payment claim in Florida

2024See Wollard, 439 So. 2d at 218 ; see also Ivey v. Allstate Ins., 774 So. 2d 679 , 684–85 (Fla. 2000) (reiterating that it held in Wollard that “where an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or a verdict in favor of the insured”).

2023Co., 774 So. 2d 679 , 684–85 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]here an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the 1 “Because section 626.9373 is patterned after section 627.428, the confession-of-judgment doctrine applicable to section 627.428 applies equally to section 626.9373.” Bryant v. GeoVera Specialty Ins.

2024See Wollard, 439 So. 2d at 218 ; see also Ivey v. Allstate Ins., 774 So. 2d 679 , 684–85 (Fla. 2000) (reiterating that it held in Wollard that “where an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or a verdict in favor of the insured”).

2016In Florida, the payment of a settlement claim is the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or a verdict in favor of the insured.”) (citation omitted); Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 684-85 (“[W]here an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or verdict in favor of the insured, thereby entitling the insured to - 16 - attorney’s fees.”); Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1983) (“When the insurance company has agreed to set

2008Co. v. Palmer, 297 So.2d 96, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)). "[W]here an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or verdict in favor of the insured, thereby entitling the insured to attorney's fees." Ivey v. Allstate Ins.

1989See also Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 297 So.2d 96, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

2022See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 814 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[A] special condition, such as payment for alcohol or drug evaluation, must be stricken where the trial court fails to orally pronounce the special condition at sentencing.”).

2022See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 814 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[A] special condition, such as payment for alcohol or drug evaluation, must be stricken where the trial court fails to orally pronounce the special condition at sentencing.”).

2008See Harper v. Moore, 737 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (explaining that dismissal for failure to make the initial payment would be error where an inmate is unable to make prepayment because the Department of Corrections had placed a hold on the inmate’s account).

2001See id. at 1233 .

1996See Malone, 652 So.2d at 904 .

1996See Malone, 652 So.2d at 903-4 .

2024See Bassette, 803 So. 2d at 746–47 (concluding "that the declaratory action involved a dispute as to whether Ms. Bassette would be covered by the policy" even though the insurer "did not actually deny coverage under the policies" because it had "informed Ms. Bassette that coverage could be denied if she refused to execute the required authorizations," and when the "dispute . . . was finally resolved in Ms. Bassette's favor . . . [she] no longer suffered the looming threat that her failure to comply with Standard Fire's requests could place her coverage in jeopardy").3 Here, however, the confes

2022Co. of Am. v. Jackson, 242 P.2d 503, 504 (Wash. 1952).

2020Co., 157 So. 3d 507, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("[T]his '[confession of judgment] doctrine applies where the insurer has denied benefits the insured was entitled to, forcing the insured to file suit, -6- resulting in the insurer's change of heart and payment before judgment.' " (quoting State Farm Fla. Ins.

2014To that end, the Florida Supreme Court held in Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd's, 439 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla.1983), that, although the statute requires the “rendition of a judgment” in favor of the insured, where an insurer pays the policy proceeds after a suit has been filed but before a judgment has been rendered, “the payment of the claim is, indeed, the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or a verdict in favor of the insured.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Augustin v. Health Options of S. Fla., Inc., 580 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Amador v. Latin Am.

2010Co., 899 So.2d 331, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Scott v. Progressive Express Ins.

2005Condition 10 of the written probation order requires Jackson to pay $1.00 to First Step, Inc., for each month of supervision, but the payment requirement was not orally pronounced at sentencing and it is not included in the list of general probation conditions for which no pronouncement is required. [2] However, the fee is statutorily authorized. [3] We must strike the requirement that Jackson pay the fee, but upon remand, it may be reimposed after Jackson receives appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard. [4] See, e.g., Hart, 668 So.2d at 592 (noting that constructive *195 notice pro

2002See State v. Williams, 712 So.2d 762 (Fla.1998) (holding that payment requirement was special condition requiring oral pronouncement).

2000The Florida Supreme Court has stated that a liquidated damages clause may stand if "damages are not readily ascertainable at the time the contract is drawn, but ... [equity may] relieve against the forfeiture if it appears unconscionable in light of the circumstances existing at the time of breach." Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla.1972).

1996See Tibero v. State, 646 So.2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Ch. 95-189, § 1, Laws of Fla. AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED for Correction of Probation Order.

1993See Republic Funding Corp. v. Juarez, 563 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ("In the absence of a dispute and a finding or admission that the parties intended to, and did, reach an accord and agreed to resolve that dispute by payment of an agreed amount, a partial payment of a legal obligation does not act to satisfy and discharge that obligation."); cf. 3 John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 1691 (1941) (no consideration where insurer tenders smaller amount when larger amount is clearly owed; insured may retain partial payment and sue for difference); 3A id. § 1832