existing rule in Hawaii

1999In Horvath v. Gladstone, 97 Nev. 594 , 637 P.2d 531 (1981), the Nevada Supreme Court held, on similar facts, that the equitable principle of relative hardship is available to “a purchaser who has performed no act in violation of the restrictions and who merely purchased a house which contained an existing violation of the restrictions^]” Id. at 533.

1999On appeal, the supreme court observed, “[i]n the present case, which deals with a purchaser who has performed no act in violation of the restrictions and who merely purchased a house which contained an existing violation of the restrictions, we perceive no reason to preclude a balancing of equities[.]” Id. at 533 (emphasis added).

2025See Matter of Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 76 Hawaiʻi 1, 5, 868 P.2d 419, 423 (1994) (evaluating due process remedies following valid appeal to the TAC). 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** III.

2025See Matter of Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 76 Hawaiʻi 1, 5, 868 P.2d 419, 423 (1994) (evaluating due process remedies following valid appeal to the TAC). 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** III.

2024Id. at 273-74, 361 P.3d at 1176-77 (citations omitted).

2016See Nuuanu Valley Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 119 Hawai'i 90, 100 , 194 P.3d 531, 541 (2008) (holding an agency’s policy of refusing to publicly disclose the documents was itself a rale because it affected the procedures available to the public and violated an existing rule that the agency was to release such documents to the public); Haw.

2016See Nuuanu Valley Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 119 Hawai'i 90, 100 , 194 P.3d 531, 541 (2008) (holding an agency’s policy of refusing to publicly disclose the documents was itself a rale because it affected the procedures available to the public and violated an existing rule that the agency was to release such documents to the public); Haw.

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2016Prince Hotel Waikiki Corp. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 89 Hawai'i 381, 393 , 974 P.2d 21, 33 (1999) (holding that a city appraiser’s methodology for assessing the value of a golf course was a rale because the methodology “undoubtedly affect[ed] the assessed value of the golf course and the future assessments of all golf course owners”); Rose, 68 Haw. at 427 , 717 P.2d at 1032 (holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public); Chang, 58 Haw. at 95 , 564 P.2d at 1272-73 (holding that

2013See Riveira, 59 Haw. at 154 , 577 P.2d at 797 (“The rule requiring the submission of factual determinations to the jury if there is any evidence upon which the jury may act is based on the principle that credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence are for the jury to decide.”).

2013See Riveira, 59 Haw. at 154 , 577 P.2d at 797 (“The rule requiring the submission of factual determinations to the jury if there is any evidence upon which the jury may act is based on the principle that credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence are for the jury to decide.”).

2012See Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405 , 894 P.2d at 80 .

2012See Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405 , 894 P.2d at 80 .

2010This court has stated that, under the doctrine of stare decisis, “it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision [of a court of last resort], without regard to their views as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 653 , 658 P.2d 287, 297 (1982) (citation omitted).

2010This court has stated that, under the doctrine of stare decisis, “it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision [of a court of last resort], without regard to their views as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 653 , 658 P.2d 287, 297 (1982) (citation omitted).

2010The majority’s affirmance of Petitioner’s sentence based on the existing presumption in Sinagoga,—that was also followed in Vellina and Tauiliili, 96 Hawai'i 195, 199-200 , 29 P.3d 914, 918-19 (2001), and relied upon by the majority, see majority op. at 504, 229 P.3d at 322,—underscores the needless exercise in promulgating a new “rule” that is, clearly, “one that is unnecessary to the decision in [this ] case and therefore not precedential[.T Black’s Law Dictionary 1102 (emphases added).

2010The majority’s affirmance of Petitioner’s sentence based on the existing presumption in Sinagoga,—that was also followed in Vellina and Tauiliili, 96 Hawai'i 195, 199-200 , 29 P.3d 914, 918-19 (2001), and relied upon by the majority, see majority op. at 504, 229 P.3d at 322,—underscores the needless exercise in promulgating a new “rule” that is, clearly, “one that is unnecessary to the decision in [this ] case and therefore not precedential[.T Black’s Law Dictionary 1102 (emphases added).

2008Co., 463 N.W.2d 750, 755-56 (Minn. 1990) ("[T]he assignment of the insured's interest in an existing claim for [UM and UIM] benefits pursuant to a contract of insurance . . . was not an assignment prohibited by law.").

2006See Ai v. Frank Huff Agency, 61 Haw. 607, 619 , 607 P.2d 1304, 1312 (1980) ("The wording on HRS § 480-12 might ... appear to suggest that any contract containing an illegal provision ... should be held unenforceable in its entirety.... [U]nder ordinary contract law, however, ... a partially legal contract may be upheld if the illegal portion is severable from the part which is legal.").

2006See Ai v. Frank Huff Agency, 61 Haw. 607, 619 , 607 P.2d 1304, 1312 (1980) ("The wording on HRS § 480-12 might ... appear to suggest that any contract containing an illegal provision ... should be held unenforceable in its entirety.... [U]nder ordinary contract law, however, ... a partially legal contract may be upheld if the illegal portion is severable from the part which is legal.").

2006Our adoption of the Cliffdale Assocs. test does not change the existing rule that, in order to establish a violation of HRS § 480-2, the plaintiff need not establish an intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, World Travel Vacation Brokers, 861 F.2d at 1029 ; Five-Star Auto Club, 97 F.Supp.2d at 526 , nor any actual deceit, United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i at 51, 919 P.2d at 313 . [10] It is undisputed that Island Incentives, Inc. was acting as the Ranch's agent in this matter, and "we note that an owner is responsible for the representations of his agent made within the scope of h

2006Our adoption of the Cliffdale Assocs. test does not change the existing rule that, in order to establish a violation of HRS § 480-2, the plaintiff need not establish an intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, World Travel Vacation Brokers, 861 F.2d at 1029 ; Five-Star Auto Club, 97 F.Supp.2d at 526 , nor any actual deceit, United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i at 51, 919 P.2d at 313 . [10] It is undisputed that Island Incentives, Inc. was acting as the Ranch's agent in this matter, and "we note that an owner is responsible for the representations of his agent made within the scope of h

2006Our adoption of the Cliffdale Assocs. test does not change the existing rule that, in order to establish a violation of HRS § 480-2, the plaintiff need not establish an intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, World Travel Vacation Brokers, 861 F.2d at 1029 ; Five-Star Auto Club, 97 F.Supp.2d at 526 , nor any actual deceit, United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i at 51, 919 P.2d at 313 . [10] It is undisputed that Island Incentives, Inc. was acting as the Ranch's agent in this matter, and "we note that an owner is responsible for the representations of his agent made within the scope of h

2006Our adoption of the Cliffdale Assocs. test does not change the existing rule that, in order to establish a violation of HRS § 480-2, the plaintiff need not establish an intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, World Travel Vacation Brokers, 861 F.2d at 1029 ; Five-Star Auto Club, 97 F.Supp.2d at 526 , nor any actual deceit, United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i at 51, 919 P.2d at 313 . [10] It is undisputed that Island Incentives, Inc. was acting as the Ranch's agent in this matter, and "we note that an owner is responsible for the representations of his agent made within the scope of h

2003The majority contends a "drastic course is unnecessary" and cites Lavelle v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 426 Mass. 332 , 688 N.E.2d 1331, 1335 (1997) as "persuasive[.]" Majority opinion at 452, 71 P.3d at 403 .

2003The majority contends a "drastic course is unnecessary" and cites Lavelle v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 426 Mass. 332 , 688 N.E.2d 1331, 1335 (1997) as "persuasive[.]" Majority opinion at 452, 71 P.3d at 403 .

2002See United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.1974) (determining that the force used by officers to physically enter an apartment implicated the knock and announce rule even though the agents had employed a ruse to cause the door to be opened slightly) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968)); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 , 488 n. 1 (5th Cir.1966) (noting that "entrance gained by fraud or other use of deception for the purpose of effecting an arrest is constitutionally permissible so long as force is not employed " (emphasis adde

2002See United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.1974) (determining that the force used by officers to physically enter an apartment implicated the knock and announce rule even though the agents had employed a ruse to cause the door to be opened slightly) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968)); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 , 488 n. 1 (5th Cir.1966) (noting that "entrance gained by fraud or other use of deception for the purpose of effecting an arrest is constitutionally permissible so long as force is not employed " (emphasis adde

2002See United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.1974) (determining that the force used by officers to physically enter an apartment implicated the knock and announce rule even though the agents had employed a ruse to cause the door to be opened slightly) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968)); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 , 488 n. 1 (5th Cir.1966) (noting that "entrance gained by fraud or other use of deception for the purpose of effecting an arrest is constitutionally permissible so long as force is not employed " (emphasis adde

2002See United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.1974) (determining that the force used by officers to physically enter an apartment implicated the knock and announce rule even though the agents had employed a ruse to cause the door to be opened slightly) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968)); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 , 488 n. 1 (5th Cir.1966) (noting that “entrance gained by fraud or other use of deception for the purpose of effecting an arrest is constitutionally permissible so long as force is not employed ” (emphasis adde