existing rule in New York

2003“To have a valid accord and satisfaction, the parties .must enter into a new contract wherein they agree that a stipulated performance will be accepted in the future, in lieu of an existing claim (see, Denburg v Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 82 NY2d 375, 383 [1993]; Patel v Orma, 190 AD2d 782 [1993]).” (Altamuro v Capoccetta, 212 AD2d 904, 904-905 [3d Dept 1995].) Here, there is no promise of performance in lieu of the plaintiffs obligation to pay defendant $50,000 upon termination of the marriage as provided in the prenuptial agreement.

1995To have a valid accord and satisfaction, the parties must enter into a new contract wherein they agree that a stipulated performance will be accepted in the future, in lieu of an existing claim (see, Denburg v Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 82 NY2d 375, 383 ; Patel v Orma, 190 AD2d 782 ).

2003An accord is an agreement that a stipulated performance will be accepted, in the future, in lieu of an existing claim (Werking v Amity Estates, 2 NY2d 43, 51 [1956], appeal dismissed and cert denied 353 US 933 [1957]; Reilly v Barrett, 220 NY 170, 172-173 [1917]; General Obligations Law § 15-501 [1]).

1993An accord is an agreement that a stipulated performance will be accepted, in the future, in lieu of an existing claim (Werking v Amity Estates, 2 NY2d 43, 51, appeal dismissed and cert denied 353 US 933 ; Reilly v Barrett, 220 NY 170, 172-173 ; General Obligations Law § 15-501 [1]).

1960The commission summarized their intentions in the concluding paragraph (p. 304): “ The Commission therefore intends to continue, what they regard, has been the existing rule that where a decedent leaves no surviving brothers or sisters, but children of deceased brothers or sisters and grandchildren or other descendants of deceased brothers or sisters, that descent and distribution shall be per stirpes according to the root or stock of the deceased brother or sister.” That statement was a non sequitur insofar as it included the phrase 1 ‘ according to the root or stock of the brother or sister,

1933In order to clarify any question of doubt the old language of subdivision 5 of Section 98, with the inclusion of the word ‘ descend,’ so as to make it applicable to realty, will be restored by this amendment to Section 83, subdivision 6, which is the amended form of former subdivision 5 of Section 98, Decedent Estate Law. “ The Commission therefore intends to continue, what they regard, has been the existing rule that where a decedent leaves no surviving brothers, or sisters, but children of deceased brothers or sisters and grand-children or other descendants of deceased brothers or sisters, t

1942But even if there were no grounds for distinguishing the situations, the petitioners have no vested right in an existing rule or practice of the commission (Matter of Kornbluth v. Reay, 261 App. Div. 60, 63 ) and the commission can change such practice whenever it acts upon reasonable cause.

1942(Matter of Kornbluth v. Reavy, 261 App. Div. 60, 63 .) This brings us to the question of whether the respondents acted reasonably and whether their action conflicts in any way with the Aliotta decision (supra).

1936Laws, ch. 22, § 20), the general rule was, as stated in Kane v. City of Brooklyn ( 114 N. Y. 586, 594 ), “ to exclude the first day and to include the last.” The Statutory Construction Law disclosed “ no intention on the part of the Legislature to materially change the existing rule for the computation of time, except, perhaps, to more definitely fix the event from which the count is tp be made.” (People v. Burgess, 153 N. Y. 561, 573 .) The statutes construed in both the Kane and Burgess cases used the “ not less than ” phrase which is used here.

1914We think that this act “ discloses no intention on the part of the Legislature to materially change the existing rule for the computation of time, except, perhaps, to more definitely fix the event from which the count is to be made.” (People v. Burgess, 153 N. Y. 561, 573 ; Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Syme, 163 id. 54.) The Code now provides, with reference to the service of each pleading subsequent to the complaint, that it must be served “ within twenty days after service of a copy of the preceding pleading ” (Code Civ.

1933In Erdberg v. United Textile Print Works ( 216 App. Div. 574 ) we said:' The disobedience of an order may do no more than to establish a fault on the part of an injured employee.

1930In Erdberg v. United Textile Print Works ( 216 App. Div. 574 ) we said: “ The disobedience of an order may do no more than to establish a fault on the part of an injured employee.

2026Dow, Muddling Through the Problem of Constructive Entry: Comments on United States v Allen , 813 F3d 76 [2d Cir 2016], and Warrantless Doorway Arrests , 79 U Pitt L Rev 243, 260-262 (2017) ("there is no consensus among the courts on how much weight to place on the various existing factors," such as the "number of officers approaching the dwelling and confronting the occupant" or "presence of a brandished firearm"); see also United States v Berkowitz , 927 F2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir 1991) (" Payton prohibits only a warrantless entry into the home, not a police[ officer's] use of [their] voice to c

2026Dow, Muddling Through the Problem of Constructive Entry: Comments on United States v Allen , 813 F3d 76 [2d Cir 2016], and Warrantless Doorway Arrests , 79 U Pitt L Rev 243, 260-262 (2017) ("there is no consensus among the courts on how much weight to place on the various existing factors," such as the "number of officers approaching the dwelling and confronting the occupant" or "presence of a brandished firearm"); see also United States v Berkowitz , 927 F2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir 1991) (" Payton prohibits only a warrantless entry into the home, not a police[ officer's] use of [their] voice to c

2022It was that standard that formed the basis for the Court of Appeals' decision in Catholic Charities ( see 7 NY3d at 521-523 ), and that standard remains good law.

2020Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Howard , 92 NY2d 718, 724 [1999]; Matter of Castelli v NRG , 85 AD3d at 1416 ; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 153). [FN1] We accordingly conclude that the first criterion in the separate business entity test does not require a contractor to show a total lack of direction or control over a business entity, but instead that their relationship as a whole did not show sufficient "control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results" by the contractor to reflect an employer-employee relationship ( Matter of Empire State Tow

2020Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Howard , 92 NY2d 718, 724 [1999]; Matter of Castelli v NRG , 85 AD3d at 1416 ; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 153). [FN1] We accordingly conclude that the first criterion in the separate business entity test does not require a contractor to show a total lack of direction or control over a business entity, but instead that their relationship as a whole did not show sufficient "control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results" by the contractor to reflect an employer-employee relationship ( Matter of Empire State Tow

2018Ayala restated an existing rule, citing CPL 1.20 (11) ( 75 NY2d at 429 ).

2018Coram nobis "presupposes" an existing violation; it is "not a substitute" for an existing "appeal or other statutory remedy" ( Syville , 15 NY3d at 400 , citing People v Bachert , 69 NY2d 593, 598 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2013The Padilla Court repeatedly cited cases setting forth the traditional “reasonable probability” test for prejudice, and the Court’s comment about “rationality] under the circumstances” (Padilla, 559 US at 372 ) appears to be a simple rephrasing of the existing rule described in Strickland, Hill and their progeny.

2013Furthermore, any language in the Padilla opinion altering the prejudice standard would be dicta because the Supreme Court decided that case based solely on the performance prong of the Strickland framework without conducting a prejudice analysis; in fact, the Court expressly left the resolution of the prejudice issue to the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand (see Padilla, 559 US at 369 ).