existing rule in New Jersey

2019We noted that probable cause in the administrative context is different from the criminal context and “may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conduct ing an . . . inspection are satisfied.’” Id. at 368 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)).

2013In this context, the standard of proof to gain court-ordered entry to a property is different than probable cause in the criminal context; probable cause in the administrative-search context “may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied.’ ” Barlow’s, supra, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. at 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting Camara, supra, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 941 ).

2013In this context, the standard of proof to gain court-ordered entry to a property is different than probable cause in the criminal context; probable cause in the administrative-search context “may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied.’ ” Barlow’s, supra, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. at 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting Camara, supra, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 941 ).

2013In this context, the standard of proof to gain court-ordered entry to a property is different than probable cause in the criminal context; probable cause in the administrative-search context “may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied.’ ” Barlow’s, supra, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. at 1824 , 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting Camara, supra, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 941 ).

2024It is well settled that "[i]t is not [IAC] for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion." State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007).

2021Even though her death occurred months later, A.B.’s injuries, the communications from her doctor, her distress upon learning of her circumstance, and her condition when she made the statement, evidence A.B.’s “settled hopeless expectation that death [was] near at hand.” Shepard, 290 U.S. at 100 (quotation omitted).

2020See Jacoby, 442 N.J.

2006Thus, if anything, the policies relating to restrictions on a parent’s right to compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario. [Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062,1066 (Utah 2001) (emphasis added).] Further, in both the pre- and post-injury context, it is necessary to ensure that children retain the ability to seek compensation for an injury.

2006Thus, if anything, the policies relating to restrictions on a parent's right to compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario. [ Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P. 3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001) (emphasis added).] Further, in both the pre- and post-injury context, it is necessary to ensure that children retain the ability to seek compensation for an injury.

2005See, e.g., Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 121 N.J. 276 , 579 A. 2d 1241 (1990) (reliability requirement for expert testimony derives from the common law of evidence; technique used must be accepted by the scientific community); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 , 478 A. 2d 364 (1984) State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508 , 443 A. 2d 1020 (1982).

2005See, e.g., Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 121 N.J. 276 , 579 A. 2d 1241 (1990) (reliability requirement for expert testimony derives from the common law of evidence; technique used must be accepted by the scientific community); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 , 478 A. 2d 364 (1984) State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508 , 443 A. 2d 1020 (1982).

1993Ante at 391, 625 A. 2d at 1092 .

1993Post at 409, 625 A. 2d at 1101 (emphasis added).

1991See State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 271 , 294 A.2d 23 (1972); Evid.R. 5.

1991See State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 271 , 294 A.2d 23 (1972); Evid.R. 5.

1987The ex post facto clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions do not apply to procedural changes even though they may disadvantage the offender, State v. T.P.M., 189 N.J.

1987In Sydney Grossman Hotel Corp. v. Lakewood Water Co., 27 N.J. 91 (1958), a divided Court (Justices Heher, Jacobs and Francis dissenting), upheld Reimann , stating, "The question is a close one, but an existing rule of law should not be overturned unless its injustice is clear.

1987In Sydney Grossman Hotel Corp. v. Lakewood Water Co., 27 N.J. 91 (1958), a divided Court (Justices Heher, Jacobs and Francis dissenting), upheld Reimann , stating, “The question is a close one, but an existing rule of law should not be overturned unless its injustice is clear.

1979Assn. v. Howell, 30 N.J. 190, 194 (1959)." 59 N.J. at 484 .

1976Rather they urge: (1) that considerations of justice and convenience warrant redefining common-law liability in this area of the law to impose a duty on all abutting owners not "to maintain a sidewalk in a dangerous condition," invoking the forceful dissenting opinion of Justice Proctor to that effect in Murray v. Michalak, supra ( 58 N.J. at 220, 222 ); (2) that, short of overruling the existing rule, it be modified to permit a jury to determine whether, on the alleged circumstantial case here made out, some prior owner of the property did not construct or repair the sidewalk improperly, for