first step analysis in Louisiana

2018Cf. Johnson v. California , 545 U.S. 162 , 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (because Batson did not mean to impose an onerous burden as the first step in its analysis, a defendant need produce only "evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.").

2018Cf. Johnson v. California , 545 U.S. 162 , 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (because Batson did not mean to impose an onerous burden as the first step in its analysis, a defendant need produce only "evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.").

2018As previously determined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in an earlier appeal of a prior grant of summary judgment to Allstate in this matter, Peterson met the definition of an "insured person" under the UM provisions of the Allstate policy, because he was a "person while in, on, getting into or out of an 'insured auto' with [the policyholder's] express or implied permission." Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that the co-owned motorcycle could be considered an "insured motor vehicle" for purposes of UM coverage because it fell within the definition of a "land motor vehicle" in the policy's

2017However, the supreme court in State v. Green , 94-887, pp. 24-25 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272 , 288, explained: Regarding this first step of the Batson analysis, the trial court below did not expressly rule on whether the defendant had made out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; rather, he immediately moved to the second step and ordered the prosecutor to justify his use of peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors with race-neutral reasons.

2016State v. Reeves, 06-2419, pp. 78-79 (La. 5/5/09), 11 So.3d 1031, 1081-82 , cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1031 , 130 S.Ct. 637 , 175 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (footnotes omitted).

2014As explicated by the Court’s later decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the question Chapman instructs reviewing courts to consider is “not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” The Sullivan formulation of harmless-error explicitly drew on the Court’s prior decision in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), which posed as the first

2014As explicated by the Court’s later decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the question Chapman instructs reviewing courts to consider is “not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” The Sullivan formulation of harmless-error explicitly drew on the Court’s prior decision in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), which posed as the first

2014As explicated by the Court’s later decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the question Chapman instructs reviewing courts to consider is “not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” The Sullivan formulation of harmless-error explicitly drew on the Court’s prior decision in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), which posed as the first

2014As explicated by the Court’s later decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the question Chapman instructs reviewing courts to consider is “not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” The Sullivan formulation of harmless-error explicitly drew on the Court’s prior decision in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), which posed as the first

2013This court has held in order “to prove a violation of substantive due process, defendants must first establish the existence of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest.” State v. Weaver, 2001-0467, p. 10 (La.1/15/02); 805 So.2d 166, 173 .

1997Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La.1993) underscored the importance of ascertaining the legislature's intent and rationale in enacting a statute.

1996Id.

1994When an accused has been questioned in a custodial environment, the prosecution is required to establish that his interrogation followed the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1994When an accused has been questioned in a custodial environment, the prosecution is required to establish that his interrogation followed the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1994The testimony of Harig and his mother obviously meets the first step of the test of Housley v. Cerise, supra, that disability occurred or increased after the accident.

1990Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542 , 256 So.2d 620 (1972).

1990Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542 , 256 So.2d 620 (1972).