burden-shifting framework in Ohio

2026Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977). {¶27} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework.

2026Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977). {¶19} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework.

2024Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356 , 358–359 (1992). {¶9} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework.

2024Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356 , 358–359 (1992). {¶51} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework.

2020For the reasons discussed in Douglas’s first assignment of error, under the burden-shifting framework of summary judgment, the burden -22- Case No. 6-20-06 shifted to Douglas (as outlined in Civ.R. 56(E)) “to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293 .

2015Id. at 293 ; Civ.R. 56(E). {¶13} R.C. 4123.90 provides in relevant part that, “[n]o employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.” {¶14} “Courts analyze retaliatory-discharge claims under a burden-shifting framework, requiring the employee to initially set forth a prima facie case by showing the existe

2026Dautartas v. Abbott Laboratories, 2012-Ohio-1709 , ¶ 35 (10th Dist.), quoting Southworth v. N. Trust Sec., Inc., 2011-Ohio-3467, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). {¶ 19} If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they may raise an inference of discriminatory intent indirectly through the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2026Johnson v. Kroger Co., 160 F. Supp.2d 846, 853 (S.D.Ohio 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 319 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2003). {¶39} Conversely, establishing discriminatory intent through the indirect method of proof is subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2026To analyze due-process claims based on preindictment-delay, the Ohio Supreme Court has firmly established the following burden-shifting framework: “Once a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice, the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay.” State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 13, citing State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 (1998), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 99.

2022“The Ohio Supreme Court has established a burden- shifting framework for analyzing preindictment delay due process claims.” Id, citing State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998).

2026Mauzy at 583.

2023Mauzy at 583.

2026To analyze due-process claims based on preindictment-delay, the Ohio Supreme Court has firmly established the following burden-shifting framework: “Once a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice, the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay.” State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 13, citing State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 (1998), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 99.

2025Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court has “firmly established a burden-shifting framework for analyzing a due process claim based on preindictment delay.” Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105 , at ¶ 13.

2012Transport, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 298 , 703 N.E.2d 782 (1999), citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 , 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981). {¶31} Sex discrimination in employment may be proved either by “direct” evidence or by “indirect” evidence and application of the burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Klaus v. Kilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ohio (S.D.Ohio 2006), 437 F.Supp.2d 706, 725-726 (S.D.

2012Transport, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 298 , 703 N.E.2d 782 (1999), citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 , 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981). {¶31} Sex discrimination in employment may be proved either by “direct” evidence or by “indirect” evidence and application of the burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Klaus v. Kilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ohio (S.D.Ohio 2006), 437 F.Supp.2d 706, 725-726 (S.D.

2026See Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.).

2025See Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.).

2026Dautartas v. Abbott Laboratories, 2012-Ohio-1709 , ¶ 35 (10th Dist.), quoting Southworth v. N. Trust Sec., Inc., 2011-Ohio-3467, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). {¶ 19} If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they may raise an inference of discriminatory intent indirectly through the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2023No. 11AP-706, 2012-Ohio-1709 , ¶ 35, quoting Southworth v. N. Trust Sec., Inc., 195 Ohio App.3d 357 , 2011-Ohio-3467, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). {¶ 81} If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they may raise an inference of discriminatory intent indirectly through the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2022See also Carnahan at ¶ 22 (“In a disability-discrimination case under R.C. 4112.02(A), the burden is on the employee to establish a prima-facie case of disability discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.”). {¶12} “Once an employee successfully establishes a prima-facie case of disability discrimination, the burden ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Carnahan at ¶ 22 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , (1973), and citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,

2022See also Carnahan at ¶ 22 (“In a disability-discrimination case under R.C. 4112.02(A), the burden is on the employee to establish a prima-facie case of disability discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.”). {¶12} “Once an employee successfully establishes a prima-facie case of disability discrimination, the burden ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Carnahan at ¶ 22 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , (1973), and citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,

2022Under the burden shifting framework outlined in the current version of R.C. 2901.05(B), which became effective on April 6, 2021, “the state is not required to prove the defendant did not act in self-defense until that defendant introduces evidence that tends to support they acted in self-defense.” State v. Walker, 2021-Ohio-3860 , 180 N.E.3d 60, ¶ 61 (6th Dist.), citing Petway at ¶ 55 .

2022Under the burden shifting framework outlined in the current version of R.C. 2901.05(B), which became effective on April 6, 2021, “the state is not required to prove the defendant did not act in self-defense until that defendant introduces evidence that tends to support they acted in self-defense.” State v. Walker, 2021-Ohio-3860 , 180 N.E.3d 60, ¶ 61 (6th Dist.), citing Petway at ¶ 55 .

2022See also Carnahan at ¶ 22 (“In a disability-discrimination case under R.C. 4112.02(A), the burden is on the employee to establish a prima-facie case of disability discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.”). {¶12} “Once an employee successfully establishes a prima-facie case of disability discrimination, the burden ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Carnahan at ¶ 22 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , (1973), and citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,

2022See also Carnahan at ¶ 22 (“In a disability-discrimination case under R.C. 4112.02(A), the burden is on the employee to establish a prima-facie case of disability discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.”). {¶12} “Once an employee successfully establishes a prima-facie case of disability discrimination, the burden ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Carnahan at ¶ 22 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , (1973), and citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,

2021Ra committed an infraction while being on Level 3 AIP. [T]he plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of establishing a prima facie case in the first step of the burden-shifting analysis is one of production, not persuasion, and it is not “onerous.” [Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.] Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-256[, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)]. * * * the plaintiff is not required to conclusively prove all the elements of his claim at the prima facie stage of the burden- shifting analysis. * * * the plaintiff must ultimately prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s pro

2021Ra committed an infraction while being on Level 3 AIP. [T]he plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of establishing a prima facie case in the first step of the burden-shifting analysis is one of production, not persuasion, and it is not “onerous.” [Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.] Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-256[, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)]. * * * the plaintiff is not required to conclusively prove all the elements of his claim at the prima facie stage of the burden- shifting analysis. * * * the plaintiff must ultimately prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s pro

2014See also Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , ¶ 13-14 (Courts should apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas in cases of retaliatory discharge); Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 8-9 (applying the burden-shifting framework in an age discrimination case).1 Under this paradigm, the plaintiff must first establish a “prima facie case” which in turn shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

2013See also McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 183 , 2010-Ohio-2744, ¶ 35 (The McDonnell Douglas analysis should be involved in cases where indirect evidence of sex discrimination is alleged); Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , ¶ 13-14 (Courts should apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas in cases of retaliatory discharge); Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 8-9 (Courts should apply the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in age-discrimination cases.).

2014See also Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , ¶ 13-14 (Courts should apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas in cases of retaliatory discharge); Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 8-9 (applying the burden-shifting framework in an age discrimination case).1 Under this paradigm, the plaintiff must first establish a “prima facie case” which in turn shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

2014Where a plaintiff relies on indirect evidence, discrimination claims are subject to a version of the burden shifting analysis the United States Supreme Court described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 9.

2025Creveling v. Lakepark Industries, Inc., 2021-Ohio-764, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.), citing Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., 2014-Ohio-4115, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.).

2021Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., 2014-Ohio-4115 , 20 N.E.3d 322 , ¶ 15 (6th Dist.).

2003See, also, State v. Benton (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 801 , 737 N.E.2d 1046 (adopting the Forest approach). {¶ 12} Research reveals no instances of this court’s adoption of the burden-shifting rule espoused in Forest .

2003See, also, State v. Benton (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 801 , 737 N.E.2d 1046 (adopting the Forest approach). {¶ 12} Research reveals no instances of this court’s adoption of the burden-shifting rule espoused in Forest .

2022State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 218 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998) (“with no evidence from the state explaining the delay, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal”); see also State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51; State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 , 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 99 ; Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167 , 2016-Ohio-5105 , 69 N.E.3d 688, at ¶ 13 .

2022State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215 , 218, 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998) (“with no evidence from the state explaining the delay, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal”); see also State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51; State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 , 45 N.E.3d 127 , ¶ 99; Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167 , 2016-Ohio-5105 , 69 N.E.3d 688 , at ¶ 13.

2022State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 218 , 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998) (“with no evidence from the state explaining the delay, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal”); see also State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51; State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 , 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 99 ; Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167 , 2016-Ohio-5105 , 69 N.E.3d 688, at ¶ 13 .

2022State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215 , 218, 702 N.E.2d 1199 (1998) (“with no evidence from the state explaining the delay, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal”); see also State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 , 2002-Ohio-5059 , 775 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 51; State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429 , 2015-Ohio-3954 , 45 N.E.3d 127 , ¶ 99; Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167 , 2016-Ohio-5105 , 69 N.E.3d 688 , at ¶ 13.