115 California opinions name it 4 courts 1934–2025 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.green2 sentences2015In Marshall, the administrative search warrant standard was deemed satisfied—in the context of a search involving a business’s compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act—“ ‘not only on specific evidence of an existing violation [of governing law],’ ” but also “ ‘on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the [governing law] derived from neutral sources.’ ” (Lincoln Bank, supra, 827 P.2d at p. 1322 , quoting Marshall, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 320-321 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 316 ].) Lincoln Bank concluded the “reason to believe” standard was no stric 2015In Marshall, the administrative search warrant standard was deemed satisfied — in the context of a search involving a business’s compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ( 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.) — “ ‘not only on specific evidence of an existing violation [of governing law],’ ” but also “ ‘on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the [governing law] derived from neutral sources.’ ” (Lincoln Bank, supra, 827 P.2d at p. 1322, quoting Marshall, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 320-321 [56 L.Ed.2d at p. 316].) Lincoln Bank concluded the “reason to believe” | 3 | 3 |
Vasquez v. Californiagreen2 sentences2025(See Vasquez v. State of California, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 253 [“We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language”].) Under section 1172.6 (d)(3), the Legislature explicitly allowed for testimonial evidence to be admitted from “any prior hearing or trial” so long as the evidence “is admissible under current law.” The statute does not include a further restriction that the petitioner must also have been a party to that prior hearing or trial. 2025(See Vasquez v. State of California, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 253 [“We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language”].) Under section 1172.6 (d)(3), the Legislature explicitly allowed for testimonial evidence to be admitted from “any prior hearing or trial” so long as the evidence “is admissible under current law.” The statute does not include a further restriction that the petitioner must also have been a party to that prior hearing or trial. | 2 | 2 |
Turner v. Martiregreen2 sentences2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include 2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include | 2 | 2 |
Sullivan v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2021(See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 719 [noting that, according to the Senate Committee comment to the statute, Government Code section 821.6 “continues the existing immunity of public employees” recognized in Hardy and similar cases].) Although the statute speaks only of employees of the State of California and related entities, the broader common law principles underlying the statute are not so limited and extend also to tribal employees. 2021(See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 719 [noting that, according to the Senate Committee comment to the statute, Government Code section 821.6 “continues the existing immunity of public employees” recognized in Hardy and similar cases].) Although the statute speaks only of employees of the State of California and related entities, the broader common law principles underlying the statute are not so limited and extend also to tribal employees. | 2 | 2 |
Laurence Davis v. Norman M. Littellgreen2 sentences2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include 2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Scherergreen2 sentences2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include 2021(See Turner v. Martire (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 [“common law immunity [extends] to tribal officials” because of “the need to protect such officials from the detrimental effect that the prospect of liability would have on their performance of their official duties”]; see also Davis, supra, 398 F.2d at p. 85 [tribal council found entitled to absolute immunity under common law immunity principles].) Fourth, Acres contends we should not extend immunity to “civil litigators from private law firms acting on behalf of a for-profit commercial enterprise.” Acres’s contention appears to include | 2 | 2 |
Blanchard v. DirecTV, Inc.green2 sentences2014(See Blanchard, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 914 [“The Legislature ‘sharply defined’ the public-interest exception of subdivision (b) of section 425.17 by reference to the three ‘factors corresponding to the state’s private attorney general statute’ so that subdivision (b) ‘parallels the existing exception for actions by the attorney general and public prosecutors.’ (Assem. 2007(Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 914 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 ] [“The Legislature ‘sharply defined’ the public-interest exception of subdivision (b) of section 425.17 by reference to the three ‘factors corresponding to the state’s private attorney general *1098 statute’ so that subdivision (b) ‘parallels the existing exception for actions by the attorney general and public prosecutors’ ”].) 8 Based on this same analysis, we reject the department’s argument that the amount of the fee award should be reduced to reflect Local 290’s “purely personal interest in the litigation.” | 2 | 2 |
People v. Abilezgreen2 sentences2013(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 516, fn. 9 [“[t]o the extent defendant wished the court to modify an existing instruction itself correct in law, it was his burden to propose it. [Citation.]”].) Second, as we have averred, it is settled that a trial court has discretion, in the midst of the jury‟s deliberations, to direct the attorneys to reopen their closing arguments under certain circumstances. ( Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170-1172.) “There is authority guiding the trial court‟s actions with respect to the order of a jury trial and its obligations upon being faced with a 2013(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 516, fn. 9 [“[t]o the extent defendant wished the court to modify an existing instruction itself correct in law, it was his burden to propose it. [Citation.]”].) Second, as we have averred, it is settled that a trial court has discretion, in the midst of the jury’s deliberations, to direct the attorneys to reopen their closing arguments under certain circumstances. ( Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170-1172.) “There is authority guiding the trial court’s actions with respect to the order of a jury trial and its obligations upon being faced with a | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Stephensongreen2 sentences1997In holding that the Philbin rule was not vitiated by enactment of former Civil Code section 4721, the court reasoned: "The statute's provision requiring `consider[ation]' of earning capacity is entirely consistent with the existing rule that earning capacity be deemed equivalent to actual income in the absence of evidence of unreasonable failure to seek or accept employment or more remunerative employment." ( 20 Cal. App.4th at p. 1783 .) Nevertheless, the court appeared to modify language contained in Philbin by limiting consideration of earning capacity to cases satisfying an objective stand 1997(Id. at pp. 1781-1783; see also In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 80 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ] [finding the reasoning of County of Yolo persuasive in the context of spousal support where the payor elects early retirement].) Despite the existence of intra- and inter-district conflict concerning the meaning and continuing vitality of the Philbin rule, our Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Greergreen2 sentences1986While not reaching this issue, the Supreme Court in Pearson indicated a reluctance to expand the existing rule limiting multiple convictions to include factually included offenses. ( Id., at pp. 355-356, fn. 2.) Since the origin of and rationale for the rule is obscure ( id., at p. 355; see also People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 604 [ 184 P.2d 512 ]; People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 588 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 , 370 P.2d 1007 ]), we see no reason to extend it here. [8] The People alternatively argue that the language of section 12311 prohibiting "suspension of execution" of sen 1986While not reaching this issue, the Supreme Court in Pearson indicated a reluctance to expand the existing rule limiting multiple convictions to include factually included offenses. ( Id., at pp. 355-356, fn. 2.) Since the origin of and rationale for the rule is obscure ( id., at p. 355; see also People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 604 [ 184 P.2d 512 ]; People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 588 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 , 370 P.2d 1007 ]), we see no reason to extend it here. [8] The People alternatively argue that the language of section 12311 prohibiting "suspension of execution" of sen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Tidemangreen2 sentences1986While not reaching this issue, the Supreme Court in Pearson indicated a reluctance to expand the existing rule limiting multiple convictions to include factually included offenses. ( Id., at pp. 355-356, fn. 2.) Since the origin of and rationale for the rule is obscure ( id., at p. 355; see also People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 604 [ 184 P.2d 512 ]; People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 588 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 , 370 P.2d 1007 ]), we see no reason to extend it here. [8] The People alternatively argue that the language of section 12311 prohibiting "suspension of execution" of sen 1986While not reaching this issue, the Supreme Court in Pearson indicated a reluctance to expand the existing rule limiting multiple convictions to include factually included offenses. ( Id., at pp. 355-356, fn. 2.) Since the origin of and rationale for the rule is obscure ( id., at p. 355; see also People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 604 [ 184 P.2d 512 ]; People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 588 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 , 370 P.2d 1007 ]), we see no reason to extend it here. [8] The People alternatively argue that the language of section 12311 prohibiting "suspension of execution" of sen | 2 | 2 |
Carlisle v. Kanaywergreen2 sentences1976(Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal.App.3d 940, 943 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 246 ].) Plaintiff, therefore, bears the responsibility for injuries to her person resulting from her own intoxication, and she may not shift that responsibility to another.” (Id., at p. 394.) 1976(Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal.App.3d 940, 943 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 246 ].) Plaintiff, therefore, bears the responsibility for injuries to her person resulting from her own intoxication, and she may not shift that responsibility to another.” (Id., at p. 394.) | 2 | 2 |
Sargent v. Goldberggreen2 sentences1976(Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal.App.3d 940, 943 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 246 ].) Plaintiff, therefore, bears the responsibility for injuries to her person resulting from her own intoxication, and she may not shift that responsibility to another.” (Id., at p. 394.) 1976(Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal.App.3d 940, 943 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 246 ].) Plaintiff, therefore, bears the responsibility for injuries to her person resulting from her own intoxication, and she may not shift that responsibility to another.” (Id., at p. 394.) | 2 | 2 |
Pitts v. Perlussgreen2 sentences2019Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216 , 275, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , 878 P.2d 566 .) "By contrast, an 'administrative action is ... quasi-adjudicative' when the 'administrative agency ... is applying an existing rule to existing facts.' " ( Ibid. ) "[T]he distinction between the *424 quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance; the breadth or narrowness of the discretion cannot control." ( Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824 , 834, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 .) With these legal standards in mind, we consider the functi 2019Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216 , 275, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , 878 P.2d 566 .) "By contrast, an 'administrative action is ... quasi-adjudicative' when the 'administrative agency ... is applying an existing rule to existing facts.' " ( Ibid. ) "[T]he distinction between the *424 quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance; the breadth or narrowness of the discretion cannot control." ( Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824 , 834, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 .) With these legal standards in mind, we consider the functi | 1 | 3 |
Hauger v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1998Proc. (1973) §§ 437d to 444, p. 506.) [4] For example, the Supreme Court has held a debtor can set-off an existing claim against the creditor in response to a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. ( Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal.2d 752, 755-756 , 269 P.2d 609 .) When the debtor asserts the right to a set-off, the antideficiency statutes are not implicated. ( Aplanalp v. Forte, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 617 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 144 .) However, the present case does not involve an effort by the debtor to set off a debt. 1998Proc. (1973) §§ 437d to 444, p. 506.) [4] For example, the Supreme Court has held a debtor can set-off an existing claim against the creditor in response to a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. ( Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal.2d 752, 755-756 , 269 P.2d 609 .) When the debtor asserts the right to a set-off, the antideficiency statutes are not implicated. ( Aplanalp v. Forte, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 617 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 144 .) However, the present case does not involve an effort by the debtor to set off a debt. | 1 | 2 |
| Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
Filmon.Com. Inc. v. Doubleverify Inc.green2 sentences2023(See Woodhill Ventures LLC v. Yang (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 624 , 632 (Woodhill Ventures) [rejecting contention that statements were protected under (e)(3) by citing FilmOn’s overall conclusion that defendant’s statements were “‘too tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate’”]; cf. FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151 [after adopting Wilbanks rule and setting out two-part test, Court noted that its holding adds no additional requirement to (e)(4) and is simply a “reasonable interpretation of the provision’s existing requirement that statements be made ‘in connection with’ a 2023(See Woodhill Ventures LLC v. Yang (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 624 , 632 (Woodhill Ventures) [rejecting contention that statements were protected under (e)(3) by citing FilmOn’s overall conclusion that defendant’s statements were “‘too tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate’”]; cf. FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151 [after adopting Wilbanks rule and setting out two-part test, Court noted that its holding adds no additional requirement to (e)(4) and is simply a “reasonable interpretation of the provision’s existing requirement that statements be made ‘in connection with’ a | 1 | 1 |
| Brown Bark III v. Haver CA4/3green | 1 | 1 |
| DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Duggins Construction Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Borlikgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Putnam Sand & Gravel Co. v. Albersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marine Midland Bank v. Murkoffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller-El v. Dretkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lawleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eisley v. Mohangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Evangelatos v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| San Marcos Water District v. San Marcos Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
20th Century Insurance v. Garamendi
green
2 sentences2019Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216 , 275, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , 878 P.2d 566 .) "By contrast, an 'administrative action is ... quasi-adjudicative' when the 'administrative agency ... is applying an existing rule to existing facts.' " ( Ibid. ) "[T]he distinction between the *424 quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance; the breadth or narrowness of the discretion cannot control." ( Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824 , 834, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 .) With these legal standards in mind, we consider the functi 2019Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216 , 275, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , 878 P.2d 566 .) "By contrast, an 'administrative action is ... quasi-adjudicative' when the 'administrative agency ... is applying an existing rule to existing facts.' " ( Ibid. ) "[T]he distinction between the *424 quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance; the breadth or narrowness of the discretion cannot control." ( Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824 , 834, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 .) With these legal standards in mind, we consider the functi | 4 | 2018–2019 |
County of Yolo v. Garcia
green
2 sentences1997In holding that the Philbin rule was not vitiated by enactment of former Civil Code section 4721, the court reasoned: "The statute's provision requiring `consider[ation]' of earning capacity is entirely consistent with the existing rule that earning capacity be deemed equivalent to actual income in the absence of evidence of unreasonable failure to seek or accept employment or more remunerative employment." ( 20 Cal. App.4th at p. 1783 .) Nevertheless, the court appeared to modify language contained in Philbin by limiting consideration of earning capacity to cases satisfying an objective stand 1997In holding that the Philbin rule was not vitiated by enactment of former Civil Code section 4721, the court reasoned: “The statute’s provision requiring ‘consideration]’ of earning capacity is entirely consistent with the existing rule that earning capacity be deemed equivalent to actual income in the absence of evidence of unreasonable failure to seek or accept employment or more remunerative employment.” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783 .) Nevertheless, the court appeared to modify language contained in Philbin by limiting consideration of earning capacity to cases satisfying an objective standar | 3 | 1995–1997 |
Styne v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2025(See Reyes, at pp. 988–989.) It is axiomatic that “[a]n opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 .) Finally, we are not persuaded by Reed’s argument that in 2024 (post- Reyes) CALCRIM No. 520 was revised to incorporate the “high degree of probability” language. 2025(See Reyes, at pp. 988–989.) It is axiomatic that “[a]n opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 .) Finally, we are not persuaded by Reed’s argument that in 2024 (post- Reyes) CALCRIM No. 520 was revised to incorporate the “high degree of probability” language. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
City of Santee v. County of San Diego
green
2 sentences2023(See City of Santee v. County of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 55, 67-68 .) II Underground Regulations Plaintiffs argue DTSC and DPH have ignored the existing rule allowing for decommissioning of a radiological facility after “[r]easonable effort has been made to eliminate residual radioactive contamination, if present” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17 § 30256, subd. (k)(2), italics added) and instead have followed “more permissive” numeric cleanup standards for radioactive materials. 2023(See City of Santee v. County of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 55, 67-68 .) II Underground Regulations Plaintiffs argue DTSC and DPH have ignored the existing rule allowing for decommissioning of a radiological facility after “[r]easonable effort has been made to eliminate residual radioactive contamination, if present” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17 § 30256, subd. (k)(2), italics added) and instead have followed “more permissive” numeric cleanup standards for radioactive materials. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
King v. Lynch
green
2 sentences2023According to the King dissent, the proposed statutory revisions “reflected a clear legislative choice to change the existing law in favor of permitting greater flexibility for the settlor, and rejecting the rule . . . which would designate a method of modification as exclusive simply because it has been set forth in the trust instrument.” (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196 , dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).) The King dissent focused on the following California Law Revision Commission comment: “‘Under general principles the settlor, or other person holding the power to revoke, may modify as well 2022As the California Law Revision Commission’s comment explains, it codifies the existing rule that the power of revocation 10 includes the power of modification, thus an available method of revocation is also an available method of modification—unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011, rev. granted, citing King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 1196 (dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).) While we have no quarrel with the general sentiment expressed in Haggerty (and other cases) that the power to revoke a trust implies the power to modify it, we disagree with Hagger | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Elliott v. General Motors LLC
green
2 sentences2019Elliott v. GM LLC (In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co.) Given the limited nature of a bankruptcy court’s ability to extinguish future successor liability claims under section 363(f), I think plaintiff is correct to rely on the latest circuit-level case to address the issue, Elliott v. GM LLC (In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co.) (2d Cir. 2016) 829 F.3d 135 (Elliott), for the proposition that an asset sale does not eliminate successor liability arising from unknown claims at the time of sale. 2019Elliott v. GM LLC ( In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co. ) Given the limited nature of a bankruptcy court's ability to extinguish future successor liability claims under section 363(f), I think plaintiff is correct to rely on the latest circuit-level case to address the issue, Elliott v. GM LLC ( In Matter of Motors Liquidation Co. ) (2d Cir. 2016) 829 F.3d 135 ( Elliott ), for the proposition that an asset sale does not eliminate successor liability arising from unknown claims at the time of sale. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)
green
2 sentences2013The Attorney General argues instead that the existing test for prejudice, i.e., that prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes it was reasonably probable he or she would have rejected the plea if properly advised (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 210 ), should be reformulated to allow relief only if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that if properly advised, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 2013The Attorney General argues instead that the existing test for prejudice, i.e., that prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes it was reasonably probable he or she would have rejected the plea if properly advised (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 210 ), should be reformulated to allow relief only if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that if properly advised, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Young
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 516, fn. 9 [“[t]o the extent defendant wished the court to modify an existing instruction itself correct in law, it was his burden to propose it. [Citation.]”].) Second, as we have averred, it is settled that a trial court has discretion, in the midst of the jury‟s deliberations, to direct the attorneys to reopen their closing arguments under certain circumstances. ( Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170-1172.) “There is authority guiding the trial court‟s actions with respect to the order of a jury trial and its obligations upon being faced with a 2013(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 516, fn. 9 [“[t]o the extent defendant wished the court to modify an existing instruction itself correct in law, it was his burden to propose it. [Citation.]”].) Second, as we have averred, it is settled that a trial court has discretion, in the midst of the jury’s deliberations, to direct the attorneys to reopen their closing arguments under certain circumstances. ( Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170-1172.) “There is authority guiding the trial court’s actions with respect to the order of a jury trial and its obligations upon being faced with a | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Rojas
green
2 sentences2002(See also U.S. Cir. Ct. Rules (9th Cir.) (Ninth Circuit Rules), rule 36-2.) 3 An opinion which has none of these attributes furthers only the “review for correctness” function of the Court of Appeal, and, as such, does not merit extensive factual or legal statement. 4 (People v. Rojas, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 289 .) A meticulously crafted but unpublished legal essay, replete with extended analyses of law and expositions of reasoning and which distinguishes authorities and responds to every nuance of argument in the parties briefs, requires the devotion of a share of the Court of Appeal’s l 2002(See also the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit Rules"), rule 36-2.) [3] An opinion which has none of these attributes furthers only the "review for correctness" function of the Court of Appeal, and, as such, does not merit extensive factual or legal statement. [4] ( People v. Rojas, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 289 .) A meticulously crafted but unpublished legal essay, replete with extended analyses of law and expositions of reasoning and which distinguishes authorities and responds to every nuance of argument in the parties' briefs, requires the | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Nolan v. Morelli
green
2 sentences1976This for the reason put forth by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Nolan v. Morelli (1967) 154 Conn. 432 [ 226 A.2d 383, 387 ]: ‘To recompense in damages an injury to an intoxicated person or his property resulting from his own overindulgence in intoxicating liquor might, quite properly, be felt by the General Assembly to encourage, rather than to discourage, such overindulgence.’ Although Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 161 ], holds that a third person has a cause of action against the server for violation of the statutory duty not to furnish alcoholic beverages 1976This for the reason put forth by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Nolan v. Morelli (1967) 154 Conn. 432 [ 226 A.2d 383, 387 ]: ‘To recompense in damages an injury to an intoxicated person or his property resulting from his own overindulgence in intoxicating liquor might, quite properly, be felt by the General Assembly to encourage, rather than to discourage, such overindulgence.’ Although Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 161 ], holds that a third person has a cause of action against the server for violation of the statutory duty not to furnish alcoholic beverages | 2 | 1975–1976 |
Vesely v. Sager
red
2 sentences1976This for the reason put forth by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Nolan v. Morelli (1967) 154 Conn. 432 [ 226 A.2d 383, 387 ]: ‘To recompense in damages an injury to an intoxicated person or his property resulting from his own overindulgence in intoxicating liquor might, quite properly, be felt by the General Assembly to encourage, rather than to discourage, such overindulgence.’ Although Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 161 ], holds that a third person has a cause of action against the server for violation of the statutory duty not to furnish alcoholic beverages 1976This for the reason put forth by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Nolan v. Morelli (1967) 154 Conn. 432 [ 226 A.2d 383, 387 ]: ‘To recompense in damages an injury to an intoxicated person or his property resulting from his own overindulgence in intoxicating liquor might, quite properly, be felt by the General Assembly to encourage, rather than to discourage, such overindulgence.’ Although Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 161 ], holds that a third person has a cause of action against the server for violation of the statutory duty not to furnish alcoholic beverages | 2 | 1975–1976 |
People v. Knoller
green
2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 990.) In Reyes, by citing Knoller to support the sentence on which Castro relies, the Supreme Court reiterated the long-held precedent that “under the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152 , italics added.) The court in Reyes neither overturned nor otherwise questioned its prior decisions in which it held that 13 “dangerous to life” and “high degree of probabili 2025(Id. at p. 990.) In Reyes, by citing Knoller to support the sentence on which Castro relies, the Supreme Court reiterated the long-held precedent that “under the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152 , italics added.) The court in Reyes neither overturned nor otherwise questioned its prior decisions in which it held that 13 “dangerous to life” and “high degree of probabili | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Crovedi
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199 , 208–209 [lead counsel hospitalized]; People v. Williams (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 627 , 651–657 [efforts to remove existing counsel and retain new counsel made more than one month before trial support finding substitution was genuine desire and not delay tactic].) Further, although appellant argues in reply that the trial court erred because it did not specifically confirm the existing defense expert had completed his examination of appellant during the past continuances, we see no error upon review. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Norgart v. Upjohn Co. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Albanese v. Menounos
green
1 sentence2023(Albanese, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 .) The appellate court affirmed the denial of Menounos’ anti-SLAPP motion, determining that even assuming that Albanese herself was “rather well known in some circles for her work as a celebrity stylist and fashion expert, there is no evidence that the public is interested in this private dispute concerning her alleged theft of unknown items from Menounos.” (Id. at p. 936.) ii. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Peace green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Wolf Metals Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| AO Alpha-Bank v. Yakovlev green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Hyundai Securities Co. v. Ik Chi Lee green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corporation green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Yeager v. Blue Cross of California green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United Teachers v. Los Angeles Unified School District green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Heiner v. Kmart Corp. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Comptroller of Treasury v. PHH Corp. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Rosen v. LegacyQuest CA1/1 green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Miller v. Kaiser green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Lewis v. County of Sacramento green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Anderson v. Southern California Edison Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Oliver v. Agasse green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Robinson green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.