15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
May Department Store v. Center Developers, Inc.green1 sentence2021Devs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 194, 197 (Ga. 1996) (“Subrogation requires the existence of a contract to pay (insurance) and the actual payment of the claim; in the absence of insurance and payment thereunder, there can be no subrogation and hence no waiver.”). | 1 | 1 |
Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc.green1 sentence2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1145 (in establishing a wholly collateral claim, a plaintiff “may be able to prove elements of [his tort] causes of action without regard to any of the provisions of the [Medicare] Act relating to the provision of benefits”); McCall, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 , 21 P.3d at 1200 (because the plaintiffs “may be able to prove the elements of some or all of their causes of action without regard, or only incidentally, to Medicare coverage determinations,” the court held that “none of their causes of action seeks, at bottom, payment or reimbursement of a Medicare claim or falls within the | 1 | 1 |
Sonoran Peaks, LLC v. Maricopa Countygreen2 sentences2015And this court has recently reaffirmed the distinction between the statutes, noting that “ § 42-16210(B) [is] the statute requiring timely payment for all actions brought under Chapter 16 — not § 42-11004.” Sonoran Peaks, LLC v. Maricopa County, 236 Ariz. 399, 402, ¶ 11 , 340 P.3d 1107, 1110 (App.2015); see also RCJ Corp., 168 Ariz. at 333 , 812 P.2d at 1151 (holding that only the payment requirement of the predecessor statute to § 42-16210, not those of the statutory predecessor to § 42-11004, applied to valuation appeals). ¶ 15 Taxpayers here brought a Chapter 16 valuation appeal. 2015And this court has recently reaffirmed the distinction between the statutes, noting that “ § 42-16210(B) [is] the statute requiring timely payment for all actions brought under Chapter 16 — not § 42-11004.” Sonoran Peaks, LLC v. Maricopa County, 236 Ariz. 399, 402, ¶ 11 , 340 P.3d 1107, 1110 (App.2015); see also RCJ Corp., 168 Ariz. at 333 , 812 P.2d at 1151 (holding that only the payment requirement of the predecessor statute to § 42-16210, not those of the statutory predecessor to § 42-11004, applied to valuation appeals). ¶ 15 Taxpayers here brought a Chapter 16 valuation appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Rcj Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, Maricopa Cty.green2 sentences2015And this court has recently reaffirmed the distinction between the statutes, noting that “ § 42-16210(B) [is] the statute requiring timely payment for all actions brought under Chapter 16 — not § 42-11004.” Sonoran Peaks, LLC v. Maricopa County, 236 Ariz. 399, 402, ¶ 11 , 340 P.3d 1107, 1110 (App.2015); see also RCJ Corp., 168 Ariz. at 333 , 812 P.2d at 1151 (holding that only the payment requirement of the predecessor statute to § 42-16210, not those of the statutory predecessor to § 42-11004, applied to valuation appeals). ¶ 15 Taxpayers here brought a Chapter 16 valuation appeal. 2015And this court has recently reaffirmed the distinction between the statutes, noting that “ § 42-16210(B) [is] the statute requiring timely payment for all actions brought under Chapter 16 — not § 42-11004.” Sonoran Peaks, LLC v. Maricopa County, 236 Ariz. 399, 402, ¶ 11 , 340 P.3d 1107, 1110 (App.2015); see also RCJ Corp., 168 Ariz. at 333 , 812 P.2d at 1151 (holding that only the payment requirement of the predecessor statute to § 42-16210, not those of the statutory predecessor to § 42-11004, applied to valuation appeals). ¶ 15 Taxpayers here brought a Chapter 16 valuation appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Lakeland Anesth., Inc. v. United Health. of La.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Montefiore Medical Center v. Teamsters Local 272green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Rencare, Ltd. v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., Doing Business as Humana Health Plan of San Antonio Humana Hmo of Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1987See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 394 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1049 (1985). 1987See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 394 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1049 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co.green2 sentences1983See also Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta, 139 Ga.App. 683 , 229 S.E.2d 482 (1976). *199 Appellant argues that if it had not stopped payment, it would have lost the amount paid and been liable to its customer for the amount paid on the forged endorsement, based on Trust Co. of Georgia v. Student Air Travel Agency, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 248 , 235 S.E.2d 670 (1977). 1983See also Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta, 139 Ga.App. 683 , 229 S.E.2d 482 (1976). *199 Appellant argues that if it had not stopped payment, it would have lost the amount paid and been liable to its customer for the amount paid on the forged endorsement, based on Trust Co. of Georgia v. Student Air Travel Agency, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 248 , 235 S.E.2d 670 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Trust Co. v. Student Air Travel Agency, Inc.green2 sentences1983See also Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta, 139 Ga.App. 683 , 229 S.E.2d 482 (1976). *199 Appellant argues that if it had not stopped payment, it would have lost the amount paid and been liable to its customer for the amount paid on the forged endorsement, based on Trust Co. of Georgia v. Student Air Travel Agency, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 248 , 235 S.E.2d 670 (1977). 1983See also Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta, 139 Ga.App. 683 , 229 S.E.2d 482 (1976). *199 Appellant argues that if it had not stopped payment, it would have lost the amount paid and been liable to its customer for the amount paid on the forged endorsement, based on Trust Co. of Georgia v. Student Air Travel Agency, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 248 , 235 S.E.2d 670 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1970At the same time, the court made the following troublesome statement: “* * * [Cjertainly in view of all the authorities, an order to pay money to third parties, to wit, the holder of the mortgage on the premises, and to the tax collector of Maricopa County, is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it.” 48 Ariz. at 400^101, 62 P.2d at 140. 1970At the same time, the court made the following troublesome statement: “* * * [Cjertainly in view of all the authorities, an order to pay money to third parties, to wit, the holder of the mortgage on the premises, and to the tax collector of Maricopa County, is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it.” 48 Ariz. at 400^101, 62 P.2d at 140. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
County of Santa Cruz v. Barnes
green
2 sentences1919J. 562. ‘ ‘ One who demands the payment of a claim against a county must show some statute authorizing it, . . . express or implied, from which it arises, which itself finds authority of law.” Santa Cruz County v. Barnes, 9 Ariz. 42 , 76 Pac. 621 . 1919J. 562. ‘ ‘ One who demands the payment of a claim against a county must show some statute authorizing it, . . . express or implied, from which it arises, which itself finds authority of law.” Santa Cruz County v. Barnes, 9 Ariz. 42 , 76 Pac. 621 . | 2 | 1906–1919 |
McCall v. PacifiCare of California, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1145 (in establishing a wholly collateral claim, a plaintiff “may be able to prove elements of [his tort] causes of action without regard to any of the provisions of the [Medicare] Act relating to the provision of benefits”); McCall, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 , 21 P.3d at 1200 (because the plaintiffs “may be able to prove the elements of some or all of their causes of action without regard, or only incidentally, to Medicare coverage determinations,” the court held that “none of their causes of action seeks, at bottom, payment or reimbursement of a Medicare claim or falls within the | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hutchins v. Frohmiller
green
2 sentences1979In Hutchins v. Frohmiller, 55 Ariz. 522 , 103 P.2d 956 (1940), after finding that the reasoning of Yavapai County v. O’Neill, supra, is equally applicable to claims against the state, the court held: “[B]efore any action may be brought against a state officer ... to enforce the payment of a claim against the state, it must appear affirmatively that the claimant has first followed the method of presentation of the claim for approval set forth by the statutes . . .” 55 Ariz. at 524 , 103 P.2d at 957 . 1979In Hutchins v. Frohmiller, 55 Ariz. 522 , 103 P.2d 956 (1940), after finding that the reasoning of Yavapai County v. O’Neill, supra, is equally applicable to claims against the state, the court held: “[B]efore any action may be brought against a state officer ... to enforce the payment of a claim against the state, it must appear affirmatively that the claimant has first followed the method of presentation of the claim for approval set forth by the statutes . . .” 55 Ariz. at 524 , 103 P.2d at 957 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Lillywhite v. Coleman
neutral
2 sentences1972USF&G contends the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this case as Baird’s has failed to establish the elements necessary to raise this defense as enumerated in Lillywhite v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523 , 52 P.2d 1157 (1935). 1972USF&G contends the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this case as Baird’s has failed to establish the elements necessary to raise this defense as enumerated in Lillywhite v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523 , 52 P.2d 1157 (1935). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Arizona Tax Commission v. Dairy & Consumers Cooperative Ass'n
green
2 sentences1952Manufacturing, baling, crating, boxing, barrelling, canning, bottling, sacking, preserving, processing, or otherwise preparing for sale, profit or commercial use, agricultural and horticultural products, including livestock prepared for sale, or commercial use, or any product or products, article or articles, substance or substances, commodity or commodities not classified in paragraph 1, subsection (c) or in subsection (g).” • Prior to March, 1950, the identical parties to this litigation in an action, like the one now before us, sought from us an interpretation of section 73-1306, supra, and 1952Manufacturing, baling, crating, boxing, barrelling, canning, bottling, sacking, preserving, processing, or otherwise preparing for sale, profit or commercial use, agricultural and horticultural products, including livestock prepared for sale, or commercial use, or any product or products, article or articles, substance or substances, commodity or commodities not classified in paragraph 1, subsection (c) or in subsection (g).” • Prior to March, 1950, the identical parties to this litigation in an action, like the one now before us, sought from us an interpretation of section 73-1306, supra, and | 1 | 1952–1952 |
State Tax Commission v. Martin
neutral
1 sentence1941We have just held in State Tax Commission v. Martin, ante, p. 283, 113 Pac. (2d) 640 , that all the goods, wares and merchandise sold by the Co-op from May 1, 1935, to July 31, 1937, and from November 1, 1938, to January 31, 1939, were the property of C. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Best v. State of Arizona
neutral
1 sentence1941In Best v. State, supra [ 56 Ariz. 408 , 108 Pac. (2d) 561 ], we said: “ . . . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
La Fon v. Martin
neutral
1 sentence1941In Best v. State, supra [ 56 Ariz. 408 , 108 Pac. (2d) 561 ], we said: “ . . . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
State v. Stout
green
1 sentence1940State v. Stout, 7 Neb. 89 ; Phelps v. Auditor General, 136 Mich. 439 , 99 N. W. 374 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Ward v. Frohmiller
green
1 sentence1940Let us determine then what is required of one who has a claim against the state before he may resort to the courts for its enforcement. *525 We have stated in the cases of Ward v. Frohmiller, ante, p. 202, 100 Pac. (2d) 167 , and Proctor v. Hunt, 43 Ariz. 198 , 29 Pac. (2d) 1058 , that these requirements are found in sections 2619 and 28, Revised Code 1928. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Proctor v. Hunt
green
2 sentences1940Let us determine then what is required of one who has a claim against the state before he may resort to the courts for its enforcement. *525 We have stated in the cases of Ward v. Frohmiller, ante, p. 202, 100 Pac. (2d) 167 , and Proctor v. Hunt, 43 Ariz. 198 , 29 Pac. (2d) 1058 , that these requirements are found in sections 2619 and 28, Revised Code 1928. 1940Let us determine then what is required of one who has a claim against the state before he may resort to the courts for its enforcement. *525 We have stated in the cases of Ward v. Frohmiller, ante, p. 202, 100 Pac. (2d) 167 , and Proctor v. Hunt, 43 Ariz. 198 , 29 Pac. (2d) 1058 , that these requirements are found in sections 2619 and 28, Revised Code 1928. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Phelps v. Auditor General
neutral
2 sentences1940State v. Stout, 7 Neb. 89 ; Phelps v. Auditor General, 136 Mich. 439 , 99 N. W. 374 ; People ex rel. 1940State v. Stout, 7 Neb. 89 ; Phelps v. Auditor General, 136 Mich. 439 , 99 N. W. 374 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Simmons v. Terrell
neutral
2 sentences1921Simmons v. Terrell et al., 75 Tex. 275 , 12 S. W. 854 It is also contended that the claim for the attorney’s fee was never presented to the administrator, and hence that no suit could be maintained for the purpose of collecting such claim under the express provisions of paragraph 889 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1913, which provides: “No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is first presented to the executor or administrator, except in the following case.” But a copy of the note containing the stipulation for the attorney’s fee was p 1921Simmons v. Terrell et al., 75 Tex. 275 , 12 S. W. 854 It is also contended that the claim for the attorney’s fee was never presented to the administrator, and hence that no suit could be maintained for the purpose of collecting such claim under the express provisions of paragraph 889 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1913, which provides: “No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is first presented to the executor or administrator, except in the following case.” But a copy of the note containing the stipulation for the attorney’s fee was p | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.