existing rule in Michigan

2024See also Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 493 Mich 238, 243 ; 828 NW2d 660 (2013). 5 from bedrock legal rules as such tectonic shifts might produce unforeseen and undesirable consequences,’ id. at 307 . . . .”); see also Woodman [v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 231 ; 785 NW2d 1 (2010)] (opinion by YOUNG, J.) (“[M]odifications [of the common law] should be made with the utmost caution because it is difficult for the judiciary to assess the competing interests that may be at stake and the societal trade-offs relevant to one modification of the common law versus another in relation to the existing rule

2024See also Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 493 Mich 238, 243 ; 828 NW2d 660 (2013). 5 from bedrock legal rules as such tectonic shifts might produce unforeseen and undesirable consequences,’ id. at 307 . . . .”); see also Woodman [v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 231 ; 785 NW2d 1 (2010)] (opinion by YOUNG, J.) (“[M]odifications [of the common law] should be made with the utmost caution because it is difficult for the judiciary to assess the competing interests that may be at stake and the societal trade-offs relevant to one modification of the common law versus another in relation to the existing rule

2014Further, in evaluating whether to “alter a common law doctrine that has existed undisturbed for well over a century,” the Supreme Court should “ ‘exercise caution and ... defer to the Legislature when called upon to make a new and potentially societally dislocating change to the common law.’ ” Id. at 245 (opinion by YOUNG, J.), quoting Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 89 ; 701 NW2d 684 (2005) (declining to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring, describing it as a “radical change in our negligence jurisprudence”).

2013Among them has been our attempt to ‘avoid capricious departures from bedrock legal rules as such tectonic shifts might produce unforeseen and undesirable consequences,’ id. at 307 . . ..”); see also Woodman, 486 Mich at 231 (opinion by YOUNG, J.) (“[Modifications [of the common law] should be made with the utmost caution because it is difficult for the judiciary to assess the competing interests that may be at stake and the societal trade-offs relevant to one modification of the common law versus another in relation to the existing rule.”); id. at 268 (MARKMAN, J., concurring in part and disse

1978We found the instruction erroneous; " 'But, on the other hand, it has been held, "if there is a reasonable possibility that the zoning classification will be changed, this possibility should be considered in arriving at the proper value.” ’ (Emphasis supplied.) While the trial judge was correct in instructing that the possibility of rezoning must be something more than remote, see State Highway Commission v Minckler, 62 *622 Mich App 273; 233 NW2d 527 (1975), we think that his 'real probability’ instruction set defendants’ burden of proof too high under the existing standard announced in Eilen

1978We found the instruction erroneous; " 'But, on the other hand, it has been held, "if there is a reasonable possibility that the zoning classification will be changed, this possibility should be considered in arriving at the proper value.” ’ (Emphasis supplied.) While the trial judge was correct in instructing that the possibility of rezoning must be something more than remote, see State Highway Commission v Minckler, 62 *622 Mich App 273; 233 NW2d 527 (1975), we think that his 'real probability’ instruction set defendants’ burden of proof too high under the existing standard announced in Eilen

1978We found the instruction erroneous; " 'But, on the other hand, it has been held, "if there is a reasonable possibility that the zoning classification will be changed, this possibility should be considered in arriving at the proper value.” ’ (Emphasis supplied.) While the trial judge was correct in instructing that the possibility of rezoning must be something more than remote, see State Highway Commission v Minckler, 62 *622 Mich App 273; 233 NW2d 527 (1975), we think that his 'real probability’ instruction set defendants’ burden of proof too high under the existing standard announced in Eilen

1976In State Highway Commissioner v Eilender, 362 Mich 697, 699 ; 108 NW2d 755 (1961), our Supreme Court set the following standard for a jury in considering the effect of possible rezoning: "But, on the other hand, it has been held, 'if there is a reasonable possibility that the zoning classification *338 will be changed, this possibility- should be considered in arriving at the proper value.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) While the trial judge was correct in instructing that the possibility of rezoning must be something more than remote, see State Highway Commission v Minckler, 62 Mich App 273 ; 233 NW

1978As was observed in Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 10 ; 247 NW2d 530 (1976): "The historical context in which the governmental immunity statute was enacted suggests that the Legislature, alarmed at the prospects of liability for govern mental activities previously protected, sought to restore the immunity enjoyed by municipalities prior to Williams v Detroit; 364 Mich 231 ; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), and to codify the state’s existing immunity to insulate governmental entities from tort liability.” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, in order to determine the scope of the now codified i

1978As was observed in Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 10 ; 247 NW2d 530 (1976): "The historical context in which the governmental immunity statute was enacted suggests that the Legislature, alarmed at the prospects of liability for govern mental activities previously protected, sought to restore the immunity enjoyed by municipalities prior to Williams v Detroit; 364 Mich 231 ; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), and to codify the state’s existing immunity to insulate governmental entities from tort liability.” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, in order to determine the scope of the now codified i

1956The cases of City of Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 128 Mich 438 ; and Kimmerle v. Village of Cassopolis, 160 Mich 90 , are no obstacle to this holding, both being rested upon an absence of proof, and both recognizing the existing rule.

1911Village of Cassopolis, 160 Mich. 90 ( 125 N. W. 65 ), are no obstacle to this holding, both being rested upon an absence of proof, and both recognizing the existing rule.

2026In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-44 ; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

2026In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-44 ; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

2024While “[a] release immediately discharges an existing claim or right . . . , a covenant not to sue is merely an arrangement not to sue on an existing claim.” Id. at 357-358 .

2024In other words, a covenant not to sue or execute on a judgment “does not extinguish a claim or cause of action.” Id. at 358 .

2019“Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307 ; 911 NW2d 219 (2017).

2019“Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307 ; 911 NW2d 219 (2017).

2016Notwithstanding, when it ruled, the trial court expressly refused to consider any new “events or evidence offered by [defendant mother] that [we]re not addressed in the existing hearing record.”1 “Custody determinations should be expedited, not left hanging or based on stale evidence.” Shelters v Shelters, 115 Mich App 63, 68 ; 320 NW2d 292 (1982).

2016Notwithstanding, when it ruled, the trial court expressly refused to consider any new “events or evidence offered by [defendant mother] that [we]re not addressed in the existing hearing record.”1 “Custody determinations should be expedited, not left hanging or based on stale evidence.” Shelters v Shelters, 115 Mich App 63, 68 ; 320 NW2d 292 (1982).

2015“It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).

2015“It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).

2015Because Cole’s holding represented an application of an existing rule, and not the creation of a new rule, it is “applied retroactively even to cases that became final for purposes of direct appellate review before the case on which defendant relied for the rule was decided.” Carp, 496 Mich at 471-472 .

2014Contrary to the partial dissent’s contention, just because the parties and the Court assumed, without deciding, that knowledge is an element of a nuisance claim in Wendt v Village of Richmond, 164 Mich 173 ; 129 NW 38 (1910), does not mean that if this Court today expressly held that knowledge is an element of a nuisance claim this would not constitute a modification of our existing common law.

2014Contrary to the partial dissent’s contention, just because the parties and the Court assumed, without deciding, that knowledge is an element of a nuisance claim in Wendt v Village of Richmond, 164 Mich 173 ; 129 NW 38 (1910), does not mean that if this Court today expressly held that knowledge is an element of a nuisance claim this would not constitute a modification of our existing common law.

2008Thus, if anything, the policies relating to restrictions on a parent's right to compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario. [ Hawkins, supra at 1066 .] Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Colo., 2002), [3] while recognizing the dissonance created between the "well-settled principle that `[a] minor during his minority, and acting timely on reaching his majority, may disaffirm any contract that he may have entered into during his minority'" and "`our traditional regard for freedom

2008Thus, if anything, the policies relating to restrictions on a parent’s right to compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario. [Hawkins, supra at 1066 .] Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Cooper v Aspen Skiing Co, 48 P3d 1229, 1232 (Colo, 2002), 3 while recognizing the dissonance created between the “well-settled principle that ‘[a] minor during his minority, and acting timely on reaching his majority, may disaffirm any contract that he may have entered into during his minority’ ” and “ ‘our traditional regard for freedom of co

2006The Court noted that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that claims brought under the dramshop act may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that, “if the combination of the circumstantial evidence and the permissible inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, a directed verdict is improper.” Heyler, supra at 146 .

2006The Court noted that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that claims brought under the dramshop act may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that, "if the combination of the circumstantial evidence and the permissible inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, a directed verdict is improper." Heyler, supra at 146 , 408 N.W.2d 121 .

2002The Supreme Court in Nemeth, supra at 29-30 , explained this Court’s failure to recognize that the SESCA provided the applicable standard: At the heart of the Court of Appeals error in this case was its failure to consider subsection 1701(2) [of the mepa], which provides: “In granting relief provided by subsection (1), if there is a standard for pollution or for an antipollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by the state or an instrumentality, agency, or political subdivision of the state, the court may: (a) Determine the validity, applicability, and reasonableness of the st

1988The possibility of indemnity actions has been at least recognized in Craven v Lawson, 534 SW2d 653, 656 (Tenn, 1976); Ritter v Technicolor Corp, 27 Cal App 3d 152, 155; 103 Cal Rptr 686 (1972); Swanigan v State Farm Ins Co, 99 Wis 2d 179, 201-203 ; 299 NW2d 234 (1980); Van Cleave v Gamboni Const Co, 101 Nev 524, 528-529; 706 P2d 845 (1985). [14] The use and significance of a covenant not to sue has been explained as follows: A covenant not to sue is to be distinguished from a release in that it is not a present abandonment or relinquishment of the right or claim but is merely an agreement not

1988The possibility of indemnity actions has been at least recognized in Craven v Lawson, 534 SW2d 653, 656 (Tenn, 1976); Ritter v Technicolor Corp, 27 Cal App 3d 152, 155; 103 Cal Rptr 686 (1972); Swanigan v State Farm Ins Co, 99 Wis 2d 179, 201-203 ; 299 NW2d 234 (1980); Van Cleave v Gamboni Const Co, 101 Nev 524, 528-529; 706 P2d 845 (1985). [14] The use and significance of a covenant not to sue has been explained as follows: A covenant not to sue is to be distinguished from a release in that it is not a present abandonment or relinquishment of the right or claim but is merely an agreement not

1988The possibility of indemnity actions has been at least recognized in Craven v Lawson, 534 SW2d 653, 656 (Tenn, 1976); Ritter v Technicolor Corp, 27 Cal App 3d 152, 155; 103 Cal Rptr 686 (1972); Swanigan v State Farm Ins Co, 99 Wis 2d 179, 201-203 ; 299 NW2d 234 (1980); Van Cleave v Gamboni Const Co, 101 Nev 524, 528-529; 706 P2d 845 (1985). [14] The use and significance of a covenant not to sue has been explained as follows: A covenant not to sue is to be distinguished from a release in that it is not a present abandonment or relinquishment of the right or claim but is merely an agreement not

1987The New decision was a reaffirmation and clarification of an existing rule of law first announced in People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424 ; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), which stated that a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.

1987The New decision was a reaffirmation and clarification of an existing rule of law first announced in People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424 ; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), which stated that a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.

1987The existing standard, when the basis of the classification is on age, is stated in Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; 96 S Ct 2562 ; 49 L Ed 2d 520 (1976).

1987The existing standard, when the basis of the classification is on age, is stated in Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; 96 S Ct 2562 ; 49 L Ed 2d 520 (1976).

1984In this connection, this Court’s recent decision in Ann Arbor v Michigan, 132 Mich App 132 ; 347 NW2d 10 (1984), supports a conclusion that nursing home services as described in Act 391 are not "requirements of state law”, so that a requirement that the county reimburse the state would not run afoul of the Headlee Amendment.

1984In this connection, this Court’s recent decision in Ann Arbor v Michigan, 132 Mich App 132 ; 347 NW2d 10 (1984), supports a conclusion that nursing home services as described in Act 391 are not "requirements of state law”, so that a requirement that the county reimburse the state would not run afoul of the Headlee Amendment.