first step analysis in Virginia

2020However, whether a properly instructed jury would view the facts in that light is an open question since they were not instructed that the nature of the transaction and the degree of 3 Although the second jury instruction slightly misquotes Zuniga, which laid out the first step of the test as “the seller knows the buyer’s intended illegal use,” 7 Va. App. at 529 (emphasis added), that slight misquotation does not change our analysis.

1994See Zuniga, 7 Va. App. at 529, 375 S.E.2d at 385 .

2012The first step in this analysis is determining “whether the accused unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel.” Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532 , 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998).

2012The first step in this analysis is determining “whether the accused unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel.” Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532 , 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998).

2025This second part of the inquiry utilizes seven non-exhaustive factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).

2024“Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

2024“Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

2020See Edwards, 18 Va. App. at 48 (“When one buyer knows that the other buyer intends to possess the substance with intent to distribute it, the first step in the test is met.”).

2018The first step in the analysis, before applying the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), is to consider “whether ‘the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.’” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231 , 284, 699 S.E.2d 237, 267 (2010) (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985)).

2018The first step in the analysis, before applying the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), is to consider “whether ‘the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.’” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231 , 284, 699 S.E.2d 237, 267 (2010) (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985)).

2018The first step in the analysis, before applying the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), is to consider “whether ‘the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.’” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231 , 284, 699 S.E.2d 237, 267 (2010) (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985)).

2007Additionally, the trial court failed to "ascertain whether the amount of recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence" as required by the second step of the Shepard analysis. 262 Va. at 721 , 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation omitted); see also Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142 , 146, 122 S.E.2d 872 , 875 (1961) ("In a case where the verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, . . . [i]f the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded had [he] been a member of the jury, it ough

2007Additionally, the trial court failed to "ascertain whether the amount of recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence" as required by the second step of the Shepard analysis. 262 Va. at 721 , 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation omitted); see also Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142 , 146, 122 S.E.2d 872 , 875 (1961) ("In a case where the verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, . . . [i]f the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded had [he] been a member of the jury, it ough

2007Additionally, the trial court failed to "ascertain whether the amount of recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence" as required by the second step of the Shepard analysis. 262 Va. at 721 , 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation omitted); see also Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142 , 146, 122 S.E.2d 872 , 875 (1961) ("In a case where the verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, . . . [i]f the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded had [he] been a member of the jury, it ough

2007Additionally, the trial court failed to "ascertain whether the amount of recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence" as required by the second step of the Shepard analysis. 262 Va. at 721 , 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation omitted); see also Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142 , 146, 122 S.E.2d 872 , 875 (1961) ("In a case where the verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, . . . [i]f the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded had [he] been a member of the jury, it ough

2005As one court has stated the analysis, these two prongs of the test set out in Shell Oil are to be applied progressively; that is, the normal-work test is the first step in the analysis with the subcontracted-fraction test to be applied only if the requirements of the first test are not met.” Ferreira v. Boeing Service Co., 60 Va. Cir. 237, 239 (Fairfax County 2002).