46 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lindsey Dostal v. Curtis Strandgreen2 sentences2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . 2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . | 2 | 2 |
Northern States Power Co. v. Bughergreen2 sentences2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . 2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . | 2 | 2 |
Randall v. Feltgreen2 sentences2023"An issue is 'actually litigated' when it is 'properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.'" Id.; see also Randall v. Felt, 2002 WI App 157, ¶9 , 256 Wis. 2d 563 , 647 N.W.2d 373 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d (1980)). 2023"An issue is 'actually litigated' when it is 'properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.'" Id.; see also Randall v. Felt, 2002 WI App 157, ¶9 , 256 Wis. 2d 563 , 647 N.W.2d 373 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d (1980)). | 2 | 2 |
Kruckenberg v. Harveygreen2 sentences2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . 2023See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51 , 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). "[T]he rights of persons not parties to the original litigation may be implicated . . . ." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . ¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment." Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 . | 2 | 2 |
Bartlett v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences2022The Supreme Court in Cooper concluded that when an elective district "functioned, election year in and election year out, as a 'crossover' district, in which members of the majority help a 'large enough' minority to elect its candidate of choice . . . it is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met——and hence how § 2 liability could be established." Id. (citing Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (2009)). ¶185 The three Gingles prerequisites are factual conditions that must be proved in order to establish the first step of a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rig 2022The Supreme Court in Cooper concluded that when an elective district "functioned, election year in and election year out, as a 'crossover' district, in which members of the majority help a 'large enough' minority to elect its candidate of choice . . . it is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met——and hence how § 2 liability could be established." Id. (citing Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (2009)). ¶185 The three Gingles prerequisites are factual conditions that must be proved in order to establish the first step of a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rig | 2 | 2 |
Rock v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 14 No. 2013AP1724.awb greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has not yet been sentenced or committed. | 2 | 2 |
Gary Stewart Boardman v. Wayne Estelle, Wardengreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 14 No. 2013AP1724.awb greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has not yet been sentenced or committed. | 2 | 2 |
Lloyd C. Ashe and Hilliard P. Ashe v. State of North Carolina, and Cherokee County, Murphy, North Carolinagreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 14 No. 2013AP1724.awb greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has not yet been sentenced or committed. | 2 | 2 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 14 No. 2013AP1724.awb greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has not yet been sentenced or committed. | 2 | 2 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 2016See, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (sentencing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 n.9. 14 No. 2013AP1724.awb greater than that of a parolee or probationer, because he has not yet been sentenced or committed. | 2 | 2 |
Crawford v. Marion County Election Boardgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 189-90 ; id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). 2014Id. at 189-90 ; id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barrgreen2 sentences2021Id. at 447 . 2021Step one: Does Wis. Stat. § 941.20 (1)(b) impose a burden on conduct falling within the Second Amendment's scope? ¶36 The first step in the inquiry is to consider "whether the regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second Amendment." Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoted source omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Bay View Packing Co. v. Taffgreen1 sentence2024See Bay View Packing, 198 Wis. 2d at 681 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Timothy E. Dobbsgreen2 sentences2022This inquiry “is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” “[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶¶13-14, 16-17 , 395 Wis. 2d 385 , 953 N.W.2d 847 (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted); see also State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64 , 392 Wis. 2 2022This inquiry “is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” “[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶¶13-14, 16-17 , 395 Wis. 2d 385 , 953 N.W.2d 847 (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted); see also State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64 , 392 Wis. 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brian L. Halversongreen2 sentences2022This inquiry “is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” “[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶¶13-14, 16-17 , 395 Wis. 2d 385 , 953 N.W.2d 847 (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted); see also State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64 , 392 Wis. 2 2022This inquiry “is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” “[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶¶13-14, 16-17 , 395 Wis. 2d 385 , 953 N.W.2d 847 (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted); see also State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64 , 392 Wis. 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gruengreen1 sentence2022See Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d at 593 . | 1 | 1 |
California v. Behelergreen1 sentence2022This inquiry “is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” “[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶¶13-14, 16-17 , 395 Wis. 2d 385 , 953 N.W.2d 847 (alterations in original, footnote and citations omitted); see also State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64 , 392 Wis. 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. Shatzergreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of New Richmond v. State Dept. of Natural Resourcesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ringergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown County Department of Human Services v. Brenda B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arneson v. Jezwinskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Mathiasongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rhode Island v. Innisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Plymessergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Building Owners & Managers Ass'n of Milwaukee v. Adamanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2000Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 . ¶ 55. 2000Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 . ¶ 55. | 3 | 1998–2000 |
State v. Mosley
green
2 sentences2023State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 652 , 307 N.W.2d 200 (1981). 2022Also, if a subsequent in-court identification is challenged as tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification, “the state must show the in-court identification derives from an independent basis.” Id. ¶13 Under the first step of this test, suggestiveness in a photographic array may arise from “the manner in which the photos are presented or displayed, the words or actions of the law enforcement official overseeing the viewing, or some aspect of the photographs themselves.” Id.4 With respect to the nature of the photographs, a photographic array may be impermissibly suggestiv | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Schall v. Martin
green
2 sentences1991Id. at 264 . 1991Id. at 264 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Marshall Schinner v. Michael Gundrum
green
2 sentences2025Id., ¶41; Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶37 , 349 Wis. 2d 529 , 833 N.W.2d 685 (“[I]f the court determines that the policy was not intended to cover the asserted claims, it is not necessary to examine the policy’s exclusions.”). 2025Id., ¶41; Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶37 , 349 Wis. 2d 529 , 833 N.W.2d 685 (“[I]f the court determines that the policy was not intended to cover the asserted claims, it is not necessary to examine the policy’s exclusions.”). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Knapp
green
1 sentence2025Our supreme court has also concluded that “physical evidence obtained as the direct result of an intentional Miranda violation is inadmissible under Article 1, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.” Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶83 . ¶13 Determining whether a custodial interrogation occurred is the first step in an inquiry of whether statements and other evidentiary “fruits” were obtained in violation of Miranda and must be excluded from evidence. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Marinez
green
1 sentence2023Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶19 . ¶21 Dionne’s argument fails under the first step of this analysis. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Munger v. Seehafer
green
1 sentence2023Munger, 372 Wis. 2d 749, ¶60 . ¶24 Second, we must decide whether applying issue preclusion comports with principles of fundamental fairness. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Torres
green
2 sentences2023State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, ¶6 , 267 Wis. 2d 213 , 670 N.W.2d 400 . ¶8 On appeal, Blankenship argues that the circuit court erred in failing to modify his sentence to make him eligible for the ERP. 2023State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, ¶6 , 267 Wis. 2d 213 , 670 N.W.2d 400 . ¶8 On appeal, Blankenship argues that the circuit court erred in failing to modify his sentence to make him eligible for the ERP. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Michelle T. Ex Rel. Sumpter v. Crozier
green
2 sentences2023Michelle T. by Sumpter v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-89 , 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993). 9 No. 2020AP1943 ¶24 In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment. 2023Michelle T. by Sumpter v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-89 , 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993). 9 No. 2020AP1943 ¶24 In the first step of the analysis, we must determine whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and whether the determination was essential to the judgment. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Cofield
green
2 sentences2023A reasonable judge could determine that the classmate allegation was not “a step in a plan leading to the [sexual assault allegations], or some other result of which the [sexual assault allegations were] but one step.” See State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, ¶13 , 238 Wis. 2d 467 , 618 N.W.2d 214 . 2023A reasonable judge could determine that the classmate allegation was not “a step in a plan leading to the [sexual assault allegations], or some other result of which the [sexual assault allegations were] but one step.” See State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, ¶13 , 238 Wis. 2d 467 , 618 N.W.2d 214 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2022State v. Jones, 228 Wis. 2d 593, 598 , 598 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1999). 2022State v. Jones, 228 Wis. 2d 593, 598 , 598 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1999). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Howes v. Fields
green
2 sentences2021This inquiry "is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last." Id. "[T]he freedom- of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). 2021Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask "whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ramuta
green
2 sentences2021State v. Ramuta, 2003 WI App 80, ¶8 , 261 Wis. 2d 784 , 661 N.W.2d 483 . 2021State v. Ramuta, 2003 WI App 80, ¶8 , 261 Wis. 2d 784 , 661 N.W.2d 483 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Estate of Esther Hussey v. Milwaukee County green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. DeSantis green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Trawitzki green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Rhone green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State Ex Rel. Cannon v. Moran green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Fencl green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.