burden-shifting analysis in Missouri

2025Section 213.101(3) states: “If an employer in a case brought under this chapter files a motion 11 pursuant to [R]ule 74.04 of the Missouri rules of civil procedure, the court shall consider the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny to be highly persuasive . . . .” Section 213.101(3) (emphasis added).

2025“Like federal courts, Missouri courts use the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) to evaluate proof in discrimination cases where disparate treatment is alleged.” Vermett v. State, 544 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. 2018); § 213.101.3,4.

2024The general assembly hereby expressly abrogates by this statute the cases of Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) and its progeny as they relate to the contributing factor standard and abandonment of the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 24 legislature has declared that this format is to be considered highly persuasive for summary judgment analysis in cases not involving direct evidence of discrimination.”).

2024As stated prior, section 213.101.4, adopted by the Missouri legislature in 2017, specifically abrogated Daugherty’s exclusive application of Missouri law as to the contributing 32 factor standard and, instead, embraced the federal motivating factor standard 16 as well as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, stating: The general assembly hereby expressly abrogates by this statute the cases of Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) and its progeny as they relate to the contributing factor standard and abandonment of the burden-shifting framework established

2006Young v. American Airlines, Inc., 182 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Mo.App.2005), and Mid-state Oil Company, Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Mo. banc 1984).

2000Midstate Oil Co., 679 S.W.2d at 845 .

2025“Like federal courts, Missouri courts use the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) to evaluate proof in discrimination cases where disparate treatment is alleged.” Vermett v. State, 544 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. 2018); § 213.101.3,4.

2021Section 213.010(19) defines “the motivating factor” as: “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” “Like federal courts, Missouri courts use the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) to evaluate proof in discrimination cases where disparate treatment is alleged.” Vermett v. State, 544 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. 2018); § 213.101.3,4.

2014Two years later, this Court reaffirmed the application of the “contributing factor” analysis to the plaintiff’s MHRA retaliation claims in Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. banc 2009), and once again rejected the burden-shifting framework employed under McDonnell Douglas.

2014Two years later, this Court reaffirmed the application of the “contributing factor” analysis to the plaintiff’s MHRA retaliation claims in Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. banc 2009), and once again rejected the burden-shifting framework employed under McDonnell Douglas.

2000The burden-shifting analysis is “used to progressively sharpen the inquiry into the question of whether intentional discrimination has occurred.” H.S. v. Board of Regents, Southeast Missouri State Univ., 967 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Mo.App.

1999Midstate Oil Co. Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Mo.banc 1984); H.S. v. Bd. of Regents, Southeast Missouri State University, 967 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Mo.App.1998).

2025In his briefing, Allen contends that C.R.’s reliance on information supplied by M.V. triggers the following principle: “‘When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, [the] discrimination might . . . be called a ‘factor’ . . . in the decision.’” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418-419 (2011) (citation omitted; quoted with approval in Ferguson, 498 S.W.3d at 490 ).

2023Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007), overruled by statute; see, ¢.g., Medley v. Valentine Radford Comme’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315, 325 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (applying the burden-shifting standard in an MHRA retaliation claim on summary judgment and finding the employer’s evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action supported concluding that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the employer’s adverse action was causally related to her discrimination complaint).

2019See Schnitzer, 297 S.W.3d at 607 .

2012Of those four states, two shift the burden in redistricting challenges based on the state’s constitution without providing any analysis, 6 one applies the federal framework without providing any rationale for doing so, 7 and the last shifts the burden based on a state statute specifically relating to reapportionment challenges. 8 While federal courts apply a burden-shifting framework, they do so under a different constitutional standard, and there is no apparent rationale that supports a departure from the burden of proof applied by this Court in Johnson , at 32-83.

2006Young v. American Airlines, Inc., 182 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Mo.App.2005), and Mid-state Oil Company, Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Mo. banc 1984).

2006Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir.1998).

2006McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; Smith, 151 F.3d at 818 .

2005See City of Clayton v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 821 S.W.2d 521, 527-28 (Mo.App.