burden-shifting framework in North Carolina

2022More recently, in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), the Supreme Court explained that the first step in the burden-shifting analysis is that the “good faith of [the state] legislature must be presumed.” Id. at 2324 (cleaned up).

2022More recently, in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), the Supreme Court explained that the first step in the burden-shifting analysis is that the “good faith of [the state] legislature must be presumed.” Id. at 2324 (cleaned up).

2013This Court then vacated the Commission’s decision and remanded with specific instructions that it “shall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how it weighed the evidence to reach its conclusions using the burden-shifting framework articulated above and in this Court’s previous decisions.” Id. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 453 (emphasis in original).

2011App. _, _, 689 S.E.2d 487, 494 (2009), we recognized that, “if [the contention that the schedule used by all 100 counties produces true value] prevails, then tax appeals would simply be limited to determining whether or not the proper government schedule was employed” and noted that “[t]his is not what is contemplated in the burden shifting analysis required by this Court.” Thus, there is no merit to the County’s argument that use of its schedule of values necessitates the conclusion that the taxpayer failed to rebut the presumption of correctness.

2020Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S. Ct. at 1723 ); accord Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170 , 125 S. Ct. at 2417 (“Thus, in describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in Batson that - 16 - STATE V.

2020Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S. Ct. at 1723 ); accord Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170 , 125 S. Ct. at 2417 (“Thus, in describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in Batson that - 16 - STATE V.

2013This Court then vacated the Commission’s decision and remanded with specific instructions that it “shall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how it weighed the evidence to reach its conclusions using the burden-shifting framework articulated above and in this Court’s previous decisions.” Id. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 453 (emphasis in original).

2013This Court also explicitly instructed that the Commission “shall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how it weighed the evidence to reach its conclusions using the burden-shifting framework articulated above and in this Court’s previous decisions.” Id. (emphasis in original).

2005See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365-66 (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim of retaliatory harassment and discharge brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 , 636 (Tex.1995) (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim brought under a state statutory whistleblower provision). 2 Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine proof scheme, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a lawful reason for the employment action at issue.

2005See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365-66 (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim of retaliatory harassment and discharge brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1995) (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim brought under a state statutory whistleblower provision). 2 Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine proof scheme, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a lawful reason for the employment action at issue.

2005See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 , 67 L.

2005See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 , 67 L.

2024Specifically, North Carolina courts have adopted the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L.

2024Specifically, North Carolina courts have adopted the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L.

2023Neb. 2004) (same); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (using a burden-shifting framework for racial discrimination in jury selection).

2023See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (requiring prima facie evidence to satisfy the initial burden under the burden-shifting framework).

2005See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365-66 (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim of retaliatory harassment and discharge brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 , 636 (Tex.1995) (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim brought under a state statutory whistleblower provision). 2 Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine proof scheme, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a lawful reason for the employment action at issue.

2005See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365-66 (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim of retaliatory harassment and discharge brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1995) (applying this burden-shifting analysis to a claim brought under a state statutory whistleblower provision). 2 Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine proof scheme, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a lawful reason for the employment action at issue.

2023See Ivey, 360 N.C. at 564 (determining that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race” (cleaned up)); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373 (deciding a case involving the disparate application of the law to Chinese immigrants “with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of . . . equal protection of the laws”).

2023See Ivey, 360 N.C. at 564 (determining that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race” (cleaned up)); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373 (deciding a case involving the disparate application of the law to Chinese immigrants “with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of . . . equal protection of the laws”).

2023Generally, “[a] ‘prima facie case’ . . . means no more than evidence sufficient to justify, but not to compel an inference.” Staples v. Carter, 5 N.C.

2023E.g., Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 , 713 (2020) (shifting the burden to the government after defendant makes a prima facie showing of selective enforcement); United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 992 (D.

2016The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “because FMLA retaliation claims are analogous to Title VII retaliation claims, they can be analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 800–06 (1973).” Ranade v. BT Ams., Inc., 581 F. App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Nichols v. Ashland Hosp.

2015Aug. 22, 2012) (“[W]hen faced with state law wrongful discharge on the basis of handicap/disability claims, courts utilize the evidentiary framework used in evaluating disability discrimination claims under the ADA.”); Morris v. BellSouth Telecomms., 302 F. Supp. 2d 515 , 524–25 (M.D.N.C. 2004) ("[S]tate law claims for wrongful termination for discharge due to handicap are analyzed with the same burden shifting test as claims brought under the ADA.").

2011App. 223, 227 , 650 S.E.2d 828, 831 (2007) (stating that the Commission’s analysis did not reflect the proper burden-shifting framework) aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 228 , 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008).