2d at 1007 (court may apply equitable tolling principles where a defendant fails to provide statutorily imposed notice to plaintiff). [57 Hickerson argues that In re Estate of Ongaro, 973 P.2d 660 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 998 P.2d 1097 (Colo.2000), supports the proposition that the partial payment doctrine is a creature of equitable tolling. | 1 | 1 |
Berger v. Coongreen2 sentences2012Beathune, 30 Colo.App. at 326 , 494 P.2d at 605 ; Pasternak, 511 P.2d at 530-31; see also Coon v. Berger, 41 Colo.App. 358 , 360, 588 P.2d 386, 387-88 (1978) (discussion not necessary for the decision before the court is dicta and not controlling on later decisions), aff'd, 199 Colo. 133 , 606 P.2d 68 (1980). 162 Accordingly, we conclude, under the cireumstances here, that the trial court erred in ruling that laches was available as a defense to Vessels's timely filed claim brought to recover on a promissory note, where a new statute of limitations period was triggered, as a matter of law, by 2012Beathune, 30 Colo.App. at 326 , 494 P.2d at 605 ; Pasternak, 511 P.2d at 530-31; see also Coon v. Berger, 41 Colo.App. 358 , 360, 588 P.2d 386, 387-88 (1978) (discussion not necessary for the decision before the court is dicta and not controlling on later decisions), aff'd, 199 Colo. 133 , 606 P.2d 68 (1980). 162 Accordingly, we conclude, under the cireumstances here, that the trial court erred in ruling that laches was available as a defense to Vessels's timely filed claim brought to recover on a promissory note, where a new statute of limitations period was triggered, as a matter of law, by | 1 | 1 |
Coon v. Bergergreen1 sentence2012Beathune, 30 Colo.App. at 326 , 494 P.2d at 605 ; Pasternak, 511 P.2d at 530-31; see also Coon v. Berger, 41 Colo.App. 358 , 360, 588 P.2d 386, 387-88 (1978) (discussion not necessary for the decision before the court is dicta and not controlling on later decisions), aff'd, 199 Colo. 133 , 606 P.2d 68 (1980). 162 Accordingly, we conclude, under the cireumstances here, that the trial court erred in ruling that laches was available as a defense to Vessels's timely filed claim brought to recover on a promissory note, where a new statute of limitations period was triggered, as a matter of law, by | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Beckergreen2 sentences2012See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo.App.2000) (one division of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow decisions of another division), aff'd, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo.2002). 2012See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo.App.2000) (one division of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow decisions of another division), aff'd, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Lyons Partnership, L.P., a Texas Limited Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Incorporated Philip Morris Amy Morris Smithgreen1 sentence2012See Lyons P'ship, L.P., 243 F.3d at 798 ("Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created doctrine of lach-es to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations."); Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260 ; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235 (refusing to apply laches to the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief and prospective injunctive relief because "under our tripartite system of government, [the wisdom of a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement] is committed to the discretion of t | 1 | 1 |
Michael A. Chirco Dominic J. Moceri v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., and Bernard Gliebermangreen2 sentences2012Chirco, 474 F.3d at 2209-31 ; Teamsters & Emp'rs, 283 F.3d at 879-81 . 2012See Lyons P'ship, L.P., 243 F.3d at 798 ("Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created doctrine of lach-es to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations."); Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260 ; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235 (refusing to apply laches to the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief and prospective injunctive relief because "under our tripartite system of government, [the wisdom of a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement] is committed to the discretion of t | 1 | 1 |
Denver Water Department Credit Union v. Estate of Ongarogreen1 sentence2012See Shell, 948 P.2d at 1007 (court may apply equitable tolling principles where a defendant fails to provide statutorily imposed notice to plaintiff). [57 Hickerson argues that In re Estate of Ongaro, 973 P.2d 660 (Colo.App.1998), aff'd, 998 P.2d 1097 (Colo.2000), supports the proposition that the partial payment doctrine is a creature of equitable tolling. | 1 | 1 |
Cates v. Continental Casualty Co.green1 sentence2002Co., 366 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1963) ("[Nlo issue of fact is raised by appellant's affidavit that he 'believed said check to be either a partial payment of claim or dividend." "). | 1 | 1 |
Koch v. Construction Technology, Inc.green1 sentence1999See Koch v. Construction Tech., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 68 , 71 & n. 1 (Tenn.1996) (reviewing cases). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Farshawe v. Lanegreen1 sentence1885See Fanshawe v. Lane, 16 Abb. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. County of MacOn
green
2 sentences1901In United States v. Macon, 99 U. S. 582 , it was sought to compel the authorities of the county of Macon, Missouri, to levy a tax for the payment of a judgment recovered by the relator against the county upon interest coupons detached from bonds issued by it under an act of the general assembly of the state incorporating the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Company. 1901In United States v. Macon, 99 U. S. 582 , it was sought to compel the authorities of the county of Macon, Missouri, to levy a tax for the payment of a judgment recovered by the relator against the county upon interest coupons detached from bonds issued by it under an act of the general assembly of the state incorporating the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Company. | 2 | 1901–1901 |
Holmquist v. Gilbert
green
1 sentence2014Buckingham, 6 Colo. at 589-90 ; Dodge v. East, 100 Colo. 36 , 64 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1937) ("[Vloluntary payments made by the debtor [interrupt] the operation of the statute of limitations."); Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113 , 92 P. 232 , 233 (1907) (holding that the partial payment by a trustee does not revive a debt outside the statute of limitations where the trustee was an agent of both the creditor and debtor). 120 While the court of appeals recognized that the partial payment doctrine is a part of our common law, it determined that restarting the limitations period thereunder necessarily | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ivani Contracting Corporation v. The City Of New York
green
1 sentence2012See Lyons P'ship, L.P., 243 F.3d at 798 ("Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created doctrine of lach-es to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations."); Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260 ; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235 (refusing to apply laches to the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief and prospective injunctive relief because "under our tripartite system of government, [the wisdom of a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement] is committed to the discretion of t | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Beathune v. Cain
green
2 sentences2012Beathune, 30 Colo.App. at 326 , 494 P.2d at 605 ; Pasternak, 511 P.2d at 530-31; see also Coon v. Berger, 41 Colo.App. 358 , 360, 588 P.2d 386, 387-88 (1978) (discussion not necessary for the decision before the court is dicta and not controlling on later decisions), aff'd, 199 Colo. 133 , 606 P.2d 68 (1980). 162 Accordingly, we conclude, under the cireumstances here, that the trial court erred in ruling that laches was available as a defense to Vessels's timely filed claim brought to recover on a promissory note, where a new statute of limitations period was triggered, as a matter of law, by 2012Beathune, 30 Colo.App. at 326 , 494 P.2d at 605 ; Pasternak, 511 P.2d at 530-31; see also Coon v. Berger, 41 Colo.App. 358 , 360, 588 P.2d 386, 387-88 (1978) (discussion not necessary for the decision before the court is dicta and not controlling on later decisions), aff'd, 199 Colo. 133 , 606 P.2d 68 (1980). 162 Accordingly, we conclude, under the cireumstances here, that the trial court erred in ruling that laches was available as a defense to Vessels's timely filed claim brought to recover on a promissory note, where a new statute of limitations period was triggered, as a matter of law, by | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Illinois v. Gorman Brothers Ready Mix
green
2 sentences2012Chirco, 474 F.3d at 2209-31 ; Teamsters & Emp'rs, 283 F.3d at 879-81 . 2012Teamsters & Emp'rs, 283 F.3d at 882-85 . 1155 To the extent that the trial court here interpreted Teamsters to permit a lach-es defense where a court had previously equitably tolled the statute of limitations in the same case, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court erred because, in Colorado, the partial payment doctrine is a judge-made rule of law interpreting the statute of limitations, not a creature of equity. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank
green
1 sentence2000Finally, there is no claim that Pueblo Bank had actual knowledge of the forged signatures, and thus subsection (a)(3) does not apply. *787 Indeed, as the court noted in Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank, 401 N.E.2d 752 (Ind.App.1980), if the warranty that all signatures were genuine applied to a bank in the position of Pueblo Bank, the final payment doctrine contained in § 4-3^18 would be meaningless. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brandon v. Sterling Colorado Beef Co.
green
1 sentence1997Brandon v. Sterling Colorado Beef Co., 827 P.2d 559 (Colo.App.1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Brighton School District 27J v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1997We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Brighton School District 27J v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Co., 923 P.2d 328 (Colo.App.1996), to determine whether Colorado recognizes the existence of a common law tort claim against a commercial surety who fails to reasonably proceed with the payment of a claim under a performance bond. 1997We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Brighton School District 27J v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Co., 923 P.2d 328 (Colo.App.1996), to determine whether Colorado recognizes the existence of a common law tort claim against a commercial surety who fails to reasonably proceed with the payment of a claim under a performance bond. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Barnes v. Spangler
green
2 sentences1954Barnes v. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407 , 56 P. (2d) 31 . 1954Barnes v. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407 , 56 P. (2d) 31 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Grotte v. Weil & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1930Grotte v. Weil, 62 Neb. 478 , 87 N. W. 173 , 9 L. 1930Grotte v. Weil, 62 Neb. 478 , 87 N. W. 173 , 9 L. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
In re Appropriations by General Assembly
green
1 sentence1893In re Appropriations, 13 Colo. 316 ; Mute & Blind Institute v. Henderson, ante, p. 98; In re Continuing Appropriations, ante p. 192; Burritt v. Commissioners, 120 Ills. 322; May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 . | 1 | 1893–1893 |
May v. Rice
green
1 sentence1893In re Appropriations, 13 Colo. 316 ; Mute & Blind Institute v. Henderson, ante, p. 98; In re Continuing Appropriations, ante p. 192; Burritt v. Commissioners, 120 Ills. 322; May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 . | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.