21 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.green2 sentences1983The standard to be used by the court when determining if probable cause exists, was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., (1978) 436 U.S. 301 , 319, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 : For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the *1093 issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation 16 but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara v. Municipal 1983The standard to be used by the court when determining if probable cause exists, was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., (1978) 436 U.S. 301 , 319, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 : For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the *1093 issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation 16 but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara v. Municipal | 1 | 5 |
In the Matter of S.D., Alleged to be a Child in Need of Services J.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen1 sentence2016See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290 (reversing trial court’s CHINS determination for lack of evidence that coercive intervention of the court was necessary); In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing trial court’s CHINS determination for lack of evidence that children were endangered or their basic needs were not met). | 1 | 1 |
Bowles v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Bowles v. State, No. 49S04-0708-CR-310, 891 N.E.2d 30, 32-33 (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting); Belvedere v. State, 48S05-0806-CR-370, 889 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Belvedere v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Bowles v. State, No. 49S04-0708-CR-310, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting); Belvedere v. State, 48S05-0806-CR-370, 889 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting). 2008See Bowles v. State, No. 49S04-0708-CR-310, 891 N.E.2d 30, 32-33 (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting); Belvedere v. State, 48S05-0806-CR-370, 889 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind.2008) (Rucker, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Lindley v. Sinkgreen2 sentences2000Here, we find that the rationale for the existing rule is no longer persuasive, for two reasons: first, the opinions defining the rule rely on an incomplete understanding of our supreme court’s opinion in Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 14-15 , 30 N.E.2d 456, 461 (1940); and second, the opinions are inconsistent with the present perception of the purpose of punitive damages and of the wrongful death statute. 2000Here, we find that the rationale for the existing rule is no longer persuasive, for two reasons: first, the opinions defining the rule rely on an incomplete understanding of our supreme court’s opinion in Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 14-15 , 30 N.E.2d 456, 461 (1940); and second, the opinions are inconsistent with the present perception of the purpose of punitive damages and of the wrongful death statute. | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employesgreen2 sentences1992As stated in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (1984), 466 U.S. 435, 457, n. 15 , 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, n. 15 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 : “The fact that petitioners invoke the First Amendment is insufficient reason to impose the heightened standard on their opponents, and we perceive no need to abandon the preponderance standard normally applicable in civil suit for damages.” In summary, we hold a union cannot meet its burden of proving a nonunion member’s fair share fee by a formula that subtracts nonehargeable expenses from the union’s total expenses. 1992As stated in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (1984), 466 U.S. 435, 457, n. 15 , 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, n. 15 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 : “The fact that petitioners invoke the First Amendment is insufficient reason to impose the heightened standard on their opponents, and we perceive no need to abandon the preponderance standard normally applicable in civil suit for damages.” In summary, we hold a union cannot meet its burden of proving a nonunion member’s fair share fee by a formula that subtracts nonehargeable expenses from the union’s total expenses. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kokomo Tube Co.
green
2 sentences2012Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 320 ; Kokomo Tube, 426 N.E.2d at 1342 . 2012Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 ; Kokomo Tube, 426 N.E.2d at 1342 . | 3 | 1984–2012 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences1984For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a porticuler [establishment]" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. [523], at 538, 87 S.Ct. [1727] at 1736 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)]. 1983The standard to be used by the court when determining if probable cause exists, was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., (1978) 436 U.S. 301 , 319, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 : For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the *1093 issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation 16 but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara v. Municipal | 3 | 1981–1984 |
Union Pacific Railroad v. Cezar
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 804 . 2012Id. at 804 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
A.J.'s Automotive Sales, Inc. v. Freet
green
1 sentence2017Finally, Svabek makes no argument on appeal that Lancet did not “promptly s[eek] rescission within a reasonable time after discovering Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1610-PL-2271 | May 11, 2017 Page 15 of 17 the fraud” with respect to the denial of coverage misrepresentation.1 Freet, 725 N.E.2d at 968 . [9] In sum, Svabek has failed to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” namely, that Lancet is entitled to rescission based on Svabek’s misrepresentation on his application for insurance regarding a prior denial of covera | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In the Matter of S.M., J.M., A.M., H.G., Children in Need of Services, A.M. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services
green
1 sentence2016See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290 (reversing trial court’s CHINS determination for lack of evidence that coercive intervention of the court was necessary); In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing trial court’s CHINS determination for lack of evidence that children were endangered or their basic needs were not met). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brandon Brummett v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015With the exception of the rehearing opinion's potentially misleading reference to "the standard now to be used," id. (emphasis added), we summarily affirm. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sensient Flavors LLC v. Indiana Occupational Safety & Health Administration
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, Indiana
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Aldrich
green
1 sentence2003Similarly, this court continues to hold that imposing a heightened standard of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the existing standard of preponderance of the evidence, is inappropriate." 585 N.E.2d at 670 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Neeley v. State
green
2 sentences1998Neeley v. State, 261 Ind. 434 , 305 N.E.2d 434 (1974) (legislative rules on procedural matters do not require judicial preclearance and should be regarded as having "full force and effect" unless found to be inconsistent with "a specific existing rule of this Court”). 13 .Other jurisdictions have wrestled with application of notice statutes in the class action setting. 1998Neeley v. State, 261 Ind. 434 , 305 N.E.2d 434 (1974) (legislative rules on procedural matters do not require judicial preclearance and should be regarded as having "full force and effect" unless found to be inconsistent with "a specific existing rule of this Court”). 13 .Other jurisdictions have wrestled with application of notice statutes in the class action setting. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Albro v. Indianapolis Education Ass'n
green
1 sentence1995Albro, 585 N.E.2d at 670 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Gee v. State
green
2 sentences1994Gee v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 28, 36 , 389 N.E.2d 303, 309 . [4] In any event, the probable cause affidavit was admitted to prove the results of field sobriety tests. 1994Gee v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 28, 36 , 389 N.E.2d 303, 309 . [4] In any event, the probable cause affidavit was admitted to prove the results of field sobriety tests. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Davis v. Nielson
green
2 sentences1979Davis v. Nielson (1973), 9 Wash.App. 864 , 515 P.2d 995 . 1979Davis v. Nielson (1973), 9 Wash.App. 864 , 515 P.2d 995 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Russell v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1950It is obvious that the legislature intended to change the existing rule on dependencies as declared in Russell v. Johnson (1943), 220 Ind. 649 , 46 N. E. 2d 219 , supra. The legislature had the right to provide that a common-law wife be excluded unless the relationship as common-law wife shall have existed openly and notoriously for not less than five years immediately preceding death. 1950It is obvious that the legislature intended to change the existing rule on dependencies as declared in Russell v. Johnson (1943), 220 Ind. 649 , 46 N. E. 2d 219 , supra. The legislature had the right to provide that a common-law wife be excluded unless the relationship as common-law wife shall have existed openly and notoriously for not less than five years immediately preceding death. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.