burden-shifting framework in Illinois

2026See Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178-79 (1989).

2021The Commission therefore did not improperly exceed the scope of its review when it evaluated whether substantial evidence supported a prima facie case of an accommodation claim. ¶ 39 Next, Spiegel argues that the burden shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which is a three-step analysis that is applied to disparate treatment discrimination claims under the Act and looks to the motive of an alleged discriminatory action (see Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178-79 (1989)), is inapplicable because no facts are in dispute.

2026Rather, this evidence only demonstrated that the Association was determined to enforce its rules and regulations against short-term leasing, irrespective of any protected class. ¶ 25 In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, our supreme court has adopted the burden-shifting framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) to analyze whether there is indirect evidence of discrimination.

2025The Supreme Court of the United States outlined a three-part burden-shifting analysis for indirectly proving employment discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2019See, e.g., Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545 ; Goral, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236 .

2018See, e.g. , Stein v. Krislov , 2013 IL App (1st) 113806 , 376 Ill.Dec. 462 , 999 N.E.2d 345 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca , 2014 IL App (1st) 121545 , 382 Ill.Dec. 677 , 13 N.E.3d 90 ; Goral , 2014 IL App (1st) 133236 , 386 Ill.Dec. 578 , 21 N.E.3d 64 .

2005The burden-shifting requirement is actually derived from the California case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30 , 573 P.2d 443, 454 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978), which pioneered the risk-utility test.

2005The burden-shifting requirement is actually derived from the California case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30 , 573 P.2d 443, 454 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978), which pioneered the risk-utility test.

2025Id. ¶ 109; see -5- No. 1-23-1740 also People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 254 (2009) (describing burden-shifting process for a motion to suppress).

2023The Code “incorporates a burden-shifting principle which makes a ‘holder’ the functional equivalent of a ‘holder in due course’ until a defense has been shown to exist.” (Emphasis in original.) Bank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 630 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1980); see 810 ILCS 5/3- 308 (West 2020). ¶ 23 Here, at trial, plaintiff introduced check 4024, which Jones presented to plaintiff for payment and Chase returned unpaid.

2023Because plaintiff possessed check 4024, it was deemed a holder in due course until defendant established a defense that nullified plaintiff’s status. 810 ILCS Ann. 5/3-308, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 2, at 191 (Smith-Hurd 2014) (physical possession of a check creates a prima facie case that the possessor of the check is a holder in due course); Tuttle, 102 Ill.

2021The Seventh Circuit in CIMZNHCA rejected the district court’s application of the burden-shifting test under Sequoia and instead found that the “correct answer” regarding the role of a court in reviewing the government’s motion to dismiss “lies much nearer” to Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C.

2020Comm’n, 373 Ill.

2019App. 3d 214, 221 (2007) (citing Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 184 Ill. 2d 328, 335-36 (1998)). ¶ 136 With respect to causation, which is the only element at issue in this appeal, Illinois does not use the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and commonly applied in federal employment discrimination and retaliation cases.

2019That method allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case without proving a direct causal link.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018).

2013See, e.g., Illinois Bell, 327 Ill.

2007While several cases from this court discuss odd lot in terms of requiring the employee to make a prima facie case of odd lot prior to having the burden shift to the employer to produce evidence that some type of regular and continuous employment is available to the employee (see Meadows v. Industrial Comm’n, 262 Ill.