14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v. Tosco Corp.green2 sentences2003Bar 70 Enters., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Colo.1985). 2003Bar 70 Enters., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Colo.1985). | 2 | 3 |
City of Thornton ex rel. Utilities Board v. City of Fort Collinsgreen2 sentences2003See id. at 925 . 2003Id. at 926 . | 2 | 2 |
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co.green2 sentences2025Board of Water Commissioners v. Colorado River Water Conservation District , 696 P.2d 730 , 747 n.13 (Colo. 1985), it observed that such determinations "must always be made on an ad hoc basis, taking into account whether the particular 21 facts of each case satisfy the purposes underlying the requirements of the first step test [as to intent and overt acts towards an appropriation]." (Alteration in the 2023 order.) The water court also analyzed our holding in City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co. , 926 P.2d 1, 34 (Colo. 1996), in which we noted that "notice does not require an applicant to 2003Bijou Irrigation, 926 P.2d at 32 . | 1 | 3 |
Munoz v. Measnergreen1 sentence2026As already noted, when a party is pro se — as the Sweets were for much of this litigation — the court must also find that the party “clearly knew or reasonably should have known” that their action or defense was substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. § 13-17-102(6). ¶ 28 The first step of the analysis is “to determine whether the action in question (or any part thereof) ‘lacked substantial justification.’” Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Domingo-Gomez v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2022I d. ¶ 32 At the first step of the analysis, it is well settled that in closing argument a prosecutor may not convey an opinion about the t ruth or falsity of a witness’s testimony; nor may the prosecutor sugge st “ personal knowledge of evidence unknown to the jury .” Domingo-Gomez v. People , 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2012Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77, 83 (Colo.1991). 182 In implementing the first step of this test, a trial court should consider "whether the content of the media report is inherently prejudicial" as well as "whether the report contained information that would not be admissible at trial or that was not in fact adduced before the jury and how closely related the publicity is to the matters at issue in the trial." Id. at 84 (citation omitted). 2012Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77, 83 (Colo.1991). 182 In implementing the first step of this test, a trial court should consider "whether the content of the media report is inherently prejudicial" as well as "whether the report contained information that would not be admissible at trial or that was not in fact adduced before the jury and how closely related the publicity is to the matters at issue in the trial." Id. at 84 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemlinggreen2 sentences1996Adequacy of Overt Acts to Give Notice—General Standards From the very earliest decisions concerning conditional rights, this court adopted an “inquiry notice” standard. 18 In Frwitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, we explained the notice function of the first step test: Certainly the first step demanded by the rule is nothing short of an open and notorious physical demonstration, conclusively indicating a fixed purpose to diligently pursue and, within a reasonable time, ultimately acquire a right to the use of water, and as its primary function is to give notice to those subsequently desiring 1996Adequacy of Overt Acts to Give Notice—General Standards From the very earliest decisions concerning conditional rights, this court adopted an “inquiry notice” standard. 18 In Frwitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, we explained the notice function of the first step test: Certainly the first step demanded by the rule is nothing short of an open and notorious physical demonstration, conclusively indicating a fixed purpose to diligently pursue and, within a reasonable time, ultimately acquire a right to the use of water, and as its primary function is to give notice to those subsequently desiring | 1 | 1 |
Eagle River Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. District Court Ex Rel. County of Eaglegreen1 sentence1993In Eagle River Mobile Home Park v. District Court, 647 P.2d 660, 662 (Colo.1982), we considered the application of Rule 15(a), including in particular this instructive phrase, and stated that: [t]he rule prescribes a liberal policy of amendment and encourages the courts to look favorably on requests to amend. | 1 | 1 |
City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Districtgreen1 sentence1985See infra at 750-51, 753; Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 696 P.2d at 762 (decided this day); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 197 Colo. 413, 417 , 594 P.2d 566, 568 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co.green2 sentences1985See infra at 750-51, 753; Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 696 P.2d at 762 (decided this day); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 197 Colo. 413, 417 , 594 P.2d 566, 568 (1979). 1985See infra at 750-51, 753; Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 696 P.2d at 762 (decided this day); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 197 Colo. 413, 417 , 594 P.2d 566, 568 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City & County of Denver Ex Rel. Board of Water Commissioners v. Colorado River Water Conservation District
green
2 sentences2025Board of Water Commissioners v. Colorado River Water Conservation District , 696 P.2d 730 , 747 n.13 (Colo. 1985), it observed that such determinations "must always be made on an ad hoc basis, taking into account whether the particular 21 facts of each case satisfy the purposes underlying the requirements of the first step test [as to intent and overt acts towards an appropriation]." (Alteration in the 2023 order.) The water court also analyzed our holding in City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co. , 926 P.2d 1, 34 (Colo. 1996), in which we noted that "notice does not require an applicant to 2003Intent to appropriate requires "a fixed purpose to pursue diligently a certain course of action to take and beneficially use water from a particular source." Denver, 696 P.2d at 745 . | 3 | 2003–2025 |
People v. Medina
green
1 sentence2026If it is, the court then determines “whether the prognosis without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the state in preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its charge and in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Id. ¶ 21 On appeal, Zhu focuses on the first step of this test by emphasizing the facial tremors, nausea, and exhaustion he has been experiencing. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Edwards v. People
green
2 sentences2015Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983 . ¶54       Under Teague, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether a conviction is final. 2015Edwards, 129 P.3d at 988 . {54 Under Teague, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether a conviction is final. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Boatright v. Derr
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2007Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Carolene Products Co.
green
2 sentences1994In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 , 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778 , 784 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), the Supreme Court distinguished two kinds of rightsÔÇöfundamental and nonfundamental. 1994In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 , 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778 , 784 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), the Supreme Court distinguished two kinds of rightsÔÇöfundamental and nonfundamental. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.