payment claim in Michigan

2025See Roberts v Farmers Ins Exch, 275 Mich App 58, 66 ; 737 NW2d 332 (2007). -10- (b) A payment for the claim is overdue under this chapter. [Emphasis added.] “Under these statutes, personal protection benefits become ‘overdue’ when an insurer fails to pay ‘within 30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and of the amount loss sustained.’ ” Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 510-511 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008), quoting MCL 500.3142(2).

2025See Roberts v Farmers Ins Exch, 275 Mich App 58, 66 ; 737 NW2d 332 (2007). -10- (b) A payment for the claim is overdue under this chapter. [Emphasis added.] “Under these statutes, personal protection benefits become ‘overdue’ when an insurer fails to pay ‘within 30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and of the amount loss sustained.’ ” Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 510-511 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008), quoting MCL 500.3142(2).

2017An equitable lien is “the right to have property subjected in a court of equity to the payment of a claim.” Johnson v Bush Lumber Co, 258 Mich 306, 308 ; 241 NW 819 (1932).

2017An equitable lien is “the right to have property subjected in a court of equity to the payment of a claim.” Johnson v Bush Lumber Co, 258 Mich 306, 308 ; 241 NW 819 (1932).

2025“The purpose of the no-fault act’s attorney-fee penalty provision is to ensure prompt payment to the insured.” Ross, 481 Mich at 11 .

2025Pirgu, 499 Mich at 274 .

2019In Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 33-34 ; 878 NW2d 799 (2016), our Supreme Court explained that MCL 500.3145(1) provides two exceptions to the one-year limitation period, the notice exception and the payment exception.

2019In Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 33-34 ; 878 NW2d 799 (2016), our Supreme Court explained that MCL 500.3145(1) provides two exceptions to the one-year limitation period, the notice exception and the payment exception.

2016We conclude that the statute’s plain language supports the plaintiffs reading of the statute. *35 First, the Legislature used the word “or” to separate the notice exception and the payment exception. “ ‘Or’ is ... a disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.” People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 499 n 11; 803 NW2d 200 (2011), quoting Mich Pub Serv Co v City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (alteration in original).

2016We conclude that the statute’s plain language supports the plaintiffs reading of the statute. *35 First, the Legislature used the word “or” to separate the notice exception and the payment exception. “ ‘Or’ is ... a disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.” People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 499 n 11; 803 NW2d 200 (2011), quoting Mich Pub Serv Co v City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (alteration in original).

2016We conclude that the statute’s plain language supports the plaintiffs reading of the statute. *35 First, the Legislature used the word “or” to separate the notice exception and the payment exception. “ ‘Or’ is ... a disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.” People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 499 n 11; 803 NW2d 200 (2011), quoting Mich Pub Serv Co v City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (alteration in original).

2016We conclude that the statute’s plain language supports the plaintiffs reading of the statute. *35 First, the Legislature used the word “or” to separate the notice exception and the payment exception. “ ‘Or’ is ... a disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.” People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 499 n 11; 803 NW2d 200 (2011), quoting Mich Pub Serv Co v City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (alteration in original).

2016To give full effect to the Legislature’s intention, we must avoid an interpretation that renders the payment exception all but surplusage. 4 See Hannay, 497 Mich at 57 .

2016To give full effect to the Legislature’s intention, we must avoid an interpretation that renders the payment exception all but surplusage. 4 See Hannay, 497 Mich at 57 .

2015As stated above, the evidence offered by plaintiff lacked information concerning the policy that covered the property, the date the policy was issued, and the circumstances surrounding the payment of the claim. “[A] plaintiff’s circumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation.” Skinner, 445 Mich at 164 .

2015Even if the jury had been presented with this evidence, and even viewing it in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the inference that plaintiff could in fact have insured the property against the peril that caused the loss would have been “impermissible conjecture” rather than a “reasonable inference.” Id. at 164 . -7-

1984We do not think that the Legislature intended such an absurd consequence.” See, however, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Allen, 50 Mich App 71, 80 ; 212 NW2d 821 (1973): *42 "This statute, restricting an insurer’s power to cancel a policy of insurance, does not limit the court’s power to declare a policy inoperative because of fraud or forgery.” Rescission is a remedy distinct from cancellation.

1984We do not think that the Legislature intended such an absurd consequence.” See, however, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Allen, 50 Mich App 71, 80 ; 212 NW2d 821 (1973): *42 "This statute, restricting an insurer’s power to cancel a policy of insurance, does not limit the court’s power to declare a policy inoperative because of fraud or forgery.” Rescission is a remedy distinct from cancellation.

1970In any event, the defendant Larson, although not financially compensated, received consideration for driving in the f: ri" of a reduction in the cost of traveling between Fort Leonard Wood and Muskegon as compared with the cost of public transportation. 6 See Kinney v. Kraml Dairy, Inc. (1959), 20 Ill App 2d 531 ( 156 NE2d 623 ). 7 Here, as in Robbins, the suit is between the alleged members of the joint enterprise. 8 In Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. (1937), 366 Ill 330 ( 8 NE2d 934 ), the Illinois Supreme Court said that if there is “a substantial sharing of the expense, the host and guest r

1970The legislative and administrative powers of the city are hereby vested in the city commission, which is authorized to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject to the constitution and general laws of the state and this charter.” In Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General (1911), 167 Mich 444 , and Auditor General v. Liquor Control Commission (1934), 268 Mich 320 , where the auditor general sought some of the additional rights claimed by the defendant here, the court made the point that when the proper governing authority has acted it is

1970In any event, the defendant Larson, although not financially compensated, received consideration for driving in the f: ri" of a reduction in the cost of traveling between Fort Leonard Wood and Muskegon as compared with the cost of public transportation. 6 See Kinney v. Kraml Dairy, Inc. (1959), 20 Ill App 2d 531 ( 156 NE2d 623 ). 7 Here, as in Robbins, the suit is between the alleged members of the joint enterprise. 8 In Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. (1937), 366 Ill 330 ( 8 NE2d 934 ), the Illinois Supreme Court said that if there is “a substantial sharing of the expense, the host and guest r

1970The legislative and administrative powers of the city are hereby vested in the city commission, which is authorized to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject to the constitution and general laws of the state and this charter.” In Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General (1911), 167 Mich 444 , and Auditor General v. Liquor Control Commission (1934), 268 Mich 320 , where the auditor general sought some of the additional rights claimed by the defendant here, the court made the point that when the proper governing authority has acted it is

1956Cohn, in which the decision is not that of a court of last resort, on first impression appears to lend support to defendants’ position, but, as the Tennessee court observed in State v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn 339, 346, 347 ( 69 SW2d 895 ), the decision in Cohn "was expressly grounded upon a statute of the State of California recognizing the right of a collection agency to carry on its business by ‘obtaining in any manner the payment of a claim.’ This statutory provision, the court ruled, ‘is broad enough to include bringing a suit.’ We have no such statute.” Clark is not authority for d

1936Or, if the chancellor, assuming jurisdiction to determine that matter, should grant a deficiency decree in any amount, the parties would be bound by that decree, unless it should be réversed on appeal.” In Belle Mead Development Corp. v. Reed (1934), 114 Fla. 300 ( 153 South. 843 ), in action at law upon the debt, defendant had judgment upon plea that plaintiff had foreclosed the mortgage in chancery, had prayed for deficiency decree in its bill, had made *278 application for a deficiency decree and the chancellor had refused it.

1936Or, if the chancellor, assuming jurisdiction to determine that matter, should grant a deficiency decree in any amount, the parties would be bound by that decree, unless it should be réversed on appeal.” In Belle Mead Development Corp. v. Reed (1934), 114 Fla. 300 ( 153 South. 843 ), in action at law upon the debt, defendant had judgment upon plea that plaintiff had foreclosed the mortgage in chancery, had prayed for deficiency decree in its bill, had made *278 application for a deficiency decree and the chancellor had refused it.

1932As stated in Kukuk v. Martin, 331 Ill. 602 ( 163 N. E. 391 ): “An equitable lien is the right to have property subjected in a court of equity to the payment of a claim.

1932As stated in Kukuk v. Martin, 331 Ill. 602 ( 163 N. E. 391 ): “An equitable lien is the right to have property subjected in a court of equity to the payment of a claim.

1921Thus if a .street be laid out through land subject to a mortgage, although the damages be assessed to the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to them, as an equivalent for the land taken for the street.” See, also, Dodge v. Railroad Co., 20 Neb. 276 ( 29 N. W. 936 ); Sherwood v. City of LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411 ( 10 N. E. 89 ); In re Public Park, 184 App. Div. 509 ( 172 N. Y.

1921Thus if a .street be laid out through land subject to a mortgage, although the damages be assessed to the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to them, as an equivalent for the land taken for the street.” See, also, Dodge v. Railroad Co., 20 Neb. 276 ( 29 N. W. 936 ); Sherwood v. City of LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411 ( 10 N. E. 89 ); In re Public Park, 184 App. Div. 509 ( 172 N. Y.

1921Thus if a .street be laid out through land subject to a mortgage, although the damages be assessed to the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to them, as an equivalent for the land taken for the street.” See, also, Dodge v. Railroad Co., 20 Neb. 276 ( 29 N. W. 936 ); Sherwood v. City of LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411 ( 10 N. E. 89 ); In re Public Park, 184 App. Div. 509 ( 172 N. Y.

1921Thus if a .street be laid out through land subject to a mortgage, although the damages be assessed to the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to them, as an equivalent for the land taken for the street.” See, also, Dodge v. Railroad Co., 20 Neb. 276 ( 29 N. W. 936 ); Sherwood v. City of LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411 ( 10 N. E. 89 ); In re Public Park, 184 App. Div. 509 ( 172 N. Y.

1921Thus if a .street be laid out through land subject to a mortgage, although the damages be assessed to the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to them, as an equivalent for the land taken for the street.” See, also, Dodge v. Railroad Co., 20 Neb. 276 ( 29 N. W. 936 ); Sherwood v. City of LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411 ( 10 N. E. 89 ); In re Public Park, 184 App. Div. 509 ( 172 N. Y.

1917Gardner v. Gorham, 1 Doug. 507 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 568 ; Sarmiento v. The Catherine C., 110 Mich. 120 ( 67 N. W. 1085 ).” Two exhibits in the case are illuminating.

1917Gardner v. Gorham, 1 Doug. 507 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 568 ; Sarmiento v. The Catherine C., 110 Mich. 120 ( 67 N. W. 1085 ).” Two exhibits in the case are illuminating.

1917Gardner v. Gorham, 1 Doug. 507 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 568 ; Sarmiento v. The Catherine C., 110 Mich. 120 ( 67 N. W. 1085 ).” Two exhibits in the case are illuminating.

1898That case is referred to in Curtis v. Moore, 152 N. Y. 159 ( 57 Am.