first step analysis in Minnesota

2007The argument against disclosure will "ordinarily grow stronger as the danger to rights of * * * association increases." Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1267 .

2007The argument against disclosure will “ordinarily grow stronger as the danger to rights of * * * association increases.” Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1267 .

2026Id.

2024“Therefore, the first step in the analysis of a trust instrument is to determine the intent of the settlor from the plain language of the instrument.” Id. at 45 .

2018Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638 , 643 (Minn. 2017).

2017Section 573.02, subdivision 3, does not define “oath.” Our caselaw has defined “oath” generally as “all forms of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully.” State v. Gay, 59 Minn. 6, 21 , 60 N.W. 676 (1894).

2017Section 573.02, subdivision 3, does not define “oath.” Our caselaw has defined “oath” generally as “all forms of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully.” State v. Gay, 59 Minn. 6, 21 , 60 N.W. 676 (1894).

2016E.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

2016E.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

2015Id. at 802 , 93 S. Ct. at 1824 .

2015Id. at 802 , 93 S. Ct. at 1824 .

2014See State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 808 (Minn. 2013) (declining to “consider the remaining prongs of the plain-error test” after 4 concluding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony”); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211 , 230–31 (Minn. 2010) (concluding during plain-error review that “the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit any error when it granted the State’s motion to exclude the evidence on relevance grounds”); see also State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Minn. 2007) (“Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound

2013Distinction between classifications The first step in this analysis is to determine if there is “a genuine and substantial distinction between those inside and outside the class.” Id.

2011Id.

2008The majority relies on our decision in State v. Busse, 644 N.W.2d 79 (2002), in which we concluded in the first step of our analysis that heightened safety concerns were presented by the offense of driving after cancellation based on the driver being inimical to public safety, and at the second step that Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2006), is criminal/prohibitory.

2008The majority relies on our decision in State v. Busse, 644 N.W.2d 79 (2002), in which we concluded in the first step of our analysis that heightened safety concerns were presented by the offense of driving after cancellation based on the driver being inimical to public safety, and at the second step that MinmStat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2006), is criminal/prohibitory.

2006In conducting the first step in the analysis, “courts should focus their inquiry on the individual’s conduct and whether the individual ‘[sought] to preserve [something] as private.’ ” Id. at 571 (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 , 120 S.Ct. 1462 , 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000)).

2006In conducting the first step in the analysis, “courts should focus their inquiry on the individual’s conduct and whether the individual ‘[sought] to preserve [something] as private.’ ” Id. at 571 (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 , 120 S.Ct. 1462 , 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000)).

2005Generally, our re *422 view is deferential and “[¡legislative classifications not based on a suspect class nor affecting fundamental interests * * * must be upheld under equal protection and uniformity clause analysis unless there is no reasonable basis for the classification.” Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 820 .

2005The first step in our inquiry is to determine whether the distinction based on a structure’s existence before 1991 is “manifestly arbitrary and fanciful” rather than being “genuine and substantial, * * * providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs.” Id.

1988This figure is determined by multiplying the “number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation * * * by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433 , 103 S.Ct. at 1939 .

1988This figure is determined by multiplying the “number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation * * * by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433 , 103 S.Ct. at 1939 .

1986The first step of this test is to ask if the challenged law operates as “a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 . 7 We need not go further in our analysis than this first step.

1986The first step of this test is to ask if the challenged law operates as “a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 . 7 We need not go further in our analysis than this first step.