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18 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pressler v. Duke Universitygreen2 sentences2021Pressler, 199 N.C. App. at 590 , 685 S.E.2d at 9 (citation omitted). ¶ 25 The determination of whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration “involves a two-step analysis requiring the trial court to ascertain both (1) whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate, and also (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of that agreement.” Slaughter, 162 N.C. App. at 461 , 591 S.E.2d at 580 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26 The first step of this analysis—whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate—is the issue presented in 2021Pressler, 199 N.C. App. at 590 , 685 S.E.2d at 9 (citation omitted). ¶ 25 The determination of whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration “involves a two-step analysis requiring the trial court to ascertain both (1) whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate, and also (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of that agreement.” Slaughter, 162 N.C. App. at 461 , 591 S.E.2d at 580 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26 The first step of this analysis—whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate—is the issue presented in | 2 | 2 |
Slaughter v. Swicegoodgreen2 sentences2021Pressler, 199 N.C. App. at 590 , 685 S.E.2d at 9 (citation omitted). ¶ 25 The determination of whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration “involves a two-step analysis requiring the trial court to ascertain both (1) whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate, and also (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of that agreement.” Slaughter, 162 N.C. App. at 461 , 591 S.E.2d at 580 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26 The first step of this analysis—whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate—is the issue presented in 2021Pressler, 199 N.C. App. at 590 , 685 S.E.2d at 9 (citation omitted). ¶ 25 The determination of whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration “involves a two-step analysis requiring the trial court to ascertain both (1) whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate, and also (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of that agreement.” Slaughter, 162 N.C. App. at 461 , 591 S.E.2d at 580 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26 The first step of this analysis—whether the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate—is the issue presented in | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. Carriergreen2 sentences2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). 2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). 2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Murraygreen2 sentences2020Where appellate counsel “ha[s] researched the question, but ha[s] determined that the claim [is] unlikely to succeed,” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 , 531-32, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2665 (1986), and therefore does not pursue the claim on appeal, counsel has not rendered ineffective assistance, id. at 535-36, 106 S. Ct. at 2667. 2020Where appellate counsel “ha[s] researched the question, but ha[s] determined that the claim [is] unlikely to succeed,” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 , 531-32, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2665 (1986), and therefore does not pursue the claim on appeal, counsel has not rendered ineffective assistance, id. at 535-36, 106 S. Ct. at 2667. | 2 | 2 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1981Therefore, the North Carolina courts have greatly simplified the first step in the test by interpreting section 1-75.4 (1) (d) to apply to any defendant who meets the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L. 1981Therefore, the North Carolina courts have greatly simplified the first step in the test by interpreting section 1-75.4 (1) (d) to apply to any defendant who meets the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 872 , 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2016). 2026See State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 872 , 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Skinner v. Preferred Creditgreen2 sentences2014“To satisfy the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis, there must be sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and our state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122 , 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L. 2014“To satisfy the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis, there must be sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and our state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122 , 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
Raper v. Mansfield Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2011See Raper v. Mansfield Sys., Inc., 189 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cummingsgreen2 sentences2005To rebut a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecution must "`articulate legitimate reasons which are clear and reasonably specific and related to the particular case to be tried which give a neutral explanation for challenging jurors of the cognizable group.'" Cummings, 346 N.C. at 308-09 , 488 S.E.2d at 560 (citations omitted). 2005To rebut a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecution must "`articulate legitimate reasons which are clear and reasonably specific and related to the particular case to be tried which give a neutral explanation for challenging jurors of the cognizable group.'" Cummings, 346 N.C. at 308-09 , 488 S.E.2d at 560 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). 2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Gray v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). 2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Gray v. United Parcel Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). 2022This presumption “may be used to help a claimant carry [the claimant’s] burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent’s employment, or both.” Id. at 368 , 368 S.E.2d at 585 . ¶ 18 “The first step in the analysis is whether the presumption applies, based upon the facts of the case.” Gray v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 212 N.C. App. 674, 678 , 713 S.E.2d 126, 129 , disc. review and cert. denied, 365 N.C. 351 , 717 S.E.2d 743 (2011). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). 2020The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). “[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Howes v. Fields
green
2 sentences2016Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda . " Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 . 2016Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda . " Howes v. Fields, --- U.S. ----, ----, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 , 28 (2012) ; see also State v. Barnes , --- N.C. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences2014Supreme Court] and the U.S. Supreme Court.” Turner, 305 N.C. at 364 , 289 S.E.2d at 373 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. 2014Supreme Court] and the U.S. Supreme Court.” Turner, 305 N.C. at 364 , 289 S.E.2d at 373 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2014Supreme Court] and the U.S. Supreme Court.” Turner, 305 N.C. at 364 , 289 S.E.2d at 373 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. 2014Supreme Court] and the U.S. Supreme Court.” Turner, 305 N.C. at 364 , 289 S.E.2d at 373 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Appeal of Totsland Preschool, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009App. at 164 , 636 S.E.2d at 295 . 2009“The first step in an analysis under section 105-278.7(a) is to determine that the entity seeking an exemption qualifies as one of the types of agencies entitled to an exemption pursuant to section 105-278.7(c).” Totsland, 180 N.C. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hernandez v. New York
green
2 sentences2005We need not address the first step in this analysis because once a prosecutor offers a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge, and the trial court subsequently rules on whether there was intentional discrimination of a juror based on their race, “the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 , 114 L. 2005We need not address the first step in this analysis because once a prosecutor offers a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge, and the trial court subsequently rules on whether there was intentional discrimination of a juror based on their race, “the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 , 114 L. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Koufman v. Koufman
green
2 sentences2005We need not address the first step in this analysis, since it is well settled that where no exception is taken to a finding of fact, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal, Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93 , 97, 408 S.E.2d 729 , 731 (1991); and the findings of fact which defendant did not assign as error are themselves sufficient to support the conclusions of law. 2005We need not address the first step in this analysis, since it is well settled that where no exception is taken to a finding of fact, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal, Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93 , 97, 408 S.E.2d 729 , 731 (1991); and the findings of fact which defendant did not assign as error are themselves sufficient to support the conclusions of law. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the Flood Plain Ordinance v. City of Asheville
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.