burden-shifting framework in Massachusetts

2025Where an employee relies on indirect or circumstantial evidence of the causal connection between the 8 protected activity and the adverse employment action, he may survive summary judgment using a three-part burden-shifting framework similar to the one articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas). 5 See Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582 , 591- 592 (2004).

2019With regard to disparate treatment, whether Ogaldez were to proceed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or to try to prove her claim through other evidence raising an inference of discrimination, she must prove discriminatory intent on the part of the actual decision maker, namely, the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner).

2022The burden-shifting framework devised in Duracraft, 427 Mass. 156 , and augmented in Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 159-161, is used to evaluate such motions.

2019The burden-shifting framework devised in Duracraft, 427 Mass. 156 , and augmented in Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 159-161, is used to evaluate such motions.

2025We adopted the burden-shifting framework in recognition "that proof of unlawful discrimination rarely can be established by direct evidence and that an employer's seemingly arbitrary action or pretended explanation for [an action] should not be permitted to justify conduct which is in fact unlawfully discriminatory." Wheelock College, supra. Accordingly, the framework "lightens the employee's burden" by requiring the employer to produce evidence that "provides information and narrows the field of possible lawful reasons that the employee must address" once the employee has met the low bar requ

2014See Wheelock Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 137-38 (1976) (adopting framework under state law); see also Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000).

1986See also Commonwealth v. Conroy , 333 Mass, at 756-757, which may represent an exercise of the power before Freeman . 15 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 16 Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976). 17 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 18 The trial took place after Mullaney v. Wilbur , but the court reasoned that the failure to object must, as matter of fairness, be excused because the application of the burden-shifting principle to the rule on materiality was far from clear, and the judge, if confronted with an objection, would in all probability have felt obliged to f

1981“Because [the Richards] jury may have interpreted the judge’s instruction^] as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption ... or a conclusive presumption . . ., and because either interpretation would have deprived the defendant of his right to the due process of law . . . the instruction^] given in this case [were] unconstitutional.” Sandstrom v. Montana, supra at 524 .

2024Id. 5 Here, the judge began her analysis by acknowledging the proper standard, stating that the case "must be approached using the three-part burden-shifting analysis." However, the judge then analyzed Regan's discrimination claim based on the evidentiary burden required at trial, including the element of causation.

2024See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680 .

2008Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 589-90 (2001); cf. Randolph, 438 Mass. at 299 (“A burden-shifting error in a provocation instruction is prejudicial if the defendant was entitled to such a charge . . .”).

2008Accordingly, the erroneous instructions did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice for either McAfee or Elliot, see Randolph, 438 Mass. at 298 (stating that only where error prejudices defendant can it create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice), and neither McAfee’s trial nor appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, see id. at 296 .

2025See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-95 ; Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-491 ." Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763 , 768 (2021).

2024See Morris v. Board of Registration in Med., 405 Mass. 103, 109 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989) (reviewing board should not disregard trier of fact's findings on credibility). 15 c. 150E, § 10 (a) (3), may be proved by following the burden- shifting framework used for similar claims asserted under G.

2024See Morris v. Board of Registration in Med., 405 Mass. 103, 109 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989) (reviewing board should not disregard trier of fact's findings on credibility). 15 c. 150E, § 10 (a) (3), may be proved by following the burden- shifting framework used for similar claims asserted under G.

2020See Ochoa, 146 N.M. at 44 (listing factors).

2019See, e.g., Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc ., 265 Conn. 210 , 241, 828 A.2d 64 (2003) ("we find persuasive the plaintiffs' contention that, when an employer has failed to comply with statutory record keeping provisions, the failure to implement the Anderson burden shift has the potential to interfere with the remedial purpose of [the State wage collection statute], because any uncertainty in the damages amount is the fault of the employer"). 18 Specifically, the Wage Act provides that "[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such

2019See, e.g., Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc ., 265 Conn. 210 , 241, 828 A.2d 64 (2003) ("we find persuasive the plaintiffs' contention that, when an employer has failed to comply with statutory record keeping provisions, the failure to implement the Anderson burden shift has the potential to interfere with the remedial purpose of [the State wage collection statute], because any uncertainty in the damages amount is the fault of the employer"). 18 Specifically, the Wage Act provides that "[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such

2019See Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp. , 507 F.3d 23 , 31 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Actionable discrimination cannot exist in a vacuum.

2019See Blanchard I , 477 Mass. at 147-148, 159-160 , 75 N.E.3d 21 .

2016Cir. 2015) (recognizing retaliation claim under 29 U.S.C. § 2615 [a][l] [2012]); Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 2005) (observing that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 [c] “unambiguously interprets [29 U.S.C] § 2615 as prohibiting retaliation”). 7 Where, as in this case, there is no direct evidence of a motive or intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for taking FMLA leave, courts have applied the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-806 (1973).

2016See Colburn, 429 F.3d at 335-336 .

2016In so doing, we will follow the burden-shifting framework laid out by HUD and adopted by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2424-2425. 28 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (court defers to HUD’s implementing regulations as long as they are “permissible construction of the statute”).

2016To establish a prima facie case for disparate impact housing discrimination under the FHA, and therefore survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging facts showing that the “challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” Inclusive Communities, supra at 2514, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c)(1) (2014).

2016In so doing, we will follow the burden-shifting framework laid out by HUD and adopted by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2424-2425. 28 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (court defers to HUD’s implementing regulations as long as they are “permissible construction of the statute”).

2014Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 52 (2008), quoting from Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 765 (1986) (affirming summary judgment for defendant).

2014Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 52 (2008), quoting from Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 765 (1986) (affirming summary judgment for defendant).

2014Instead, the issue is whether the hospital met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of fact concerning pretext. 10 See Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989) (“The party moving for summary judgment assumes the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue, even if he would have no burden on an issue if the case were to go to trial”).

2014Instead, the issue is whether the hospital met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of fact concerning pretext.10 See Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14 , 9 Bulwer's appellate brief devotes only one and one-half pages to the argument that the hospital did not meet its burden on the second stage. 10 The dissent incorrectly argues that the burden is on "Bulwer to prove that [the defendant's] reason for termination constituted a pretext concealing a discriminatory purpose." Post at .