first step analysis in Indiana

2025See Kimsey, 781 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-2381 | December 29, 2025 Page 17 of 33 N.E.2d at 691 (“[A] statute with a population category is a special law if it is designed to operate upon or benefit only particular municipalities and thus is essentially no different than if the statute had identified the particular municipalities by name.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Auditor of Monroe Cnty., 849 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. 2006) (“It is difficult to imagine a piece of legislation more ‘special’ than Section 4

2025See Kimsey, 781 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-2381 | December 29, 2025 Page 17 of 33 N.E.2d at 691 (“[A] statute with a population category is a special law if it is designed to operate upon or benefit only particular municipalities and thus is essentially no different than if the statute had identified the particular municipalities by name.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Auditor of Monroe Cnty., 849 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. 2006) (“It is difficult to imagine a piece of legislation more ‘special’ than Section 4

2025Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 692-93 ; see also City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d 70, 74 (Ind. 2019) (holding special law unconstitutional where there was no link between the cities’ alleged unique characteristics and the special treatment afforded them). [30] Turning back to the first step in the analysis, while a law might be general in that it does not directly refer to a particular locality, we look deeper to determine whether it applies generally throughout the state.

2019McVey v. State, 56 N.E.3d 674, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2019McVey v. State, 56 N.E.3d 674 , 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2018Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997); Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). [23] With regard to the first step of the inquiry, we have recognized that “where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant’s prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1708-CR-1994 | March 14, 2018 Page 15 of 24 admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 408 .

2018Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997); Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). [23] With regard to the first step of the inquiry, we have recognized that “where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant’s prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1708-CR-1994 | March 14, 2018 Page 15 of 24 admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 408 .

2018With regard to the second step, “‘The trial court has wide latitude, however, in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission.’” Goldsberry, 821 N.E.2d at 455 (quoting Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Ind. 2000)). [24] Here, the State offered evidence of an October 2009 incident, for which Haines was ultimately convicted, during which Haines accused Wagers of having slept with a neighbor, and he hit her in the face and strangled her, in the Children’s presence.

2018With regard to the second step, “‘The trial court has wide latitude, however, in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission.’” Goldsberry, 821 N.E.2d at 455 (quoting Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Ind. 2000)). [24] Here, the State offered evidence of an October 2009 incident, for which Haines was ultimately convicted, during which Haines accused Wagers of having slept with a neighbor, and he hit her in the face and strangled her, in the Children’s presence.

2015Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ind.1996).

2014As for the first step of the test, we noted in Gerald that when defining what constitutes a substantially related matter within the context of Rule 1.9, our supreme court has “looked to the facts of a case to determine if the issues in the prior and present cases are ‘essentially the same or are closely interwoven therewith.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Robak, 654 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind.1995)).

2011When the sole claim of malpractice is a failure to diagnose, the *66 date of the malpractice “cannot as a matter of law extend beyond the time the physician last rendered a diagnosis.” Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. 1991).

2002See id. 8 . - Under the court's reasoning, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff discovered the alleged malpractice and resulting injury, or possessed enough infor *352 mation which, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have lead to such discovery within the limitation period.

1994If the offenses are premised upon different acts, the problem is not so great." Derado v. State (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 181, 182 (quoting Elmore v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 532 , 382 N.E.2d 893, 894 .

1990See O’Conner v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 460 , 399 N.E.2d 364 ; Barker v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 271 , 150 N.E.2d 680 .

1990See O’Conner v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 460 , 399 N.E.2d 364 ; Barker v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 271 , 150 N.E.2d 680 .