44 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1897–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leipziger v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1995Leipziger v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa. Cmwlth. 417, 420, 315 A.2d 883, 885 (1974) (Citations omitted). 1995Leipziger v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa. Commw. 417, 420 , 315 A.2d 883, 885 (1974) (citations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Seebold v. Prison Health Services, Inc.green2 sentences2017“The 50 [Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has said it is ‘reluctan[t] to impose new affirmative duties,’ especially where there is an existing and longstanding framework establishing what duties generally apply, and that a request to add a new duty to such an existing framework ‘require[s] concrete and substantial justification.’” Newell v. Montana West, Inc., 154 A.3d 819, 832 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1246 ). 2017The Court has said it is “reluctan[t] to impose new affirmative duties,” especially where there is an existing and longstanding framework establishing what duties generally apply, and that a request to add a new duty to such an existing framework “require[s] concrete and substantial justification.” Id. at 1246. | 1 | 2 |
Lineal Industries, Inc. v. Worker's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2007Id. 2001Lineal, 542 Pa. at 599 , 669 A.2d at 331 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Montejo v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2020Among the appropriate factors to consider when assessing whether the scales tip in favor of overruling precedent are the “workability” of the existing standard, “the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests [J-51-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2 at stake, and . . . whether the decision was well reasoned.” Montego v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Knick v. Township of Scottgreen1 sentence2020But, again, and critically, “an argument that we got something wrong — even a good argument to that effect — cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.” Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455 ; see id. (“The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he entire idea of stare decisis is that judges do not get to reverse a deci | 1 | 1 |
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLCgreen2 sentences2020But, again, and critically, “an argument that we got something wrong — even a good argument to that effect — cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.” Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455 ; see id. (“The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he entire idea of stare decisis is that judges do not get to reverse a deci 2020But, again, and critically, “an argument that we got something wrong — even a good argument to that effect — cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.” Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455 ; see id. (“The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he entire idea of stare decisis is that judges do not get to reverse a deci | 1 | 1 |
Yeager v. Zoning Hearing Boardgreen2 sentences2019Notably, Hertzberg does not stand for the premise that “a variance must be 9 granted from a dimensional requirement that prevents or financially burdens a property owner’s ability to employ his property exactly as he wishes, so long as the use itself is permitted.” Yeager v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the City of Allentown, 779 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (emphasis in original). “[A] substantial burden must attend all dimensionally compliant uses of the property, not just the particular use the owner chooses.” Id. 2019Notably, Hertzberg does not stand for the premise that “a variance must be 9 granted from a dimensional requirement that prevents or financially burdens a property owner’s ability to employ his property exactly as he wishes, so long as the use itself is permitted.” Yeager v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the City of Allentown, 779 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (emphasis in original). “[A] substantial burden must attend all dimensionally compliant uses of the property, not just the particular use the owner chooses.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. Montana West, Inc.green1 sentence2017“The 50 [Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has said it is ‘reluctan[t] to impose new affirmative duties,’ especially where there is an existing and longstanding framework establishing what duties generally apply, and that a request to add a new duty to such an existing framework ‘require[s] concrete and substantial justification.’” Newell v. Montana West, Inc., 154 A.3d 819, 832 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1246 ). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Cricket Lightersgreen2 sentences2011We remain committed to DGS’s recognition that the existing doctrine is not to be expanded on its own terms, see id. at 254 n. 10, 898 A.2d at 601 n. 10; see also Phillips, 576 Pa. at 657 , 841 A.2d at 1007 (lead opinion); id,, at 674-75, 841 A.2d at 1018 (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Castille, J. and Eakin, J.), pending reevaluation and adjustment to address the deficiencies which have become apparent. 2011We remain committed to DGS’s recognition that the existing doctrine is not to be expanded on its own terms, see id. at 254 n. 10, 898 A.2d at 601 n. 10; see also Phillips, 576 Pa. at 657 , 841 A.2d at 1007 (lead opinion); id,, at 674-75, 841 A.2d at 1018 (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Castille, J. and Eakin, J.), pending reevaluation and adjustment to address the deficiencies which have become apparent. | 1 | 1 |
Bugosh v. I.U. North America, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Bugosh, 601 Pa. at 277 , 971 A.2d at 1228 . 15 Moreover, after a failed effort to obtain certification from this Court to resolve at least some of the foundational concerns, 16 the Third Circuit attempted to put them to rest by predicting that we would adopt the approach embodied in the Restatement Third of Torts. 2011See Bugosh, 601 Pa. at 277 , 971 A.2d at 1228 . 15 Moreover, after a failed effort to obtain certification from this Court to resolve at least some of the foundational concerns, 16 the Third Circuit attempted to put them to rest by predicting that we would adopt the approach embodied in the Restatement Third of Torts. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2009See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 565 , 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001) (“The practical effect of the legislative scheme as we have interpreted it is to channel claims for post-conviction relief through the PCRA, to ensure that the post-conviction review process remains open for review of certain fundamental claims implicating the reliability of the conviction and/or sentence, but to limit this opportunity in most cases to a single, counseled petition.”). 2009See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 565 , 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001) (“The practical effect of the legislative scheme as we have interpreted it is to channel claims for post-conviction relief through the PCRA, to ensure that the post-conviction review process remains open for review of certain fundamental claims implicating the reliability of the conviction and/or sentence, but to limit this opportunity in most cases to a single, counseled petition.”). | 1 | 1 |
Swartz v. Sunderlandgreen2 sentences1990“They [non-settling parties] will still have their day in court with full opportunity to defend against liability and the reasonableness of the amount paid in settlement of the existing claim.” Id., 403 Pa. at 226 , 169 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original). 1990“They [non-settling parties] will still have their day in court with full opportunity to defend against liability and the reasonableness of the amount paid in settlement of the existing claim.” Id., 403 Pa. at 226 , 169 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1980In Department of Labor & Industry v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 234, 238 , 406 A.2d 354, 356 (1979), we determined that Section 407 will invalidate those “settlements which provide for payments in an amount or for a period different from the amount or period provided in the Act for the particular stated disability.” The parties here stipulated to the date upon which partial disability began and agreed that interest would be waived. 1980In Department of Labor & Industry v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 234, 238 , 406 A.2d 354, 356 (1979), we determined that Section 407 will invalidate those “settlements which provide for payments in an amount or for a period different from the amount or period provided in the Act for the particular stated disability.” The parties here stipulated to the date upon which partial disability began and agreed that interest would be waived. | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Sutliffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DiCampli v. General Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Entygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In the Interest of F.P.
green
2 sentences2019Court also rejected the notion that unique rules for admissibility of electronic communications should be created, stating "We believe that e-mail messages and similar forms of electronic communication can be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law[.]" Id. 2018Court also rejected the notion that unique rules for admissibility of electronic communications should be created, stating "[w]e believe that e-mail messages and similar forms of electronic communication can be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law[,]" Id. | 3 | 2014–2019 |
Rock v. Pyle
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 21-22 (discussing Rock, 720 A.2d at 141 ; Rehrer, 91 A.3d at 193; Tri-State Asphalt Corp., 875 A.2d at 1202). 2025Id. at 21-22 (discussing Rock, 720 A.2d at 141 ; Rehrer, 91 A.3d at 193; Tri-State Asphalt Corp., 875 A.2d at 1202). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Gorby
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 384 , 787 A.2d 367 . 2006Id. at 384 , 787 A.2d 367 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Smitti Et Ux. v. Roth Cadillac Co.
neutral
2 sentences1976Smitti v. Roth Cadillac Company, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 , 21 A.2d 127 (1941). “. . . ‘Dependency is not affirmatively established by mere proof of the receipt of contributions. . . .’ DiCampli v. General Electric Company, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 427, 431 , 165 A.2d 255, 257 (1960). 1976Smitti v. Roth Cadillac Company, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 , 21 A.2d 127 (1941). “. . . ‘Dependency is not affirmatively established by mere proof of the receipt of contributions. . . .’ DiCampli v. General Electric Company, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 427, 431 , 165 A.2d 255, 257 (1960). | 2 | 1974–1976 |
Perkinpine v. Hogan
green
2 sentences1926Supp. 639 ), so long as the value of the land may be diminished, though the contrary is held where the existing claim works no injury: Perkinpine v. Hogan, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 22 ; Gilham v. Real Estate Trust Co., 203 Pa. 24 .” In the present case, the agreement constitutes what may be called a condition subsequent annexed to the enjoyment of the full use of the land, it must be construed as a covenant running with the land and bears as a charge upon the estate and affects the value thereof, and therefore, is an encumbrance thereon. 1924Supp. 699 ), so long as the value of the land may be diminished, though the contrary is held where the existing claim works no injury: Perkinpine v. Hogan, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 22 ; Gilham v. Real Estate Trust Co., 203 Pa. 24 . | 2 | 1924–1926 |
Gilham v. Real Estate Title, Insurance & Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1926Supp. 639 ), so long as the value of the land may be diminished, though the contrary is held where the existing claim works no injury: Perkinpine v. Hogan, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 22 ; Gilham v. Real Estate Trust Co., 203 Pa. 24 .” In the present case, the agreement constitutes what may be called a condition subsequent annexed to the enjoyment of the full use of the land, it must be construed as a covenant running with the land and bears as a charge upon the estate and affects the value thereof, and therefore, is an encumbrance thereon. 1924Supp. 699 ), so long as the value of the land may be diminished, though the contrary is held where the existing claim works no injury: Perkinpine v. Hogan, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 22 ; Gilham v. Real Estate Trust Co., 203 Pa. 24 . | 2 | 1924–1926 |
Com. of Pa. v. Mangel
green
1 sentence2023“Nevertheless, social media records and communications can be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law, similar to the manner in which text messages and instant messages can be authenticated.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Kearney v. Rambler
green
1 sentence2023In Rambler II, the Commonwealth, through the York County District Attorney, filed a quo warranto complaint seeking the removal of a mayor based on the mayor pleading guilty to “a federal felony charge of mailing threatening communications,” which the Commonwealth alleged was an infamous crime. 32 A.3d at 661 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency
green
1 sentence2016Thus, it remains “axiomatic that as factfinder the trial court is empowered to decide what evidence is credible and to draw any reasonable inferences from all of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160 , 163 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
DEPT. OF GEN. SERV. v. US Mineral Prod.
green
2 sentences2011We remain committed to DGS’s recognition that the existing doctrine is not to be expanded on its own terms, see id. at 254 n. 10, 898 A.2d at 601 n. 10; see also Phillips, 576 Pa. at 657 , 841 A.2d at 1007 (lead opinion); id,, at 674-75, 841 A.2d at 1018 (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Castille, J. and Eakin, J.), pending reevaluation and adjustment to address the deficiencies which have become apparent. 2011We remain committed to DGS’s recognition that the existing doctrine is not to be expanded on its own terms, see id. at 254 n. 10, 898 A.2d at 601 n. 10; see also Phillips, 576 Pa. at 657 , 841 A.2d at 1007 (lead opinion); id,, at 674-75, 841 A.2d at 1018 (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Castille, J. and Eakin, J.), pending reevaluation and adjustment to address the deficiencies which have become apparent. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rowles v. Rowles
green
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court did not apply the existing rule that “parents have a ‘prima facie right to custody,’ which could be forfeited only if ‘convincing reasons’ appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party.” Id. at 446 , 668 A.2d at 127 , citing Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). 1998The Supreme Court did not apply the existing rule that “parents have a ‘prima facie right to custody,’ which could be forfeited only if ‘convincing reasons’ appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party.” Id. at 446 , 668 A.2d at 127 , citing Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ellerbe v. Hooks
green
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court did not apply the existing rule that “parents have a ‘prima facie right to custody,’ which could be forfeited only if ‘convincing reasons’ appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party.” Id. at 446 , 668 A.2d at 127 , citing Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). 1998The Supreme Court did not apply the existing rule that “parents have a ‘prima facie right to custody,’ which could be forfeited only if ‘convincing reasons’ appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party.” Id. at 446 , 668 A.2d at 127 , citing Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Martin v. Ketchum, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Claimant also argues, for the purpose of preserving a right to further review by the Supreme Court, that we should modify the existing standard, as set forth in Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509 , 568 A.2d 159 (1990), of determining whether a worker’s mental disability is job-related. 1993Claimant also argues, for the purpose of preserving a right to further review by the Supreme Court, that we should modify the existing standard, as set forth in Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509 , 568 A.2d 159 (1990), of determining whether a worker’s mental disability is job-related. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki
green
2 sentences1987Since the court in Cottman was interpreting an existing rule and not making changes in existing practice, its decision applied to all cases. [2] In the Concurring Opinion by President Judge Cirillo, the issue of the application of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987) is raised and the opinion would suggest that the appeal as it may be interpreted to be from the discretionary aspects of sentencing, should be quashed. 1987Since the court in Cottman was interpreting an existing rule and not making changes in existing practice, its decision applied to all cases. [2] In the Concurring Opinion by President Judge Cirillo, the issue of the application of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987) is raised and the opinion would suggest that the appeal as it may be interpreted to be from the discretionary aspects of sentencing, should be quashed. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bertsch v. Pike County Sand & Gravel Co.
green
2 sentences1982(Citations omitted.) The Board concluded here, in reliance on Bertsch v. Pike County Sand & Gravel Co., 27 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 90 , 365 A.2d 886 (1976), that the petitioners were not dependent because they were both gainfully employed and neither of them was individually dependent upon their son’s contributions, even though the family as a whole may have been dependent thereon to some degree. 1982(Citations omitted.) The Board concluded here, in reliance on Bertsch v. Pike County Sand & Gravel Co., 27 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 90 , 365 A.2d 886 (1976), that the petitioners were not dependent because they were both gainfully employed and neither of them was individually dependent upon their son’s contributions, even though the family as a whole may have been dependent thereon to some degree. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
City of Beaver Falls v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1982For example, in City of Beaver Falls v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 65 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 14, n. 3 , 441 A.2d 510 , 512, n. 3, (1982), which involved a residency requirement, we stated: This is not to say that an employer who has not consistently enforced a rule in the past is forever precluded from doing so . . . [a]n employee who violates a previously unenforced company rule after a warning that such rule would be strictly enforced in .the future, is guilty of willful misconduct. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co.
green
2 sentences1978In Powell v. Sutliff, 410 Pa. 436, 438 , 189 A. 2d 864, 865 (1963), the court distinguished between error and another party as follows: “The test. . . was whether ‘the right party was sued but under a wrong designation’ — in which event the amendment was permissible — or whether ‘a wrong party was sued and the amendment was designed to substitute another and distinct party’ — in which event the amendment was not permissible (357 Pa. at 29).” Citing from Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23 , 53 A. 2d 73 (1947). 1978In Powell v. Sutliff, 410 Pa. 436, 438 , 189 A. 2d 864, 865 (1963), the court distinguished between error and another party as follows: “The test. . . was whether ‘the right party was sued but under a wrong designation’ — in which event the amendment was permissible — or whether ‘a wrong party was sued and the amendment was designed to substitute another and distinct party’ — in which event the amendment was not permissible (357 Pa. at 29).” Citing from Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23 , 53 A. 2d 73 (1947). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Cain green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Sweeney v. Reading Company green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Smith v. United States green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Milliken green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Cottrell green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Commonwealth v. Roundtree green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Pritchard v. Norton green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Bachman's Appeal green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Livengood v. Hay neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Brooks v. White neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Diehl v. Rodgers green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.