25 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garzagreen2 sentences2023A. Length of the Delay {5} The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length of pretrial delay is “presumptively prejudicial.” State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2023A. Length of the Delay {5} The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length of pretrial delay is “presumptively prejudicial.” State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 7 |
Herron v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Although acknowledging that unitary conduct is only the first step of the inquiry under the analysis set out in Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 361 , 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991), Defendant contends that the second step of that analysis requires a decision in his favor because the other factors (time between acts, location of acts, intervening events, distinctions in acts, defendant’s intent, and number of victims) all, with the exception of number of victims, support a finding of legislative intent to punish only once for the unitary act. 2001Although acknowledging that unitary conduct is only the first step of the inquiry under the analysis set out in Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 361 , 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991), Defendant contends that the second step of that analysis requires a decision in his favor because the other factors (time between acts, location of acts, intervening events, distinctions in acts, defendant’s intent, and number of victims) all, with the exception of number of victims, support a finding of legislative intent to punish only once for the unitary act. | 2 | 2 |
Lewis L. Wayne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019An objective review requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a "prudent and reasonable official [would] see a need to act to protect life or *190 property[.]" Wayne v. United States , 318 F.2d 205 , 212 (D.C. 2019An objective review requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a “prudent and reasonable official [would] see a need to act to protect life or property[.]” Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Spearmangreen1 sentence2022Under that test, courts balance “(1) the length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5 , 366 P.3d 1121 . “[W]e give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.” Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {21} The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length | 1 | 1 |
Sanabria v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021The purpose of this first step is to ascertain the legislative intent as to the unit of prosecution or, in other words, to determine what conduct the Legislature “has defined [as] a statutory offense” or “[w]hether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under the statute.” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Olssongreen1 sentence2021See Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 7. {13} Under the first step of our framework, we “must analyze the statute to determine whether the Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution and, if the statute spells out the unit of prosecution, then the court follows that language and the inquiry is complete.” Olsson, 2014-NMSC-012, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 1 |
Albright v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2019See Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that where a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears a heavy two-part burden). | 1 | 1 |
Lion's Gate Water v. D'ANTONIOgreen2 sentences2013See Lion’s Gate Water v. D’Antonio, 7 1 2009-NMSC-057, ¶ 17 , 147 N.M. 523 , 226 P.3d 622 (limiting the district court’s de 2 novo review of a State Engineer’s order to the issues presented before the State 3 Engineer). 2013See Lion’s Gate Water v. D’Antonio, 7 1 2009-NMSC-057, ¶ 17 , 147 N.M. 523 , 226 P.3d 622 (limiting the district court’s de 2 novo review of a State Engineer’s order to the issues presented before the State 3 Engineer). | 1 | 1 |
Spears v. Canon De Carnue Land Grantgreen2 sentences2005Spears v. Canon de Carnue Land Grant, 80 N.M. 766, 768 , 461 P.2d 415, 417 (1969). {23} The first step of our analysis is to determine if Applicants made a prima facie showing that the water rights associated with the springs are less than the estimated yield of the springs. 2005Spears v. Canon de Carnue Land Grant, 80 N.M. 766, 768 , 461 P.2d 415, 417 (1969). {23} The first step of our analysis is to determine if Applicants made a prima facie showing that the water rights associated with the springs are less than the estimated yield of the springs. | 1 | 1 |
Roth v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2005See Roth, 113 N.M. at 334 , 825 P.2d at 1244 . 2005See Roth, 113 N.M. at 334 , 825 P.2d at 1244 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frankgreen2 sentences2001See Frank, 123 N.M. 734 , 945 P.2d 464 , 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 8 . {12} The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the second step of its Watchman test may require "some modification" because of Venetie. 2001See Frank, 123 N.M. 734 , 945 P.2d 464 , 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 8 . {12} The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the second step of its Watchman test may require "some modification" because of Venetie. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bernal
green
2 sentences2024“If the acts are not sufficiently distinct, then the rule of lenity 7 mandates an interpretation that the [L]egislature did not intend multiple 8 punishments, and a defendant cannot be punished for multiple crimes.” State v. 9 Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 14 , 140 N.M. 644 , 146 P.3d 289 . 10 {13} At the first step of our analysis, our Supreme Court has already determined 11 that Section 30-9-11 is ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution. 2024“If the acts are not sufficiently distinct, then the rule of lenity 7 mandates an interpretation that the [L]egislature did not intend multiple 8 punishments, and a defendant cannot be punished for multiple crimes.” State v. 9 Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 14 , 140 N.M. 644 , 146 P.3d 289 . 10 {13} At the first step of our analysis, our Supreme Court has already determined 11 that Section 30-9-11 is ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution. | 3 | 2007–2024 |
State v. Sena
green
2 sentences2024Id. {4} With respect to the first step of the analysis, we generally evaluate the conduct to determine whether “[s]ufficient indicia of distinctness” separate the illegal acts; if so, the conduct is not unitary, and there is no double jeopardy violation. 2021“To determine whether a defendant’s conduct was unitary, we consider such factors as whether acts were close in time and space, their similarity, the sequence in which they occurred, whether other events intervened, and the defendant’s goals for and mental state during each act.” Id. “[W]e have also looked to the elements of the charged offenses, the facts presented at trial, and the instructions given to the jury.” Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 46 . {19} In this case, Defendant’s manslaughter conviction was not the result of a jury verdict; the jury deadlocked on the homicide charge and after the Ne | 2 | 2021–2024 |
State v. Swick
green
2 sentences2020State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33 , 279 P.3d 747 (stating that “[i]f the unit of prosecution is not clear from the statute at issue, including its wording, history, purpose, and the quantum of punishment that is prescribed” then courts should move to the second step of the inquiry). 2015Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33 . | 2 | 2015–2020 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2014The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length of pretrial delay is ‘“presumptively prejudicial.’” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 ). 2014The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length of pretrial delay is “‘presumptively prejudicial.’” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 ). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2008If we are unable to ascertain the unit of prosecution from the statutory language, "we move to the second step, in which we determine whether a defendant's acts are separated by sufficient `indicia of distinctness' to justify multiple punishments under the same statute." Id. {13} This Court recently conducted the first step of this analysis, in Turner, 2007-NMCA-105 , 142 N.M. 460 , 166 P.3d 1114 , concluding that "the language in the forgery statute is sufficiently ambiguous such that we cannot resolve the unit of prosecution simply by examining the language of the statute." Id. ¶ 28. 2008If we are unable to ascertain the unit of prosecution from the statutory language, "we move to the second step, in which we determine whether a defendant's acts are separated by sufficient `indicia of distinctness' to justify multiple punishments under the same statute." Id. {13} This Court recently conducted the first step of this analysis, in Turner, 2007-NMCA-105 , 142 N.M. 460 , 166 P.3d 1114 , concluding that "the language in the forgery statute is sufficiently ambiguous such that we cannot resolve the unit of prosecution simply by examining the language of the statute." Id. ¶ 28. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
State v. Serros
green
1 sentence2022Under that test, courts balance “(1) the length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5 , 366 P.3d 1121 . “[W]e give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.” Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {21} The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Franco
green
1 sentence2021If so, we then consider “whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 25. {18} At the first step of the analysis, our Supreme Court has said that “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Franco
green
2 sentences2021If so, we then consider “whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 25. {18} At the first step of the analysis, our Supreme Court has said that “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2021If so, we then consider “whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 25. {18} At the first step of the analysis, our Supreme Court has said that “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2021Defendant relies on State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 53 , 409 P.3d 902 , in which the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that “where a statute prohibits the doing of some act to a victim specified by a singular noun, ‘a person’ for example, then ‘the person’ is the unit of prosecution.” However, Defendant acknowledges that even if we measure the unit of prosecution in this way, the statute does not “explain how to determine whether or when a person has been the victim of more than one battery.” Consequently, it is evident that the unit of prosecution for aggravated battery is ambiguous at the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Barr
green
1 sentence2007If we are unable to ascertain the unit of prosecution from the statutory language, “we move to the second step, in which we determine whether a defendant’s acts are separated by sufficient ‘indicia of distinctness’ to justify multiple punishments under the same statute.” Id. {26} Under the first step of analysis, we consider the language of the forgery statute. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum
green
2 sentences1999The determination of whether a party transacted business in the state, within the meaning of the long-arm statute, “must be determined by the facts in each case.” Telephonic, Inc., 88 N.M. at 534 , 543 P.2d at 827 . 1999The determination of whether a party transacted business in the state, within the meaning of the long-arm statute, “must be determined by the facts in each case.” Telephonic, Inc., 88 N.M. at 534 , 543 P.2d at 827 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Derrick Watchman
green
1 sentence1997Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1543 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.