payment claim in Alabama

1990Tarver v. Com'rs of Tallapoosa County , 17 Ala. 527 ; Marshall County v. Jackson County , 36 Ala. 613 ; R.C. § 930." 51 Ala. at 106 .

1875Marshall county v. Jackson county, 36 Ala., 613 .

1990Tarver v. Com'rs of Tallapoosa County , 17 Ala. 527 ; Marshall County v. Jackson County , 36 Ala. 613 ; R.C. § 930." 51 Ala. at 106 .

1874Tarver v. Comm’rs Court of Tallapoosa, 17 Ala. 527 ; Marshall County v. Jackson County, 36 Ala. 613 ; R.

1888As against the heirs, and for the purpose of subjecting either their lands or the rents thereof to the payment of the claim of the personal representative, growing out of the partnership transactions, the case made by the bill was barred by the statute of limitations of six years.— Wells v. Brown, 83 Ala. 162 ; Chandler v. Harris, 85 Ala. 312 ; Harwood v. Harper, 54 Ala. 659 ; Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala. 529 ; Mundin v. Bailey, 70 Ala. 69 ; Scott v. Ware, 64 Ala. 174 ; Trimble v. Farris, 78 Ala. 260.

1886When a settling guardian, or personal representative, claims a credit for assets not reduced to possession, or for the payment of a claim preferred against the trust, and exception is filed to the allowance of the credit, the burden is on the guardian, or personal representative, as the case may be, to prove the justness of his claim; that is, he must show that he employed due diligence to collect the demand, or obtain possession of the property , for whose loss he asks credit, or he must show that diligence could have accomplished nothing. [So, if the exception be that he improperly paid an a

2002The Subcontractor may be required as a condition precedent to any payment to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor that all payrolls, material bills, and other indebtedness applicable to the work have been paid.'" 924 S.W.2d at 69 .

2002The Subcontractor may be required as a condition precedent to any payment to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor that all payrolls, material bills, and other indebtedness applicable to the work have been paid.'" 924 S.W.2d at 69 .

1990Tarver v. Com'rs of Tallapoosa County , 17 Ala. 527 ; Marshall County v. Jackson County , 36 Ala. 613 ; R.C. § 930." 51 Ala. at 106 .

1989Cf. Gilbert v. Wilson , 237 Ala. 645 , 188 So. 260 (1939).

1989Cf. Gilbert v. Wilson , 237 Ala. 645 , 188 So. 260 (1939).

1964In Blackwood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 227 Ala. 343 , 150 So. 180 , where the attorney for insured entered into agreement that the action of insurer in participating in trial and in representing insured should not be a waiver of the right of insurer to claim want of cooperation as a valid defense to the liability of insurer, this court said that the attorney’s agreement was binding on insured.

1964In Blackwood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 227 Ala. 343 , 150 So. 180 , where the attorney for insured entered into agreement that the action of insurer in participating in trial and in representing insured should not be a waiver of the right of insurer to claim want of cooperation as a valid defense to the liability of insurer, this court said that the attorney’s agreement was binding on insured.

1952West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305 , 51 So. 338 ; Hawkins V.

1952West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305 , 51 So. 338 ; Hawkins V.

1943The defunct bank has a right to the litigation of questions involved in a claim made against it, and the general creditors should not be penalized because of the exercise of this prerogative. 7 Am.Jur. pp. 536, 537, section 745; Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 210 Iowa 613 , 231 N.W. 497 , 69 A.L.R. 1206 , and annotations.

1943The defunct bank has a right to the litigation of questions involved in a claim made against it, and the general creditors should not be penalized because of the exercise of this prerogative. 7 Am.Jur. pp. 536, 537, section 745; Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 210 Iowa 613 , 231 N.W. 497 , 69 A.L.R. 1206 , and annotations.

1936Had the small amount of compound interest been eliminated by the decree, and had the amount required to effectuate redemption been ascertained in accord with the partial payment rule (Lee et al. v. Cochran, 231 Ala. 272 , 164 So. 389 ; Vaughan v. Smith, 69 Ala. 92 ; 33 C.J. page 225, § 168), and the attorney’s 'fees added, the amount of the decree would have been in excess of that rendered.

1936Had the small amount of compound interest been eliminated by the decree, and had the amount required to effectuate redemption been ascertained in accord with the partial payment rule (Lee et al. v. Cochran, 231 Ala. 272 , 164 So. 389 ; Vaughan v. Smith, 69 Ala. 92 ; 33 C.J. page 225, § 168), and the attorney’s 'fees added, the amount of the decree would have been in excess of that rendered.

1936Had the small amount of compound interest been eliminated by the decree, and had the amount required to effectuate redemption been ascertained in accord with the partial payment rule (Lee et al. v. Cochran, 231 Ala. 272 , 164 So. 389 ; Vaughan v. Smith, 69 Ala. 92 ; 33 C.J. page 225, § 168), and the attorney’s 'fees added, the amount of the decree would have been in excess of that rendered.

1935In the ease of In. re Central :Bank, supra, It was held that the state of Arizona was .not entitled to a preference in- the payment of its claim against an insolvent bonded state depositary, although the surety was unable to pay any part of the bond; the court observing: “We think the plan for lending and safeguarding the public moneys of the state and counties provided for in title 44, Civil Code, supra, in allowing the state to exact security from the depositary, whereas no other depositor or patron of the bank is given such privilege, must have been intended as a substitute for the common-l

1935In the ease of In. re Central :Bank, supra, It was held that the state of Arizona was .not entitled to a preference in- the payment of its claim against an insolvent bonded state depositary, although the surety was unable to pay any part of the bond; the court observing: “We think the plan for lending and safeguarding the public moneys of the state and counties provided for in title 44, Civil Code, supra, in allowing the state to exact security from the depositary, whereas no other depositor or patron of the bank is given such privilege, must have been intended as a substitute for the common-l

1935“The indorsers resided in the town of Andalusia.” And it was there held, that “Without question * * * this instrument is subject to the requirements of law touching presentment for payment and notice of dishonor.” O’Neal et al. v. Clark, 229 Ala. 127, 130 , 155 So. 562, 564 .

1935“The indorsers resided in the town of Andalusia.” And it was there held, that “Without question * * * this instrument is subject to the requirements of law touching presentment for payment and notice of dishonor.” O’Neal et al. v. Clark, 229 Ala. 127, 130 , 155 So. 562, 564 .

1931McCarty v. Robinson, 222 Ala. 55 , 130 So. 680 ; Moore on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 823, § 67, and eases in note 86.

1931McCarty v. Robinson, 222 Ala. 55 , 130 So. 680 ; Moore on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 823, § 67, and eases in note 86.

1930In other words you would give a verdict for such one sum.” The instruction of the trial court in the general charge last quoted is in accord with the law in such matter as to interest (National Surety Co. v. State, 219 Ala. 609, 614 , 123 So. 202 ); and as to undisputed and liquidated items of the various claims, interest is to be counted from the date when by the several contracts the demands should have been paid by the principal — “accrues only from the time the principal (sum) is due and payable.” Robinson v. United States (C.

1930In other words you would give a verdict for such one sum.” The instruction of the trial court in the general charge last quoted is in accord with the law in such matter as to interest (National Surety Co. v. State, 219 Ala. 609, 614 , 123 So. 202 ); and as to undisputed and liquidated items of the various claims, interest is to be counted from the date when by the several contracts the demands should have been paid by the principal — “accrues only from the time the principal (sum) is due and payable.” Robinson v. United States (C.

1929X, who was also the author of the opinion in Gilmer v. Ware, supra (but the former opinion does not seem to have been cited in the later cases on the subject), in referring to Gilmer v. Ware, supra, the opinion states: “Here, the fraud (if any) and injury were consummated before the payment; and to hold the payment to be a bar, would give it the effect of releasing a right of action which had already accrued.

1929X, who was also the author of the opinion in Gilmer v. Ware, supra (but the former opinion does not seem to have been cited in the later cases on the subject), in referring to Gilmer v. Ware, supra, the opinion states: “Here, the fraud (if any) and injury were consummated before the payment; and to hold the payment to be a bar, would give it the effect of releasing a right of action which had already accrued.

1924The case of Westmoreland v. Davis, 1 Ala. 299 , is quite unlike the present ope.

1911The only authority which could be said to support the contention of the relator is that of Marengo County v. Lyles, 101 Ala. 423 , 12 South. 412 , and what was there said in support of the proposition contended for was declared dictum, and unsound, in the case of Scarbrough v. Watson, 140 Ala. 351 , 37 South. 281 .

1908In short, “to entitle the representative (administrator) to be reinbursed, the payment must be made in the confidence that the assets will be sufficient for all purposes, and that the deficiency is shown by unexpected occurrences or by debts and claims made known at a subsequent time.” -Moore v. Lesueur, 33 Ala. 237 .

1904And, following these, this Court decided that one who has rendered services to an estate, at the instance of the administrator, cannot subject the estate to the payment of his claim, after the administration has been closed. — Lyon v. Hays, 30 Ala. 430 .

1904The Court, subsequently, while re-affirming the last three cited cases and holding that a wife’s separate estate cannot be subjected in equity, for services rendered to him, under contract with her husband, goes on to state that “A majority of the Court cloubt the correctness of Jones v. Dawson, so far as it overrules, or conflicts with any point actually decided in Coopwood v. Wallace.” “They incline to the opinion, that when an administra,tor, who is required by law to see that reasonable diligence is used for the collection of money due the estate, in the proper performance of that duty, se

1898We d.eem it unnecessary to discuss this question further than to say that such creditor is within the spirit of the statutory exception to the statutory rule of competency which dedares a transferor incompetent to prove for the transferee a claim against the estate of a dead man, that our own adjudications extend the rule to cases within its purview and spirit though not strictly within its terms, and constrain us to hold that such creditor even after the payment of his claim is not a competent witness to establish the claim against the estate in favor of the adminis trator. —Louis’ Admr. v. E