8 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunn v. Rockwellgreen1 sentence2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
Ohio County Commission v. Manchingreen2 sentences2008Ohio County Comm’n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 554 , 301 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1983). 2008Ohio County Comm’n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 554 , 301 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Bank of New York v. Sassongreen2 sentences2007Once the standard set forth in Rule 13(f) is satisfied and leave of court to set up the omitted counterclaim by amendment has been granted, the remaining provisions of Rule 15 should be fully applicable and the amendment should relate back if it meets the test provided by Rule 15(c)."); Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F.Supp. 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y.1992) ("Courts must read [Rule] 13(f) together with [Rule] 15(a), which provides that leave to amend a pleading `shall be freely given when justice so requires.'"). [11] The standard under Rule 16(b) for assessing a motion to amend after the scheduling o 2007Once the standard set forth in Rule 13(0 is satisfied and leave of court to set up the omitted counterclaim by amendment has been granted, the remaining provisions of Rule 15 should be fully applicable and the amendment should relate back if it meets the test provided by Rule 15(c).”); Bank of New York v. Sasson, 786 F.Supp. 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y.1992) ("Courts must read [Rule] 13(f) together with [Rule] 15(a), which provides that leave to amend a pleading 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.’ ”). .The standard under Rule 16(b) for assessing a motion to amend after the scheduling order | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guthriegreen2 sentences1999See State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) and State v. McGuire, 200 W.Va. 823 , 490 S.E.2d 912 (1997). 1999See State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) and State v. McGuire, 200 W.Va. 823 , 490 S.E.2d 912 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGuiregreen2 sentences1999See State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) and State v. McGuire, 200 W.Va. 823 , 490 S.E.2d 912 (1997). 1999See State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) and State v. McGuire, 200 W.Va. 823 , 490 S.E.2d 912 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Robert E. McFarland v. Harold J. Smith, and Lawrence T. Kurlander, Monroe County District Attorney, Intervenor-Appelleegreen2 sentences1995Even a reference that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or may trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the speaker might neither have predicted nor intended.' McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir.1979)." The same rationale applies to the prosecuting attorney drawing the jury's attention to racial, gender, and political comments made by the defendant which in no way relate to the crime. [32] Under the first step of our inquiry, we must determine whether the evidence is relevant to an issue of consequence. 1995Even a reference that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or may trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the speaker might neither have predicted nor intended.’ McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir.1979).” The same rationale applies to the prosecuting attorney drawing the jury’s attention to racial, gender, and political comments made by the defendant which in no way relate to the crime. 32 Under the first step of our inquiry, we must determine whether the evidence is relevant to an issue of consequence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dept. v. State Ex Rel. State Human Rights Commission
green
2 sentences2010Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 172 W.Va. 627 , 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983). 8 Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the complainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. 2010Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 172 W.Va. 627 , 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983). 8 Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the complainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
VanKirk v. Young
green
2 sentences1997According to the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(g), the long-arm statute “shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section [June 7, 1978].” We have previously said in Syllabus Point 1 of VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18 , 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988) (quoting Syllabus Point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137 , 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959)) “[w]hen a statute is clear and unamb 1997According to the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(g), the long-arm statute “shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section [June 7, 1978].” We have previously said in Syllabus Point 1 of VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18 , 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988) (quoting Syllabus Point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137 , 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959)) “[w]hen a statute is clear and unamb | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548
green
1 sentence1997According to the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(g), the long-arm statute “shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section [June 7, 1978].” We have previously said in Syllabus Point 1 of VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18 , 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988) (quoting Syllabus Point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137 , 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959)) “[w]hen a statute is clear and unamb | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548
green
1 sentence1997According to the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 56-3-33(g), the long-arm statute “shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section [June 7, 1978].” We have previously said in Syllabus Point 1 of VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18 , 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988) (quoting Syllabus Point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137 , 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959)) “[w]hen a statute is clear and unamb | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Spicer
green
2 sentences1982We did in State v. Spicer, 162 W.Va. 127 , 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978), recognize the Allen principle and concluded under the facts of that case there was no appreciable evidence to warrant the giving of an unarmed robbery instruction as a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 1982We did in State v. Spicer, 162 W.Va. 127 , 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978), recognize the Allen principle and concluded under the facts of that case there was no appreciable evidence to warrant the giving of an unarmed robbery instruction as a lesser included offense of armed robbery. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.