burden-shifting framework in Utah

2025Originally, the Supreme Court developed the burden-shifting framework for use in cases arising under Title VII. 411 U.S. at 793–94.

2023The statute defines “retaliate” as “the taking of adverse action by an employer . . . against one of its employees . . . because the employee . . . (i) opposes an employment practice prohibited under [the UAA]; or (ii) files charges, testifies, assists, or participates in any way in a proceeding, investigation, or hearing under [the UAA].” Utah Code § 34A-5-102(1)(y). 5 Thus, a retaliation claim focuses on the 4F employer’s response to an employee’s opposition to an employer practice that is prohibited by law. ¶22 To establish retaliation, a plaintiff may submit direct evidence of retaliatory

2012As we have noted, trial courts ought to resolve Batson objections while the iron is hot since "[the burden-shifting framework of Batson is best implemented if it is litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in the minds of both the court and the litigants." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 42 , 140 P.3d 1219 .

2012As we have noted, trial courts ought to resolve Batson objections while the iron is hot since "[the burden-shifting framework of Batson is best implemented if it is litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in the minds of both the court and the litigants." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 42 , 140 P.3d 1219 .

2025Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510–11 (cleaned up); see also Barrett v. Salt Lake Cnty., 754 F.3d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2014) (“By this point in the proceedings the McDonnell Douglas proxy ‘drops out’ and we ask instead the dispositive underlying Title VII question: has the plaintiff presented enough evidence to warrant a jury finding that the adverse employment action taken against him was taken in retaliation for his protected civil rights activity?”); Fallis v. Kerr- McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the burden shifting framework has no relevance in post-trial motions for jud

2025Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 521 , which “sharpen[s] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional [retaliation],” id. at 506 (cleaned up).

2025Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510–11 (cleaned up); see also Barrett v. Salt Lake Cnty., 754 F.3d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2014) (“By this point in the proceedings the McDonnell Douglas proxy ‘drops out’ and we ask instead the dispositive underlying Title VII question: has the plaintiff presented enough evidence to warrant a jury finding that the adverse employment action taken against him was taken in retaliation for his protected civil rights activity?”); Fallis v. Kerr- McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the burden shifting framework has no relevance in post-trial motions for jud

2025Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013) (“When a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination . . . , her claim may move forward without being subjected to the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas . . . .”).

2025See id. at 203 .

2025Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510–11 (cleaned up); see also Barrett v. Salt Lake Cnty., 754 F.3d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2014) (“By this point in the proceedings the McDonnell Douglas proxy ‘drops out’ and we ask instead the dispositive underlying Title VII question: has the plaintiff presented enough evidence to warrant a jury finding that the adverse employment action taken against him was taken in retaliation for his protected civil rights activity?”); Fallis v. Kerr- McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the burden shifting framework has no relevance in post-trial motions for jud

2022See Viktron/Lika v. Labor Comm’n, 2001 UT App 394, ¶ 7 , 38 P.3d 993 .

2022See Viktron/Lika v. Labor Comm’n, 2001 UT App 394, ¶ 7 , 38 P.3d 993 .

2010Walter Thompson, U.S.A., Inc. v. First BankAmericano, 518 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2008). [3] The UCC differentiates between forged indorsements and missing indorsements.

2006See McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (2d Cir.1996) (citing numerous decisions holding that the “subjective” nature of the peremptory challenge “mandates that any objection to its use be raised and ruled upon promptly”). ¶43 First, the party raising the Batson challenge will be better able to make out a prima facie case if he can discuss the proponent’s use of peremptory strikes in relation to the characteristics of the individual jurors stricken as well any relevant voir dire.

2006The Batson Court thus replaced the Swain test with an evidentiary framework similar to that of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the opponent of a peremptory challenge to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based “solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 2418 n. 7, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (discussing similarity of Batson framework to “the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Ti

2006The Batson Court thus replaced the Swain test with an evidentiary framework similar to that of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the opponent of a peremptory challenge to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based “solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 2418 n. 7, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (discussing similarity of Batson framework to “the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Ti

2006The Batson Court thus replaced the Swain test with an evidentiary framework similar to that of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the opponent of a peremptory challenge to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based “solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 2418 n. 7, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (discussing similarity of Batson framework to “the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Ti

2006The Batson Court thus replaced the Swain test with an evidentiary framework similar to that of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the opponent of a peremptory challenge to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based “solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 2418 n. 7, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (discussing similarity of Batson framework to “the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Ti

2001T7 Onee a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer bears the burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff, See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that this burden-shifting analysis is guided by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973)).

2001If the employer presents a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff...." Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1178 (citation omitted); cf. - University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1987) (applying a similar burden-shifting analysis to age discrimination in hiring procedures). 117 To rebut Wright's prima facie case, Viktron argued below that Wright's sustained course of insubordination provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Wright.

2001If the employer presents a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff...." Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1178 (citation omitted); cf. - University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1987) (applying a similar burden-shifting analysis to age discrimination in hiring procedures). 117 To rebut Wright's prima facie case, Viktron argued below that Wright's sustained course of insubordination provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Wright.

1999In Dahm , the Seventh Circuit, while examining what action could be “materially adverse” to a public employee, quoted its prior decision in Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993) (applying the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to federal age discrimination claim), in which the court included as materially adverse changes “a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly dimi