existing rule in Washington

1943Subsequently, it was held in Dean v. Opdycke , 151 Wn. 504 , 276 P. 545 , that the exemptions granted *Page 164 by § 563 may be claimed in garnishment proceedings.

1943Subsequently, it was held in Dean v. Opdycke , 151 Wn. 504 , 276 P. 545 , that the exemptions granted *Page 164 by § 563 may be claimed in garnishment proceedings.

1943This holding was reversed in Lemagie v. Acme Stamp Works , 98 Wn. 34 , 167 P. 60 , which announced the existing rule that the householder may select money in lieu of the designated animals, or credits, or debts due, or any other kind of property whatsoever.

1943This holding was reversed in Lemagie v. Acme Stamp Works , 98 Wn. 34 , 167 P. 60 , which announced the existing rule that the householder may select money in lieu of the designated animals, or credits, or debts due, or any other kind of property whatsoever.

2015“The existing standard does not require all three factors to establish indicia of reliability.” State v. Saggers, 182 Wn.

2015"The existing standard does not require all three factors to establish indicia of reliability." State v. Saggers, 182 Wn.

2014State v Marcum. 149 Wn.

2014State v Marcum, 149 Wn.

2010Champagne v. Thurston County, 163 Wash.2d 69, 79 , 178 P.3d 936 (2008).

2010Champagne v. Thurston County, 163 Wn.2d 69, 79 , 178 P.3d 936 (2008).

2010Champagne v. Thurston County, 163 Wash.2d 69, 79 , 178 P.3d 936 (2008).

2010Champagne v. Thurston County, 163 Wn.2d 69, 79 , 178 P.3d 936 (2008).

2010The majority's logic effectively flips the Turay presumption against a waiver of counsel and is a radical change from the existing standard. ¶ 38 The majority justifies its decision by recognizing that a trial court "cannot stack the deck against a defendant by not conducting a proper colloquy." Id.

2010The majority’s logic effectively flips the Turay presumption against a waiver of counsel and is a radical change from the existing standard. ¶38 The majority justifies its decision by recognizing that a trial court “cannot stack the deck against a defendant by not conducting a proper colloquy.” Id.

2008Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash.2d 171, 181-82 , 930 P.2d 307 (1997); see also Letourneau v. Dep't of Licensing, 131 Wash.App. 657, 665-66 , 128 P.3d 647 (2006) (applying the above guidelines to determine whether a WAC rule should apply retroactively). ¶ 15 Both parties acknowledge that "[a] regulation may be given retroactive effect where its purpose is to clarify rather than change the law." Reply in Support of Pet. for Rev. at 11; Suppl.

2008Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wn.2d 171, 181-82 , 930 P.2d 307 (1997); see also Letourneau v. Dep’t of Licensing, 131 Wn.

2008Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash.2d 171, 181-82 , 930 P.2d 307 (1997); see also Letourneau v. Dep't of Licensing, 131 Wash.App. 657, 665-66 , 128 P.3d 647 (2006) (applying the above guidelines to determine whether a WAC rule should apply retroactively). ¶ 15 Both parties acknowledge that "[a] regulation may be given retroactive effect where its purpose is to clarify rather than change the law." Reply in Support of Pet. for Rev. at 11; Suppl.

2008Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wn.2d 171, 181-82 , 930 P.2d 307 (1997); see also Letourneau v. Dep’t of Licensing, 131 Wn.

2003It said, "The proper procedure for pursuit of respondents' grievance is set forth explicitly in the APA: a petition to the agency for rulemaking, § 553(e), denial of which must be justified by a statement of reasons, § 555(e), and can be appealed to the courts, §§ 702, 706." Auer, 519 U.S. at 459 , 117 S.Ct. 905 .

2003It said, “The proper procedure for pursuit of respondents’ grievance is set forth explicitly in the APA: a petition to the agency for rulemaking, § 553(e), denial of which must be justified by a statement of reasons, § 555(e), and can be appealed to the courts, §§ 702, 706.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 459 .

2001Rios, 103 Wn.

2001Rios, 103 Wash.App. at 131-33 , 5 P.3d 19 .

1982Hoffman v. Gamache, 1 Wn.

1979E.g., Tyler v. Tyler, supra; Hoffman v. Gamache, 1 Wn.

2026The In re Stenson court noted the factors in the test somewhat overlap with the existing test for substitution of counsel test, but “the differences are substantial enough to constitute a new ground for relief.” In re Stenson, 142 Wn.2d at 724 .

2023Id.

2018Id. at 620 . 1.

2017Sess., ch. 3, §24); Flint, 174 Wn.2d at 546 . 34 84 Wn.2d 959 , 530 P.2d 630 (1975). 35 Id. at 964-65 . 36 Id. at 962-68 . 10 No. 75345-2-1/11 In deciding that the statute was remedial, the supreme court noted that the statute did not create or abolish a statutory defense or change liability for the consequences of negligence.37 Instead, the statute altered the remedy associated with the existing defense of contributory negligence.38 In contrast, the SOTR amendment does more than just alter a remedy.

2017Sess., ch. 3, §24); Flint, 174 Wn.2d at 546 . 34 84 Wn.2d 959 , 530 P.2d 630 (1975). 35 Id. at 964-65 . 36 Id. at 962-68 . 10 No. 75345-2-1/11 In deciding that the statute was remedial, the supreme court noted that the statute did not create or abolish a statutory defense or change liability for the consequences of negligence.37 Instead, the statute altered the remedy associated with the existing defense of contributory negligence.38 In contrast, the SOTR amendment does more than just alter a remedy.

2017Sess., ch. 3, §24); Flint, 174 Wn.2d at 546 . 34 84 Wn.2d 959 , 530 P.2d 630 (1975). 35 Id. at 964-65 . 36 Id. at 962-68 . 10 No. 75345-2-1/11 In deciding that the statute was remedial, the supreme court noted that the statute did not create or abolish a statutory defense or change liability for the consequences of negligence.37 Instead, the statute altered the remedy associated with the existing defense of contributory negligence.38 In contrast, the SOTR amendment does more than just alter a remedy.

2017The court held that the trial court could not rely on post- termination conduct to establish waiver because “once a termination date expires, in the absence of an existing waiver or estoppel the agreement is dead.” Id. at 235 .

2015It pointed out that "[i]n its program directives, the Department of the Treasury set forth the exact mechanisms for determining borrower eligibility and for calculating modification terms-namely, the waterfall method and the NPV [net present value] test." Wigod, 673 F.3d at 565 .

2013Co. of Wash., 155 Wn.

2011In holding the special verdict instruction to be erroneous, Bashaw applied an existing rule from Goldberg, which antedated Grimes’s trial by six years. 169 Wn.2d at 145 .

2001Rios, 103 Wash.App. at 131-33 , 5 P.3d 19 .