33 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2024 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc.green2 sentences2024See Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82 , 823 P2d 956 Cite as 334 Or App 89 (2024) 91 (1991) (outlining the requirements for plain-error review as the first step of the inquiry and explaining that, even if the alleged error meets those requirements, the court must decide to exercise its discretion to correct the error and articulate its reasons for doing so in the second step of the inquiry). 2024See Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82 , 823 P2d 956 Cite as 334 Or App 89 (2024) 91 (1991) (outlining the requirements for plain-error review as the first step of the inquiry and explaining that, even if the alleged error meets those requirements, the court must decide to exercise its discretion to correct the error and articulate its reasons for doing so in the second step of the inquiry). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2024See Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82 , 823 P2d 956 Cite as 334 Or App 89 (2024) 91 (1991) (outlining the requirements for plain-error review as the first step of the inquiry and explaining that, even if the alleged error meets those requirements, the court must decide to exercise its discretion to correct the error and articulate its reasons for doing so in the second step of the inquiry). 2024See Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82 , 823 P2d 956 Cite as 334 Or App 89 (2024) 91 (1991) (outlining the requirements for plain-error review as the first step of the inquiry and explaining that, even if the alleged error meets those requirements, the court must decide to exercise its discretion to correct the error and articulate its reasons for doing so in the second step of the inquiry). | 2 | 2 |
Strunk v. Public Employees Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences2024The first question of the first step of the inquiry—is there a state contract?—is not at issue, because, as decided in Hughes, “PERS was intended to be and is a contract between the [public employer] and its employees[.]” 314 Or at 25 ; see also, e.g., Strunk, 338 Or at 170 . 2024The first question of the first step of the inquiry—is there a state contract?—is not at issue, because, as decided in Hughes, “PERS was intended to be and is a contract between the [public employer] and its employees[.]” 314 Or at 25 ; see also, e.g., Strunk, 338 Or at 170 . | 2 | 2 |
Handy v. Lane Countygreen2 sentences2023See Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or App 698, 707 , 353 P3d 598 (2015) (addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry where the trial court did not because the question was fairly presented to the trial court 7 “There is no dispute that Oregon modeled its anti-SLAPP statute on California’s.” Handy, 360 Or at 618 . 2023See Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or App 698, 707 , 353 P3d 598 (2015) (addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry where the trial court did not because the question was fairly presented to the trial court 7 “There is no dispute that Oregon modeled its anti-SLAPP statute on California’s.” Handy, 360 Or at 618 . | 2 | 2 |
Mullen v. Meredith Corp.green2 sentences2023See Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or App 698, 707 , 353 P3d 598 (2015) (addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry where the trial court did not because the question was fairly presented to the trial court 7 “There is no dispute that Oregon modeled its anti-SLAPP statute on California’s.” Handy, 360 Or at 618 . 2023See Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or App 698, 707 , 353 P3d 598 (2015) (addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry where the trial court did not because the question was fairly presented to the trial court 7 “There is no dispute that Oregon modeled its anti-SLAPP statute on California’s.” Handy, 360 Or at 618 . | 2 | 2 |
Yogman v. Parrottgreen2 sentences2007See id. at 362 . 2001Yogman, 325 Or at 362 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Barbeaugreen2 sentences2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s 2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lylegreen1 sentence2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barrettgreen1 sentence2021Barrett, 331 Or at 32 (stating that the Court of Appeals’ practice at the time—examining just whether distinct sec- tions required proof of elements that the others did not— incorrectly omitted the first step in the analysis). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jeffersongreen1 sentence2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Houston-Sconiersgreen1 sentence2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Marriage of Grossmangreen2 sentences2020In determining at the first step of the analysis whether a contract provision is ambiguous, in addition to the text and context, the court may also “consider evidence of the circumstances underlying the formation of the con- tract.” Id. at 349 (citing ORS 42.220; Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309, 315 , 129 P3d 773 , rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006)); see also Grossman and Grossman, 338 Or 99, 108 , 106 P3d 618 (2005). 2020In determining at the first step of the analysis whether a contract provision is ambiguous, in addition to the text and context, the court may also “consider evidence of the circumstances underlying the formation of the con- tract.” Id. at 349 (citing ORS 42.220; Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309, 315 , 129 P3d 773 , rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006)); see also Grossman and Grossman, 338 Or 99, 108 , 106 P3d 618 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Myersgreen2 sentences2016See Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 225-26 , 936 P2d 964 (1997) (illustrating principle).” Thus, the first step in our analysis is to determine the changes, if any, that IP 62 would make to PECBA. 2016See Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 225-26 , 936 P2d 964 (1997) (illustrating principle).” Thus, the first step in our analysis is to determine the changes, if any, that IP 62 would make to PECBA. | 1 | 1 |
Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries Ab, and Per-Ingvar Branemark Tomas Albrektsson Ulf Lekholm Lars Sennerbygreen1 sentence2014Thus, the first step of the analysis involves “a qualitative evaluation of the defendant’s contact with the forum state in order to determine whether the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ashbaughgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297, 308-09 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (so holding); State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407 , 813 P2d 28 (1991) (seizure occurs when an officer “temporarily restrains a person’s liberty”). 2013See State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297, 308-09 , 244 P3d 360 (2010) (so holding); State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407 , 813 P2d 28 (1991) (seizure occurs when an officer “temporarily restrains a person’s liberty”). | 1 | 1 |
| Solem v. Helmred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Robertsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2021At the first step of the analysis, we consider principles of statutory construction “that bear directly on how to read the text.” PGE, 317 Or at 611 . 2008The first step in that analysis is to consider the text and context of the particular statutory provision, recognizing that the "text of the statutory provision itself * * * is the best evidence of the legislature's intent," and that "words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning." Id. at 610-11 . *Page 5 The dictionary includes occupancy as an element of the definition of homestead either expressly or by implication in all but one instance. | 3 | 1998–2021 |
Hughes v. State of Oregon
green
2 sentences2024The first question of the first step of the inquiry—is there a state contract?—is not at issue, because, as decided in Hughes, “PERS was intended to be and is a contract between the [public employer] and its employees[.]” 314 Or at 25 ; see also, e.g., Strunk, 338 Or at 170 . 2024The first question of the first step of the inquiry—is there a state contract?—is not at issue, because, as decided in Hughes, “PERS was intended to be and is a contract between the [public employer] and its employees[.]” 314 Or at 25 ; see also, e.g., Strunk, 338 Or at 170 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Flatley v. Mauro
green
2 sentences2023First, plaintiff argued that the court should 6 Defendant argued that her conduct was also protected by ORS 31.150(2)(a) and (b), but she does not advance those arguments on appeal. 204 Davoodian v. Rivera apply the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal 4th 299, 317, 139 P3d 2 (2006),7 that a special motion to strike “cannot be invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that reason, not protected by con- stitutional guarantees of free speech and petition.” Plaintiff argued that defendant’s conduct of send 2023First, plaintiff argued that the court should 6 Defendant argued that her conduct was also protected by ORS 31.150(2)(a) and (b), but she does not advance those arguments on appeal. 204 Davoodian v. Rivera apply the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal 4th 299, 317, 139 P3d 2 (2006),7 that a special motion to strike “cannot be invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that reason, not protected by con- stitutional guarantees of free speech and petition.” Plaintiff argued that defendant’s conduct of send | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences1986State v. Collins, 73 Or App 216, 219 , 698 P2d 969 (1985). 1986State v. Collins, 73 Or App 216, 219 , 698 P2d 969 (1985). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Husk v. Adelman
green
2 sentences2024Under the statute, then, at the first step of the analysis, the court must “complete two related tasks: (1) it must make findings of fact as to the evidence presented and (2) it must determine whether those factual findings, when viewed as a whole, constitute clear and convincing evi- dence that the presumption in favor of the legal parent was rebutted.” Husk v. Adelman, 281 Or App 378, 382 , 383 P3d 961 (2016) (citing ORS 109.119(2)(b), which requires a court to make “findings of fact supporting the rebuttal of the pre- sumption”). 2024Under the statute, then, at the first step of the analysis, the court must “complete two related tasks: (1) it must make findings of fact as to the evidence presented and (2) it must determine whether those factual findings, when viewed as a whole, constitute clear and convincing evi- dence that the presumption in favor of the legal parent was rebutted.” Husk v. Adelman, 281 Or App 378, 382 , 383 P3d 961 (2016) (citing ORS 109.119(2)(b), which requires a court to make “findings of fact supporting the rebuttal of the pre- sumption”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Olson v. Van Horn
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 270-71 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Gadalean v. Saif Corp. (In re Comp. of Gadalean)
green
2 sentences2021And, “[j]ust as with the court’s consid- eration of the text of a statute,” we utilize principles of stat- utory construction “that bear directly on the interpretation of the statutory provision in context,” including the principle that “ ‘where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all,’ ” id. (quoting ORS 174.010), as well as the principle that, “[w]hen the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, we presume that the legislature intended different meanings,” Gadalean v. SAIF, 364 Or 707, 719 , 439 P3d 2021And, “[j]ust as with the court’s consid- eration of the text of a statute,” we utilize principles of stat- utory construction “that bear directly on the interpretation of the statutory provision in context,” including the principle that “ ‘where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all,’ ” id. (quoting ORS 174.010), as well as the principle that, “[w]hen the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, we presume that the legislature intended different meanings,” Gadalean v. SAIF, 364 Or 707, 719 , 439 P3d | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bert Brundige, LLC v. Dept. of Rev.
green
2 sentences2021Also at the first step of the analysis, we consider “the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes.” Id. 2021And, “[j]ust as with the court’s consid- eration of the text of a statute,” we utilize principles of stat- utory construction “that bear directly on the interpretation of the statutory provision in context,” including the principle that “ ‘where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all,’ ” id. (quoting ORS 174.010), as well as the principle that, “[w]hen the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, we presume that the legislature intended different meanings,” Gadalean v. SAIF, 364 Or 707, 719 , 439 P3d | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Barbeau v. Wisconsin
neutral
1 sentence2021Thus, we turn to the first step of that inquiry: whether a sentence of “life imprisonment” under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001) with a 30-year mandatory minimum term is the same as life-without-parole or the functional equivalent. because it was not life-without-parole sentence, but also because the sentenc- ing court “considered the traditional sentencing factors, along with the miti- gating factors set forth” by statute); State v. Jefferson, 252 NC App 174, 177, 798 SE2d 121, 123 (NC Ct App 2017), cert den, ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 1169 (2018) (“the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized s | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McIntire v. Forbes
green
2 sentences2020State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91 , 949 P2d 724 (1997); McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 443-44 , 909 P2d 846 (1996). 2020State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91 , 949 P2d 724 (1997); McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 443-44 , 909 P2d 846 (1996). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State Ex Rel. Caleb v. Beesley
green
2 sentences2020State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91 , 949 P2d 724 (1997); McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 443-44 , 909 P2d 846 (1996). 2020State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91 , 949 P2d 724 (1997); McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 443-44 , 909 P2d 846 (1996). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re the Marriage of Patterson
green
1 sentence2020In determining at the first step of the analysis whether a contract provision is ambiguous, in addition to the text and context, the court may also “consider evidence of the circumstances underlying the formation of the con- tract.” Id. at 349 (citing ORS 42.220; Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309, 315 , 129 P3d 773 , rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006)); see also Grossman and Grossman, 338 Or 99, 108 , 106 P3d 618 (2005). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Batzer Construction, Inc. v. John Boyer
green
2 sentences2020In determining at the first step of the analysis whether a contract provision is ambiguous, in addition to the text and context, the court may also “consider evidence of the circumstances underlying the formation of the con- tract.” Id. at 349 (citing ORS 42.220; Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309, 315 , 129 P3d 773 , rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006)); see also Grossman and Grossman, 338 Or 99, 108 , 106 P3d 618 (2005). 2020In determining at the first step of the analysis whether a contract provision is ambiguous, in addition to the text and context, the court may also “consider evidence of the circumstances underlying the formation of the con- tract.” Id. at 349 (citing ORS 42.220; Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309, 315 , 129 P3d 773 , rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006)); see also Grossman and Grossman, 338 Or 99, 108 , 106 P3d 618 (2005). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Vasquez-Santiago
green
1 sentence2019As I will explain, the analysis in this case should end at the first step of the inquiry because the detectives Cite as 301 Or App 90 (2019) 119 made nothing close to the sort of “inducement” that has led courts in past cases to conclude that police officers crossed the line. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Burdge v. Palmateer
green
1 sentence2014Thus, the first step in our analysis requires us to determine whether “a lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment would have recognized the statutory ambiguity, would have seen an interpretation that could benefit the defendant, and would have concluded under the circumstances that the potential benefits of advancing that interpretation exceeded any risks.” Id. at 497 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Holmes green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Steen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Peeples v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Tipperman v. Tsiatsos green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Fendall v. Miller green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Commission green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Perez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Garcias green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Hockings green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Windows v. Pennsylvania green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.