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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Owens v. Huntergreen2 sentences2014An executory accord is a compromise.”)- As our supreme court stated in Owens v. Hunter, an accord and satisfaction constitutes a substituted performance on an existing claim “which will bar an action on the original claim.” 91 Ariz. 7, 10 , 368 P.2d 753, 755 (1962) “Acceptance of the substitute performance discharges the previously existing claim. 2014An executory accord is a compromise.”)- As our supreme court stated in Owens v. Hunter, an accord and satisfaction constitutes a substituted performance on an existing claim “which will bar an action on the original claim.” 91 Ariz. 7, 10 , 368 P.2d 753, 755 (1962) “Acceptance of the substitute performance discharges the previously existing claim. | 1 | 1 |
Bujanda v. Montgomery Ward & Co.green2 sentences2013We review the trial court’s decision to permit amendment of the pleadings under Rule 15(b) for an abuse of discretion. 16 Bujanda v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 125 Ariz. 314, 315 , 609 P.2d 584, 585 (App.1980). ¶ 52 The Committee contends it did not “open[ ] the door” to the issue whether Gordon was a qualified circulator because the evidence related to Gordon’s address was introduced “to support an existing claim.” We need not address this argument, however, because the Committee has not shown resulting prejudice. 2013We review the trial court’s decision to permit amendment of the pleadings under Rule 15(b) for an abuse of discretion. 16 Bujanda v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 125 Ariz. 314, 315 , 609 P.2d 584, 585 (App.1980). ¶ 52 The Committee contends it did not “open[ ] the door” to the issue whether Gordon was a qualified circulator because the evidence related to Gordon’s address was introduced “to support an existing claim.” We need not address this argument, however, because the Committee has not shown resulting prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Victoria K.green2 sentences2002See In re Victoria K., 198 Ariz. 527, 532 , 11 P.3d 1066, 1071 (App.2000) (applying interpretative presumption that the Arizona Supreme Court intends to change an existing rule when the court modifies its language). ¶23 When Rule 7.6(c)(2) (forfeiture) is read in conjunction with Rule 7.6(d) (exoneration), it appears that the supreme court intended that a surety would be entitled to exoneration of the entire appearance bond only in the previolation scenario referred to in Rule 7.6(d)(1) (the court “shall exonerate the appearance bond”), which is not affected by Rule 7.6(c)(2). 2002See In re Victoria K., 198 Ariz. 527, 532 , 11 P.3d 1066, 1071 (App.2000) (applying interpretative presumption that the Arizona Supreme Court intends to change an existing rule when the court modifies its language). ¶23 When Rule 7.6(c)(2) (forfeiture) is read in conjunction with Rule 7.6(d) (exoneration), it appears that the supreme court intended that a surety would be entitled to exoneration of the entire appearance bond only in the previolation scenario referred to in Rule 7.6(d)(1) (the court “shall exonerate the appearance bond”), which is not affected by Rule 7.6(c)(2). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dann
green
2 sentences2009Dann II, 206 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 6, 79 P.3d at 60 . ¶ 58 The instruction in this case cured any potential vagueness by using language from case law interpreting the F.8 aggravator, specifically that the murders be temporally, spatially, and motivationally related. 2009Dann II, 206 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 6, 79 P.3d at 60 . ¶ 58 The instruction in this case cured any potential vagueness by using language from case law interpreting the F.8 aggravator, specifically that the murders be temporally, spatially, and motivationally related. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Vargas
green
2 sentences1998Vargas, 157 Ariz. at 20 , 754 P.2d at 349 . 1998Vargas, 157 Ariz. at 20 , 754 P.2d at 349 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1987The change in the Act does not merely provide a new remedy for an existing claim, see Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); nor is it merely a procedural change, see United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 , 80 S.Ct. 924 , 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960). 1987The change in the Act does not merely provide a new remedy for an existing claim, see Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); nor is it merely a procedural change, see United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 , 80 S.Ct. 924 , 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond
green
2 sentences1987The change in the Act does not merely provide a new remedy for an existing claim, see Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); nor is it merely a procedural change, see United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 , 80 S.Ct. 924 , 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960). 1987The change in the Act does not merely provide a new remedy for an existing claim, see Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); nor is it merely a procedural change, see United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 , 80 S.Ct. 924 , 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State of Arizona v. Wood
green
2 sentences1976The leading case in Arizona is State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48 , 122 P.2d 416 (1942), where we adopted the existing rule in California which admitted both types of evidence on the theory that it “best conforms to logic and the common experience of mankind”: “If consent be a defense to the charge, then certainly any evidence which reasonably tends to show consent is relevant and material, and common experience teaches us that the woman who has once departed from the paths of virtue is far more apt to consent to another lapse than is the one who has never stepped aside from that path.” State v. Wood, 1976The leading case in Arizona is State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48 , 122 P.2d 416 (1942), where we adopted the existing rule in California which admitted both types of evidence on the theory that it “best conforms to logic and the common experience of mankind”: “If consent be a defense to the charge, then certainly any evidence which reasonably tends to show consent is relevant and material, and common experience teaches us that the woman who has once departed from the paths of virtue is far more apt to consent to another lapse than is the one who has never stepped aside from that path.” State v. Wood, | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.