payment claim in Nebraska

1980The sole authority cited by the court is State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456 , 66 N. W. 541 .

1980The sole authority cited by the court is State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456 , 66 N. W. 541 .

1958Beginning with Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514 , 247 N. W. 429 , down to and including McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543 , 83 N. W. 2d 13 , we have stated and restated the applicable rules.

1958Beginning with Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514 , 247 N. W. 429 , down to and including McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543 , 83 N. W. 2d 13 , we have stated and restated the applicable rules.

1958Beginning with Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514 , 247 N. W. 429 , down to and including McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543 , 83 N. W. 2d 13 , we have stated and restated the applicable rules.

1958Beginning with Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514 , 247 N. W. 429 , down to and including McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543 , 83 N. W. 2d 13 , we have stated and restated the applicable rules.

1944It was held in State v. Board of County Commissioners of Cass County, 53 Neb. 767 , 74 N. W. 254 , that, after the statutory period for appeal by a taxpayer has passed, “One in whose favor a claim has been duly allowed by a county board may, by mandamus, compel the issuance of a warrant for the payment of such claim.” In this connection, the duty of the county clerk, respondent herein, is fixed by section 26-115, Comp.

1944It was held in State v. Board of County Commissioners of Cass County, 53 Neb. 767 , 74 N. W. 254 , that, after the statutory period for appeal by a taxpayer has passed, “One in whose favor a claim has been duly allowed by a county board may, by mandamus, compel the issuance of a warrant for the payment of such claim.” In this connection, the duty of the county clerk, respondent herein, is fixed by section 26-115, Comp.

1942J. 675; Lewis v. South Shore Cooperative Ass’n, 211 App. Div. 831 , 209 N. Y.

1938The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove- a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its. writ.” State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 68 Neb. 517 , 94 N. W. 617 ; Riggs v. Hroch, 133 Neb. 260 , 274 N. W. 598 .

1938The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove- a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its. writ.” State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 68 Neb. 517 , 94 N. W. 617 ; Riggs v. Hroch, 133 Neb. 260 , 274 N. W. 598 .

1938The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove- a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its. writ.” State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 68 Neb. 517 , 94 N. W. 617 ; Riggs v. Hroch, 133 Neb. 260 , 274 N. W. 598 .

1938The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove- a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its. writ.” State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 68 Neb. 517 , 94 N. W. 617 ; Riggs v. Hroch, 133 Neb. 260 , 274 N. W. 598 .

1937The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its writ.” See, also, Thies v. Thies, 111 Neb. 805 , 198 N. W. 151 .

1937The equity court in such case is merely lending its assistance to the legal tribunal to remove a fraudulent obstruction interposed to the execution of its writ.” See, also, Thies v. Thies, 111 Neb. 805 , 198 N. W. 151 .

1935The supreme court of the United States has held: “Every state has jurisdiction to determine for itself liability of property within its territorial limits to seizure and sale under process of its courts.” Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 .

1934It is stated in Hamilton County v. Meyers, 23 Neb. 718 , 722: “While in this case public morals might suggest the payment of the claim presented, yet it would open a door which would be liable to great abuse by the unscrupulous.” If the county physician had refused or been unable to attend or had been incompetent to take care of the case, a different question might have been presented.

1904It is contended, however, that the case of Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Welshans & Co., 55 Neb. 362 , affords grounds which would authorize us to depart from the general usages and precedents of equity, but we do not so understand it.

1899(Murphy v. Moore, 23 Hun [N. Y.] 95; Seymour v. Wilson, 19 N. Y. 417 .) While it was primarily intended to indemnify Barnard against loss by reason of his guaranty, it was, as a matter of law, a security to which the First National Bank of Fremont might rightfully resort for the payment of its claim, even though it did not rely on it or know of its existence.

1899(Blair State Bank v. Stewart, 57 Neb. 58 , 77 N. W.

1899(Blair State Bank v. Stewart, 57 Neb. 58 , 77 N. W.

1897It was said in Weaver v. Cressman, 21 Neb., 675 , that while ordinarily funds held by the clerk of the court in his official character are not subject to garnishment, a court of equity, in a proper case, may subject such funds to the payment of the claim of a creditor.

1893Or, if this cannot be said to have been fully established, that by the most superficial examination, suggested by facts within his knowledge, he might have had full, and con p'ote knowledge of the condition of the title. * * * This was sufficient to cause the statute to run.” In Laird v. Kilbourne, 70 Ia., 83 , the supreme court of Iowa say: “An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate is barred in five years after the fraud is discovered, and it is conclusively presumed to be discovered when the fraudulent conveyance is filed for record.” (See also Humphreys v. Mattoon, 43 I

1893Chief Justice Reese, speaking for this court with these facts before him, said : “ There is no question but that the plaintiff’s right to apply the property to the payment of his claim was barred by the statute of limitations if the statute began to run upon the filing for record of the deed by which the real estate was finally conveyed to Mrs. Davis, for by section 12 of the Civil Code the statutory limit is four years after the discovery of the fraud.” He then cites Helman v. Davis, supra, and Parker v. Kuhn, supra, and continues: “By these cases it is pretty well settled in this state that

1893Or, if this cannot be said to have been fully established, that by the most superficial examination, suggested by facts within his knowledge, he might have had full, and con p'ote knowledge of the condition of the title. * * * This was sufficient to cause the statute to run.” In Laird v. Kilbourne, 70 Ia., 83 , the supreme court of Iowa say: “An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate is barred in five years after the fraud is discovered, and it is conclusively presumed to be discovered when the fraudulent conveyance is filed for record.” (See also Humphreys v. Mattoon, 43 I

1893Or, if this cannot be said to have been fully established, that by the most superficial examination, suggested by facts within his knowledge, he might have had full, and con p'ote knowledge of the condition of the title. * * * This was sufficient to cause the statute to run.” In Laird v. Kilbourne, 70 Ia., 83 , the supreme court of Iowa say: “An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate is barred in five years after the fraud is discovered, and it is conclusively presumed to be discovered when the fraudulent conveyance is filed for record.” (See also Humphreys v. Mattoon, 43 I

1890This section of the Code has been construed by this court, so far as its .application to the question involved in this case is concerned, in Hellman v. Davis, 24 Neb., 793 ; Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Id., 413; Blake v. Chambers, 4 Id., 90.

1882This being so she was not liable under the mechanic’s lien law then in force for the payment of the claim We adhere to our decision in the case of McCormick v. Lawton, 3 Neb., 449 , but it has no application to the facts of this case.