31 Pennsylvania opinions name it 11 courts 1842–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Triester v. 191 Tenants Ass'ngreen2 sentences1994“The classic example is the initiation of a civil proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim completely unrelated to the cause of action sued upon.” Triester v. 191 Tenants Ass’n, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 279 , 415 A.2d 698, 712 (1979). 1994“The classic example is the initiation of a civil proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim completely unrelated to the cause of action sued upon.” Triester v. 191 Tenants Ass’n, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 279 , 415 A.2d 698, 712 (1979). | 1 | 2 |
American & Foreign Insurance v. Jerry's Sport Center, Inc.green2 sentences2022Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526 , 545 (Pa. 2010) (referencing both quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in considering reasonable legal costs paid by insurer, rather than benefit that the insured retained from the defense, as alleged damages in deciding whether the insured was “unjustly enriched” by the insurer’s payment of defense costs after it was determined that the parties’ contract did not require the insurer to defend the claim at issue); Ne. 2022Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 545 (Pa. 2010) (referencing both quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in considering reasonable legal costs paid by insurer, rather than benefit that the insured retained from the defense, as alleged damages in deciding whether the insured was “unjustly enriched” by the insurer’s payment of defense costs after it was determined that the parties’ contract did not require the insurer to defend the claim at issue); Ne. | 1 | 1 |
Northeast Fence & Iron Works, Inc. v. Murphy Quigley Co.green2 sentences2022Fence & Iron Works, Inc. v. Murphy Quigley Co., Inc., 933 A.2d 664 , 669 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating that unjust enrichment is synonymous with quantum meruit and discussing a claim for payment by subcontractor against contractor as one of “unjust enrichment,” but holding that damages were appropriately established by invoices detailing the value of the services rendered). 2022Fence & Iron Works, Inc. v. Murphy Quigley Co., Inc., 933 A.2d 664, 669 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating that unjust enrichment is synonymous with quantum meruit and discussing a claim for payment by subcontractor against contractor as one of “unjust enrichment,” but holding that damages were appropriately established by invoices detailing the value of the services rendered). | 1 | 1 |
Yackobovitz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen1 sentence2017If the street railway roadbed is negligently maintained, causing an injury to a third party, SEPTA is then ultimately responsible for the payment of that claim.- Id. at 45. | 1 | 1 |
Twin City Pipe Trades Service Ass'n v. Peak Mechanical, Inc.green1 sentence2012Ass’n v. Peak Mech., Inc., 689 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Minn.App.2004) (Minn.Stat. § 514.01 declares: "[w] hoe ver ... contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill ... shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land”); Conn. Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLC, 83 Conn.App. 352 , 849 A.2d 922, 925-926 (2004) (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 49-33 states: "If any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction ... of any building ... and the claim is by virtue of an agreement with | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLCgreen2 sentences2012Ass’n v. Peak Mech., Inc., 689 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Minn.App.2004) (Minn.Stat. § 514.01 declares: "[w] hoe ver ... contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill ... shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land”); Conn. Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLC, 83 Conn.App. 352 , 849 A.2d 922, 925-926 (2004) (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 49-33 states: "If any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction ... of any building ... and the claim is by virtue of an agreement with 2012Ass’n v. Peak Mech., Inc., 689 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Minn.App.2004) (Minn.Stat. § 514.01 declares: "[w] hoe ver ... contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill ... shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land”); Conn. Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLC, 83 Conn.App. 352 , 849 A.2d 922, 925-926 (2004) (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 49-33 states: "If any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction ... of any building ... and the claim is by virtue of an agreement with | 1 | 1 |
In Re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litigationgreen1 sentence2000See Joint Asbestos Litig., 878 F.Supp. at 545. [3] "Liquidated Trust Payment" and "Unliquidated Trust Payment" are defined under Section H.3.(a)(i) and (ii) of the TDP as the amount of the Trust's payment to the claim in circumstances in which the underlying claim has been liquidated or is unliquidated, respectively. [4] Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142 § 2 (codified at 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8321-8327)(the "UCATA"). [5] The opinion provides the following example of differing apportionment schemes under Pennsylvania law: In Pennsylvania, liability among joint tortfeasors is allocated differently | 1 | 1 |
McGee v. SINGLEYgreen2 sentences1980The Court stated that [w]hile either method may be more cumbersome for [appellants] than it would be if this, court were to reach and decide the merits on this present appeal, each alternative would comport with our policy of discouraging a multiplicity of appeals in a single case, or, as it has sometimes been put, the policy of precluding “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22 , 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649 , 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). 1980The Court stated that [w]hile either method may be more cumbersome for [appellants] than it would be if this, court were to reach and decide the merits on this present appeal, each alternative would comport with our policy of discouraging a multiplicity of appeals in a single case, or, as it has sometimes been put, the policy of precluding “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22 , 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649 , 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Philadelphiagreen2 sentences1980The Court stated that [w]hile either method may be more cumbersome for [appellants] than it would be if this, court were to reach and decide the merits on this present appeal, each alternative would comport with our policy of discouraging a multiplicity of appeals in a single case, or, as it has sometimes been put, the policy of precluding “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22 , 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649 , 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). 1980The Court stated that [w]hile either method may be more cumbersome for [appellants] than it would be if this, court were to reach and decide the merits on this present appeal, each alternative would comport with our policy of discouraging a multiplicity of appeals in a single case, or, as it has sometimes been put, the policy of precluding “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22 , 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649 , 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Booth & Flinn, Ltd. v. Millergreen1 sentence1947See South Philadelphia State Bank’s Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433 (1929), and Booth & Finn, Ltd., v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297 (1929).” We are of the opinion that the learned auditor was correct in concluding that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is entitled to precedence in the payment of its claim out of the funds now in the hands of the guardian of Julius Sassaman. | 1 | 1 |
South Philadelphia State Bank's Insolvencygreen1 sentence1947See South Philadelphia State Bank’s Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433 (1929), and Booth & Finn, Ltd., v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297 (1929).” We are of the opinion that the learned auditor was correct in concluding that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is entitled to precedence in the payment of its claim out of the funds now in the hands of the guardian of Julius Sassaman. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meth v. Broad Street & Bonded Building & Loan Ass'n
green
2 sentences1945Assn., 346 Pa. 331, 333 , 30 A. 2d 119, 120 ; Brown v. Victor Building Association, *371 302 Pa. 254, 256 , 153 A. 349, 350 . 1945Assn., 346 Pa. 331, 333 , 30 A. 2d 119, 120 ; Brown v. Victor Building Association, *371 302 Pa. 254, 256 , 153 A. 349, 350 . | 2 | 1944–1945 |
Fountain v. Bigham
neutral
2 sentences1919In this connection we recently said, “the general rule undoubtedly is that the defense of duress is open only to the party upon whom it is imposed, and a third party who has become a surety for the payment of the claim cannot avail himself of the plea, unless he signed the obligation without knowledge of the duress” (Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35 / 47); and the application of this principle is a complete answer to any possible plea of that character on the part of defendant. 1915“The general rule undoubtedly is that the defense of duress is open only to the party upon whom it is imposed, and that a third party who has become surety for the payment of the claim cannot avail himself of the plea unless he signed the obligation without knowledge of the duress.” Mestrezat, J., in Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35 . | 2 | 1915–1919 |
City of Philadelphia v. Keilyk
green
1 sentence2017In Keilyk, the Superior Court set down the payment requirement for accomplishing redemption, only upon “payment of the amount bid at [the sheriff’s] sale….[the MCTLA], therefore, provides for redemption only upon payment of the full sum paid by the successful bidder.” Id. at 1096 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kosierowski v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Nicolazzo Estate
green
2 sentences1980And the legislature, adopting the traditional rule of law that the partial payment of a debt tolls the statute of hmitations (see, e.g., Nicolazzo Estate, 414 Pa. 186 , 199 A. 2d 455 (1964)), provided the claimant who receives any no-fault benefits with an additional two years in which to maintain an action. 1980And the legislature, adopting the traditional rule of law that the partial payment of a debt tolls the statute of hmitations (see, e.g., Nicolazzo Estate, 414 Pa. 186 , 199 A. 2d 455 (1964)), provided the claimant who receives any no-fault benefits with an additional two years in which to maintain an action. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Moore v. Beattie
neutral
1 sentence1974Moore v. Beattie, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 739 (Cumb. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Wilson v. Upper Moreland Hatboro Joint Sewer Authority
green
2 sentences1973See In Re: Grading, Paving and Curbing Evergreen Road etc., City of Pittsburgh, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 499 , 174 A. 804 (1934), and Wilson v. Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Authority, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 588 , 132 A. 2d 909 (1957). 1973See In Re: Grading, Paving and Curbing Evergreen Road etc., City of Pittsburgh, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 499 , 174 A. 804 (1934), and Wilson v. Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Authority, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 588 , 132 A. 2d 909 (1957). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re Grading, Paving & Curbing Evergreen Road
neutral
2 sentences1973See In Re: Grading, Paving and Curbing Evergreen Road etc., City of Pittsburgh, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 499 , 174 A. 804 (1934), and Wilson v. Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Authority, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 588 , 132 A. 2d 909 (1957). 1973See In Re: Grading, Paving and Curbing Evergreen Road etc., City of Pittsburgh, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 499 , 174 A. 804 (1934), and Wilson v. Upper Moreland-Hatboro Joint Sewer Authority, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 588 , 132 A. 2d 909 (1957). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Allegheny City v. King
neutral
1 sentence1972In this case, the court held, page 68: “If no claim was filed prior to the sale, then the date of completion appearing in the certificate of the appropriate engineer or officer is determinative of liability for the payment of the claim in question.” Defendant also relies on Allegheny City v. King, 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 182 , July 25, 1901, decided before the effective date of the Municipal Claims Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 364, as to the liens under consideration in said decision, also holding that the assessability of property for sewers must be determined as of the time when the work was done. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Rice Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh
neutral
2 sentences1953The distinction between amounts which are merely designed to cover the cost of registration and those which are true license fees intended to defray a substantial portion of the cost of regulation was first introduced into our law in Rice Drug Company v. Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 240 , 61 A. 2d 878 , wherein we said (p. 243, 244): "There is no merit in appellant's contention that the payment of a fee of One Dollar under the State Cigarette Tax Act, in order to secure a permit to sell cigarettes, is a payment for the privilege of selling cigarettes, wherefore the City mercantile tax duplicates the St 1953The distinction between amounts which are merely designed to cover the cost of registration and those which are true license fees intended to defray a substantial portion of the cost of regulation was first introduced into our law in Rice Drug Company v. Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 240 , 61 A. 2d 878 , wherein we said (p. 243, 244): "There is no merit in appellant's contention that the payment of a fee of One Dollar under the State Cigarette Tax Act, in order to secure a permit to sell cigarettes, is a payment for the privilege of selling cigarettes, wherefore the City mercantile tax duplicates the St | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Read v. Plattsmouth
green
1 sentence1946It was, therefore, competent for the legislature to interfere and impose the payment of the claim upon the city.” Justice Field adds: “The power of the legislature to require the payment of a claim for which an equivalent has been received, and from the payment of which the city can only escape on technical grounds, would seem to be clear.” (Italics supplied) In Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. 568 , the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of the Nebraska legislature legalizing certain invalid bonds issued for the building of a public school. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Brown v. Victor Building Assn.
green
2 sentences1945Assn., 346 Pa. 331, 333 , 30 A. 2d 119, 120 ; Brown v. Victor Building Association, *371 302 Pa. 254, 256 , 153 A. 349, 350 . 1945Assn., 346 Pa. 331, 333 , 30 A. 2d 119, 120 ; Brown v. Victor Building Association, *371 302 Pa. 254, 256 , 153 A. 349, 350 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Bulk Oil Transports
neutral
1 sentence1935An ‘intervenor’, under rule .34, is one who, without demanding the redelivery of the vessel, seeks only the protection of his interest in her, or the payment of his claim in the ultimate disposition of the case.” An intervenor is thus defined in the more recent case of The Cartona, 297 Fed. 827 , 828: “An intervenor is one who appears pro interesse suo, but, if the action is in rem, he must have an interest in the res.” And the qualification of the right to intervene is thus expressed in The Flush, 274 Fed. 133 : “The right of a third party to intervene can be based only upon his having a clai | 1 | 1935–1935 |
The Cartona
green
1 sentence1935An ‘intervenor’, under rule .34, is one who, without demanding the redelivery of the vessel, seeks only the protection of his interest in her, or the payment of his claim in the ultimate disposition of the case.” An intervenor is thus defined in the more recent case of The Cartona, 297 Fed. 827 , 828: “An intervenor is one who appears pro interesse suo, but, if the action is in rem, he must have an interest in the res.” And the qualification of the right to intervene is thus expressed in The Flush, 274 Fed. 133 : “The right of a third party to intervene can be based only upon his having a clai | 1 | 1935–1935 |
German Township School District v. Sangston
neutral
1 sentence1934Between permitting the judgment creditor prompt satisfaction of his claim and closing the schools as the other alternative, we prefer to keep the schools in operation and to defer the payment of the claim until payment will not result in closing the schools: German Township School District v. Sangston, 74 Pa. 454 . | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Creasy & Wells v. Emanuel Reformed Church
neutral
1 sentence1933It has long been recognized in this state that “in the absence of an application or appropriation by the parties, the law will appropriate the payment to the claim which is the least secured”: Creasy v. The Emanuel Reformed Church et al., 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 372, 377 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Chestnut Street Trust & Saving Fund Co. v. Hart
neutral
2 sentences1933In Chestnut Street Trust & Saving Fund Co. v. Hart, 217 Pa. 506, 510 , 66 A. 870 , the Supreme Court, in discussing the doctrine of the right of a creditor to appropriate proceeds to the debtor’s obligations, said: “When Singerley assigned to them the balance of his interest in the securities, he gave no direction as to the appropriation of their proceeds. 1933In Chestnut Street Trust & Saving Fund Co. v. Hart, 217 Pa. 506, 510 , 66 A. 870 , the Supreme Court, in discussing the doctrine of the right of a creditor to appropriate proceeds to the debtor’s obligations, said: “When Singerley assigned to them the balance of his interest in the securities, he gave no direction as to the appropriation of their proceeds. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Reichner v. Reichner
neutral
1 sentence1932The ruling of the lower court in refusing the motion for judgment n. o. v. was correct as there was not a motion made or point presented for binding instructions during the trial: Leonard Co. v. Scranton Bottling Co., 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 360 ; Reichner v. Reichner, 237 Pa. 540 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Thomas F. Leonard Co. v. Scranton Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
green
1 sentence1932The ruling of the lower court in refusing the motion for judgment n. o. v. was correct as there was not a motion made or point presented for binding instructions during the trial: Leonard Co. v. Scranton Bottling Co., 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 360 ; Reichner v. Reichner, 237 Pa. 540 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Estate of Hartman neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Philadelphia v. DeArmond green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Dickinson's Estate green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Froess v. Froess green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Schenley v. Commonwealth ex rel. City of Allegheny green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| New Brighton Borough v. Biddell green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Donley v. City of Pittsburgh green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Griffith v. Sitgreaves neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Dennis v. Citizens Insurance neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Commonwealth v. Hess green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| In re Hopper green | 1 | 1842–1842 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.