first step analysis in Connecticut

2015Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 , 85 S. Ct. 1229 , 14 L.

2015Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 , 85 S. Ct. 1229 , 14 L.

1997Cf. Cato v. Cato, supra, 226 Conn. 5 (long arm statute for dissolution actions reaches full extent of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction; consolidating statutory and constitutional analysis into single step); Jones v. Jones, 199 Conn. 287 , 292 , 507 A.2d 88 (1986) (same).

1997Cf. Cato v. Cato, supra, 226 Conn. 5 (long arm statute for dissolution actions reaches full extent of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction; consolidating statutory and constitutional analysis into single step); Jones v. Jones, 199 Conn. 287 , 292 , 507 A.2d 88 (1986) (same).

2025To be sure, in State v. Hender- son, supra, 208 N.J. 208 , the case we relied on in Harris to adopt the system and estimator variables rubric; see State v. Harris, supra, 330 Conn. 131 ; the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that a showup identification procedure conducted within two hours of a crime is not a system variable sufficient to trigger a hearing because it does not undermine the reliability of an identification.

2019Inferring that the trial court considered the first step required in Schoonmaker before moving to the second step of substantial unfairness is consistent with the well settled principle that ‘‘[i]n determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604, 645 , 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2019).12 The defendant also argues that the court erred in finding that adherence to the con

2019Inferring that the trial court considered the first step required in Schoonmaker before moving to the second step of substantial unfairness is consistent with the well settled principle that ‘‘[i]n determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604, 645 , 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2019).12 The defendant also argues that the court erred in finding that adherence to the con

2019State v. Hickey , 135 Conn. App. 532 , 554, 43 A.3d 701 , cert. denied, 306 Conn. 901 , 52 A.3d 728 (2012). *551 "[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments....

2019State v. Hickey , 135 Conn. App. 532 , 554, 43 A.3d 701 , cert. denied, 306 Conn. 901 , 52 A.3d 728 (2012). *551 "[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments....

2019Inferring that the trial court considered the first step required in Schoonmaker before moving to the second step of substantial unfairness is consistent with the well settled principle that ‘‘[i]n determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604, 645 , 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2019).12 The defendant also argues that the court erred in finding that adherence to the con

2019Inferring that the trial court considered the first step required in Schoonmaker before moving to the second step of substantial unfairness is consistent with the well settled principle that ‘‘[i]n determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 604, 645 , 203 A.3d 645 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907 , 202 A.3d 1022 (2019).12 The defendant also argues that the court erred in finding that adherence to the con

2018In Schovanec , this court held that "it is not uncommon that we look to the evidence at trial and to the state's theory of the case" when assessing whether the offenses stem from the same act or transaction at step one. 6 Id., at 327 , 163 A.3d 581 .

2018In Schovanec , this court held that "it is not uncommon that we look to the evidence at trial and to the state's theory of the case" when assessing whether the offenses stem from the same act or transaction at step one. 6 Id., at 327 , 163 A.3d 581 .

2018The same transaction, in other words, may constitute separate and distinct crimes where it is susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitutes a completed offense.... [ T ] he test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are such as are made punishable by the [ statute ]." (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown , 299 Conn. 640 , 652, 11 A.3d 663 (2011).

2018The same transaction, in other words, may constitute separate and distinct crimes where it is susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitutes a completed offense.... [ T ] he test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are such as are made punishable by the [ statute ]." (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown , 299 Conn. 640 , 652, 11 A.3d 663 (2011).

2018Because we conclude in the present case that the defendant's double jeopardy claim founders on the first step of the analysis, it is unnecessary to consider whether the charged crimes are the same offense under the rubric set forth in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). "[D]istinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however closely they may follow each other ... may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause. ...

2018Because we conclude in the present case that the defendant's double jeopardy claim founders on the first step of the analysis, it is unnecessary to consider whether the charged crimes are the same offense under the rubric set forth in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). "[D]istinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however closely they may follow each other ... may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause. ...

2015A In the first step of our analysis, we must determine whether an impropriety occurred. ‘‘The ultimate test of whether a prosecution argument indirectly and imper- missibly comments on the defendant’s failure to testify is whether, because of its language and context, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it as com- ment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Downing, 68 Conn. App. 388, 398 , 791 A.2d 649 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 920 , 797 A.2d 518 (2002). ‘‘It is well settled that comment by the prosecuting attorney . . . on the def

2015A In the first step of our analysis, we must determine whether an impropriety occurred. ‘‘The ultimate test of whether a prosecution argument indirectly and imper- missibly comments on the defendant’s failure to testify is whether, because of its language and context, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it as com- ment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Downing, 68 Conn. App. 388, 398 , 791 A.2d 649 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 920 , 797 A.2d 518 (2002). ‘‘It is well settled that comment by the prosecuting attorney . . . on the def

2015A In the first step of our analysis, we must determine whether an impropriety occurred. ‘‘The ultimate test of whether a prosecution argument indirectly and imper- missibly comments on the defendant’s failure to testify is whether, because of its language and context, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it as com- ment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Downing, 68 Conn. App. 388, 398 , 791 A.2d 649 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 920 , 797 A.2d 518 (2002). ‘‘It is well settled that comment by the prosecuting attorney . . . on the def

2015A In the first step of our analysis, we must determine whether an impropriety occurred. ‘‘The ultimate test of whether a prosecution argument indirectly and imper- missibly comments on the defendant’s failure to testify is whether, because of its language and context, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it as com- ment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Downing, 68 Conn. App. 388, 398 , 791 A.2d 649 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 920 , 797 A.2d 518 (2002). ‘‘It is well settled that comment by the prosecuting attorney . . . on the def

2014Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda. [Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has] decline[d] to accord talismanic power to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, Berkemer [v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2014Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda. [Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has] decline[d] to accord talismanic power to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, Berkemer [v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2012Here, the conduct in question is the prosecutor’s failure to correct allegedly false testimony regarding plea agreements even though both the court and defense counsel had been properly informed of the contours of the arrangement. 16 “It is well established that [i]mpeachment evidence as well as exculpa-toiy evidence falls within [the] definition of evidence [in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2012Here, the conduct in question is the prosecutor’s failure to correct allegedly false testimony regarding plea agreements even though both the court and defense counsel had been properly informed of the contours of the arrangement. 16 “It is well established that [i]mpeachment evidence as well as exculpa-toiy evidence falls within [the] definition of evidence [in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2009In so doing, we must bear in mind that “a prosecutor properly may ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence at trial.” State v. Batista, 101 Conn. App. 623, 635 , 922 A.2d 1116 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918 , 933 A.2d 721 (2007).

2009In so doing, we must bear in mind that “a prosecutor properly may ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence at trial.” State v. Batista, 101 Conn. App. 623, 635 , 922 A.2d 1116 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918 , 933 A.2d 721 (2007).

2009In so doing, we must bear in mind that “a prosecutor properly may ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence at trial.” State v. Batista, 101 Conn. App. 623, 635 , 922 A.2d 1116 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918 , 933 A.2d 721 (2007).

2009In so doing, we must bear in mind that “a prosecutor properly may ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence at trial.” State v. Batista, 101 Conn. App. 623, 635 , 922 A.2d 1116 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918 , 933 A.2d 721 (2007).

2006The informed consent doctrine derives from the principle that “[e]veiy human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282, 288-89 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983).

2006The informed consent doctrine derives from the principle that “[e]veiy human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282, 288-89 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983).

2005Sung v. Butterworth, 35 Conn. App. 154, 158-59 , 644 A.2d 395 (1994), appeal dismissed, 235 Conn. 400 , 665 A.2d 893 (1995).

2005Sung v. Butterworth, 35 Conn. App. 154, 158-59 , 644 A.2d 395 (1994), appeal dismissed, 235 Conn. 400 , 665 A.2d 893 (1995).

2005Sung v. Butterworth, 35 Conn. App. 154, 158-59 , 644 A.2d 395 (1994), appeal dismissed, 235 Conn. 400 , 665 A.2d 893 (1995).

2005Sung v. Butterworth, 35 Conn. App. 154, 158-59 , 644 A.2d 395 (1994), appeal dismissed, 235 Conn. 400 , 665 A.2d 893 (1995).

2002"Ordinarily, where the authority to arbitrate devolves from contract, an unrestricted submission carries with it the power to decide, with finality, all issues of fact or law in the proceedings." Bodner v. United Services Automobile Association , 222 Conn. 480 , 501 (1992); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler , 258 Conn. 101 (2001); See, Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 3713 , 35 Conn. App. 804 , 807-808 (1994).

2002Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 3713 , supra, 237 Conn. at 119 (Citations omitted.) "Because . . . [Connecticut courts] favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes . . . [they] . . . undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution." Garrity v. McCaskey , 223 Conn. 1 , 4-5 (1992) (Citations omitted.) The first step in the analysis requires a determination as to whether the "submission" was restricted or unrestricted.

2002"Ordinarily, where the authority to arbitrate devolves from contract, an unrestricted submission carries with it the power to decide, with finality, all issues of fact or law in the proceedings." Bodner v. United Services Automobile Association , 222 Conn. 480 , 501 (1992); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler , 258 Conn. 101 (2001); See, Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 3713 , 35 Conn. App. 804 , 807-808 (1994).