existing rule in Colorado

1994See Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1982).

1993Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo.1982); Jefferson County Dep't of Social Servs., 199 Colo. at 318, 607 P.2d at 1006 .

2016Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the existing standard has posed a problem in need of a solution, much less the sea change in pleadings practice that I believe the majority opinion will effect. ¶42 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority chooses to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a “plausible” claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (same), principally based on an asserted need for uniformity between how federal courts construe Fed.

2016Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the existing standard has posed a problem in need of a solution, much less the sea change in pleadings practice that I- believe the majority opinion will effect. 142 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority chooses to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 , 129 S.Ct. 1987 (noting that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a "plausible" claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 (same), principally based on an asserted need for uniformity between how federal courts construe Fed.

2016Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the existing standard has posed a problem in need of a solution, much less the sea change in pleadings practice that I believe the majority opinion will effect. ¶42 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority chooses to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a “plausible” claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (same), principally based on an asserted need for uniformity between how federal courts construe Fed.

2016Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the existing standard has posed a problem in need of a solution, much less the sea change in pleadings practice that I- believe the majority opinion will effect. 142 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority chooses to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 , 129 S.Ct. 1987 (noting that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a "plausible" claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 (same), principally based on an asserted need for uniformity between how federal courts construe Fed.

2016In short, the Authority must live with its choice. {22 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the "seniors first" policy as applied here is "merely the administrative mechanism by which" an existing rule or law prevents the Authority from calling for water in excess of its decreed rights, N. Sterling, 202 P.3d at 1208 , and thus we find it distinguishable from the fixed water year policy at issue in North Sterling.

2016In short, the Authority must live with its choice. ¶22 Consequently, we are not persuaded that the “seniors first” policy as applied here is “merely the administrative mechanism by which” an existing rule or law prevents the Authority from calling for water in excess of its decreed rights, N. Sterling, 202 P.3d at 1208, and thus we find it distinguishable from the fixed water year policy at issue in North Sterling.

2022Relief ¶ 98 While the Assessor is bound by the methodology in the Reference Library, Huddleston , 913 P.2d at 17 , provisions of the Reference Library that conflict with the URL are void as a matter of law. § 24-4-103(8)(a), C.R.S. 2021 ("Any rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency ... which conflicts with a statute shall be void."); Rigmaiden v. Colo. Dep't of Health Care Pol'y & Fin. , 155 P.3d 498, 504 (Colo. App. 2006). ¶ 99 By holding that, as written, the distinction between direct and indirect benefits in the Reference Library is contrary to the URL, we don't express

2021Our limited review of the Board's single-subject rulings concerns whether initiatives "contain separate and unconnected purposes," not their "efficacy." In re 1999-2000 No. 200A , 992 P.2d at 30 ; see also In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #63 , 2016 CO 34 , ¶ 14 , 370 P.3d 628, 632 ( "While Petitioners ' objection arguably overstates the initiative's reach, our inquiry at this juncture avoids interpretation beyond that necessary to determine whether there is a single subject and clear title." ) .

2021Our limited review of the Board's single-subject rulings concerns whether initiatives "contain separate and unconnected purposes," not their "efficacy." In re 1999-2000 No. 200A , 992 P.2d at 30 ; see also In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #63 , 2016 CO 34 , ¶ 14 , 370 P.3d 628, 632 ( "While Petitioners ' objection arguably overstates the initiative's reach, our inquiry at this juncture avoids interpretation beyond that necessary to determine whether there is a single subject and clear title." ) .

2013Any rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency ... which conflicts with a statute shall be void. § 24-4-103(8)(a), C.R.S8.2018. ¶ 18 Second, a reviewing court may invalidate an agency rule if the rule is:. arbitrary or capricious, a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations, not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of this article or as otherwise required by law, an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, based upon findings

2013In Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Colorado, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue; 919 P.2d 894, 897 (Colo.App.1996), a division of this court cited, with approval, the well-known Chevron standard for judicial review of agency actions.

2011See In re Marriage of Davisson, 797 P.2d 809, 810 (Colo.App.1990) (determining legislative intent based upon ordinary meaning of statutory language and legislative history).

1998See Home Builders, 720 P.2d at 561 .

1998See Home Builders, 720 P.2d at 561 .

1997See Colorado Mountain Properties, Inc. v. Heineman, 860 P.2d 1388 (Colo.App.1993) (declining to award damages based on delay in bringing condemnation action); see also Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481 , 379 P.2d 165 (1963) (concluding that a landowner’s right to enforce a private way of necessity over property previously held under unity of title could not be extinguished by laches).

1997See Colorado Mountain Properties, Inc. v. Heineman, 860 P.2d 1388 (Colo.App.1993) (declining to award damages based on delay in bringing condemnation action); see also Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481 , 379 P.2d 165 (1963) (concluding that a landowner’s right to enforce a private way of necessity over property previously held under unity of title could not be extinguished by laches).

1997See Colorado Mountain Properties, Inc. v. Heineman, 860 P.2d 1388 (Colo.App.1993) (declining to award damages based on delay in bringing condemnation action); see also Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481 , 379 P.2d 165 (1963) (concluding that a landowner’s right to enforce a private way of necessity over property previously held under unity of title could not be extinguished by laches).

1993See Bear Creek Development Corp. v. Dyer, 790 P.2d 897 (Colo.App.1990).

1992See Wilcox v. Pioneer Homes, Inc., 41 N.C.App. 140 , 254 S.E.2d 214 (1979) (minimum side lot violation); Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis.2d 38 , 150 N.W.2d 347 (1967) (minimum frontage requirement); Oatis v. Delcuze, 226 La. 751 , 77 So.2d 28 (1954) (non-conforming building); Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442 , 227 P.2d 102 (1951) (minimum side lot violation); Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wash.2d 159 , 201 P.2d 156 (1948) (violation of setback lines); Moyer v. De Vincentis Construction Co., 107 Pa.Super. 588 , 164 A. 111 (1933) (set-back requirement).

1992See Wilcox v. Pioneer Homes, Inc., 41 N.C.App. 140 , 254 S.E.2d 214 (1979) (minimum side lot violation); Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis.2d 38 , 150 N.W.2d 347 (1967) (minimum frontage requirement); Oatis v. Delcuze, 226 La. 751 , 77 So.2d 28 (1954) (non-conforming building); Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442 , 227 P.2d 102 (1951) (minimum side lot violation); Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wash.2d 159 , 201 P.2d 156 (1948) (violation of setback lines); Moyer v. De Vincentis Construction Co., 107 Pa.Super. 588 , 164 A. 111 (1933) (set-back requirement).

1989See Strader v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Aurora, 191 Colo. 206 , 551 P.2d 720, at 724 (1976) (where a party by its acts or omissions contributes to the running of a statute of limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will prevent its raising that defense).

1989See Strader v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Aurora, 191 Colo. 206 , 551 P.2d 720, at 724 (1976) (where a party by its acts or omissions contributes to the running of a statute of limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will prevent its raising that defense).

1984The function of the Secretary of the Interior upon selection is no longer entirely “judicial in its nature,” 255 U.S. at 497, 41 S.Ct. at 395, and is no longer .restricted to “determining whether an existing privilege conferred by Congress had been lawfully exercised,” 255 U.S. at 496, 41 S.Ct. at 394.