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29 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LoBello v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co.green2 sentences2025Co., 152 So. 3d 595, 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) and additional citation omitted); Perez v. Citizens Prop. 2023Co., 152 So. 3d 595, 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). | 2 | 2 |
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenaisgreen2 sentences2020Id. at 502 . 2012See id. | 1 | 2 |
Blythe v. Atlas Industrial Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2024Even so, the Fourth District then certified conflict with France v. France, 90 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), a case addressing only the first step of that test. 2024See id. at 864 (holding that an out-of-state resident can commit a tortious act in Florida simply by recording a Florida resident). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Wright v. State, 983 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Marcus Jamal Graham v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2017See Graham, 207 So.3d at 141 (relying on the record to determine whether the defendant’s multiple convictions were based on distinct acts); McCarter v. State, 204 So.3d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding that,, the record established two distinct acts of solicitation, a request for illicit pictures and a solicitation for a lewd or lascivious molestation, to support appellant’s dual convictions for solicitation and traveling). 2017See Graham, 207 So. 3d at 141 (relying on the record to determine whether the defendant’s multiple convictions were based on distinct acts); McCarter v. State, 204 So. 3d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding that the record established two distinct acts of solicitation, a request for illicit pictures and a solicitation for a lewd or lascivious molestation, to support appellant’s dual convictions for solicitation and traveling). | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence D. Brown McCarter v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2017See Graham, 207 So.3d at 141 (relying on the record to determine whether the defendant’s multiple convictions were based on distinct acts); McCarter v. State, 204 So.3d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding that,, the record established two distinct acts of solicitation, a request for illicit pictures and a solicitation for a lewd or lascivious molestation, to support appellant’s dual convictions for solicitation and traveling). 2017See Graham, 207 So. 3d at 141 (relying on the record to determine whether the defendant’s multiple convictions were based on distinct acts); McCarter v. State, 204 So. 3d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding that the record established two distinct acts of solicitation, a request for illicit pictures and a solicitation for a lewd or lascivious molestation, to support appellant’s dual convictions for solicitation and traveling). | 1 | 1 |
R.J.R. v. Stategreen2 sentences2017A similar analysis was applied in R.J.R. v. State, 88 So.3d 264, 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), when’ this Court observed, “the State failed to establish that the acts occurred in different locations, that there was any temporal break between the two acts that would have enabled R.J.R. to reflect and form a new criminal intent for the second act, or that there were any intervening acts interrupting RJ.R.’s resisting arrest.” Just as was required in the first step of the test, step two requires the examination of the entire record before a court may conclude that multiple acts are distinct for double 2017A similar analysis was applied in R.J.R. v. State, 88 So. 3d 264, 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), when this Court observed, “the State failed to establish that the acts occurred in different locations, that there was any temporal break between the two acts that would have enabled R.J.R. to reflect and form a new criminal intent for the second act, or that there were any intervening acts interrupting R.J.R.’s resisting arrest.” 10 Just as was required in the first step of the test, step two requires the examination of the entire record before a court may conclude that multiple acts are distinct for do | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See 1500 Coral Towers, 112 So.3d at 543-44 ; Waldrep, 400 So.2d at 785-86 ; Clena Invs., 2012 WL 1004851 , at *4. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Shatzergreen2 sentences2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi 2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi | 1 | 1 |
Justice Administrative Commission v. Lenamongreen1 sentence2013Comm’n v. Lenamon, 19 So.3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leonard David Griffingreen1 sentence2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi | 1 | 1 |
Gaber v. Stategreen1 sentence2011The analysis of these two statutes reveals no clear statement of legislative intent one way or the other. *558 “[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger ‘same-elements’ test pursuant to section 775.021(4) ... is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.” Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla.1996) (footnote omitted); see also Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1070 (“ ‘Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, co | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Stategreen1 sentence2011The analysis of these two statutes reveals no clear statement of legislative intent one way or the other. *558 “[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger ‘same-elements’ test pursuant to section 775.021(4) ... is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.” Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla.1996) (footnote omitted); see also Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1070 (“ ‘Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, co | 1 | 1 |
Valdes v. Stategreen1 sentence2011The analysis of these two statutes reveals no clear statement of legislative intent one way or the other. *558 “[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger ‘same-elements’ test pursuant to section 775.021(4) ... is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.” Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla.1996) (footnote omitted); see also Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1070 (“ ‘Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, co | 1 | 1 |
Small v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Small v. State, 630 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Fla.1994). 1 This case is resolvable on the first step of the analysis. | 1 | 1 |
Goad v. Florida Dept. of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it | 1 | 1 |
Tejeda v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 368 ("establish[ing] a bright-line test . . . [t]here is either activity on the record or there is not"); Diamond Drywall *846 Sys., Inc. v. Mashan Contractors, Inc., 943 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(" Wilson has uniformly been interpreted to mean that any document appearing in the record within one year prior to the filing of a motion to dismiss precludes the entry of dismissal for failure to prosecute."). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Salamongreen1 sentence2007Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363, 368 ("establish[ing] a bright-line test . . . [t]here is either activity on the record or there is not"); Diamond Drywall *846 Sys., Inc. v. Mashan Contractors, Inc., 943 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(" Wilson has uniformly been interpreted to mean that any document appearing in the record within one year prior to the filing of a motion to dismiss precludes the entry of dismissal for failure to prosecute."). | 1 | 1 |
| Bradley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| BARNETT BK. OF E. POLK COUNTY v. Fleminggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Andrew Jackson Robertson
green
2 sentences2003In the first step of the analysis, the trial court must determine "whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion." Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366 . 1998In the first step of the analysis, the trial court must determine "whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion." Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366 . | 2 | 1998–2003 |
Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2018However, as the Florida Supreme Court has emphasized, whether Florida’s long-arm statute applies to confer personal jurisdiction is only “the first step of the inquiry.” Internet Sols., 39 So. 3d at 1216 . 2018“The second step is a more restrictive one, precluding suit in any situation where the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would violate due process.” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Waldrep
green
1 sentence2014See 1500 Coral Towers, 112 So.3d at 543-44 ; Waldrep, 400 So.2d at 785-86 ; Clena Invs., 2012 WL 1004851 , at *4. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi 2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Howes v. Fields
green
2 sentences2013The Court stated that the first step in the analysis involves ascertaining whether, given “the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to end the interrogation and leave. 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). 2013“Determining whether an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Thompson v. Keohane
green
2 sentences2013The Court stated that the first step in the analysis involves ascertaining whether, given “the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to end the interrogation and leave. 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). 2013The Court stated that the first step in the analysis involves ascertaining whether, given “the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to end the interrogation and leave. 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Stansbury v. California
green
2 sentences2013The Court stated that the first step in the analysis involves ascertaining whether, given “the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to end the interrogation and leave. 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). 2013The Court stated that the first step in the analysis involves ascertaining whether, given “the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to end the interrogation and leave. 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Oregon v. Mathiason
green
2 sentences2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi 2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi 2013“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning,” “its duration,” “statements made during the interview,” “the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,” and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189 ; see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224-26 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Oregon v. Mathi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2009This split is based on opposing interpretations of the supreme court’s decision in Taylor v. State, 444 So.2d 931 (Fla.1983), which held that attempted manslaughter was a cognizable crime in this state. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it 2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it 2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Terry v. Ohio green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Franklin v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Townsend v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Del Duca v. Anthony green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Wakulla County v. Davis green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Adams v. Culver green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Carawan v. State red | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Barnett v. Lakeland Construction Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corporation green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.