28 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 15983green2 sentences2023Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct. 2777 , 2023Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct. 2777 , | 2 | 2 |
McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2023To present a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) an identifiable, facially neutral personnel policy or practice; (2) a disparate effect on members of a protected class; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 275 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 2023To present a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) an identifiable, facially neutral personnel policy or practice; (2) a disparate effect on members of a protected class; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 275 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Patterson v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2015See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209-211 , 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). . 2015See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209-211 , 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). . | 2 | 2 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences2023Id. 6 When reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion to dismiss an individual’s age discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence, courts employ the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which is as follows: First, the employee must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 2023Id. 6 When reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion to dismiss an individual’s age discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence, courts employ the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which is as follows: First, the employee must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. | 1 | 12 |
Yount v. Handshoegreen1 sentence2019Accord Yount , 14-919, pp. 6-7 , 171 So.3d at 386 (observing that "[i]n those cases where more than one claim is alleged in the petition, courts examine the probability of success of each claim individually") (citing Darden v. Smith , 03-1144, p.8 (La. | 1 | 1 |
LaBove v. Rafterygreen1 sentence2017Because the LADEA “is identical to the federal statute prohibiting age discrimination, Louisiana courts have traditionally looked to federal case law for guidance.” LaBove v. Raftery, 00-1394, 00-1423, p. 9 (La. 11/28/01), 802 So.2d 566, 573 (footnote omitted). 6 Under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), in order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on age, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class a | 1 | 1 |
Eastin v. Entergy Corp.green2 sentences2017Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 09-0293, p. 34 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 42 So.3d 1163, 1185-86 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ). 2017Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 09-0293, p. 34 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 42 So.3d 1163, 1185-86 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ). | 1 | 1 |
Wyvill v. United Companies Life Insurancegreen1 sentence2016Wyvill v. United Companies Life Insurance Co., 212 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Kin Gibson v. City of Louisvillegreen1 sentence2008See, Gibson v. City of Louisville, 336 F.3d 511, 513 (6 Cir.2003). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hongogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pope v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
green
2 sentences2023Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct. 2777 , 2023Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct. 2777 , | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2001While the burden-shifting framework adopted by the court of appeal to analyze retaliatory discharge claims is not entirely accurate as it modifies the defendant’s burden to one of proof, rather than one of production, once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, and lessens the requirement that the plaintiff at all times retain the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251-53 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1092-95 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the court of appeal’s result is correct. 2001While the burden-shifting framework adopted by the court of appeal to analyze retaliatory discharge claims is not entirely accurate as it modifies the defendant’s burden to one of proof, rather than one of production, once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, and lessens the requirement that the plaintiff at all times retain the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251-53 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1092-95 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the court of appeal’s result is correct. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Berquist v. Washington Mutual Bank
green
1 sentence2023Id. 6 When reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion to dismiss an individual’s age discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence, courts employ the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which is as follows: First, the employee must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
James Robinson v. the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System and Joey Sturm, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chief of Police for the University of Louisiana at Lafayette
green
1 sentence2022Robinson v. Board of Supervisors for University of Louisiana System, 2016-2145 (La. 6/29/17), 225 So. 3d 424, 431 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cree Oil Co. v. Home Ins. Co.
neutral
1 sentence2022App. 3 Cir. 3/8/95), 653 So.2d 620 , for the proposition that the burden-shifting standard as set forth in Jenkins is also applicable in legal malpractice cases involving appeals.4 In response, Defendants argue that this case does not trigger the burden shifting doctrine as set forth in Jenkins. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
MB Industries, LLC v. CNA Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2022Co., 2011-0303 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1173 , and argue that the burden shifting doctrine does not apply when the client proves negligence and/or some loss without also showing that the client was harmed by a bad outcome with the loss of an opportunity for recovery. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Baxter v. Scott
green
1 sentence2019App. 2 Cir. 5/16/03), 847 So.2d 225 , 231 (relying on California jurisprudence interpreting California's anti-SLAPP statute as support for the two-part burden-shifting analysis later discussed in Shelton ), judgment vacated on other grounds , 03-2013 (La. 11/14/03), 860 So.2d 535 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences2019California jurisprudence has expressly upheld the statutory stay of discovery as constitutional, precisely "because the statute permits a plaintiff to seek discovery by filing a motion and showing good cause." Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co. , 37 Cal. App. 4th 855 , 867, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 , 53 (1995). 2019California jurisprudence has expressly upheld the statutory stay of discovery as constitutional, precisely "because the statute permits a plaintiff to seek discovery by filing a motion and showing good cause." Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co. , 37 Cal. App. 4th 855 , 867, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 , 53 (1995). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Baxter v. Scott
green
1 sentence2019App. 2 Cir. 5/16/03), 847 So.2d 225 , 231 (relying on California jurisprudence interpreting California's anti-SLAPP statute as support for the two-part burden-shifting analysis later discussed in Shelton ), judgment vacated on other grounds , 03-2013 (La. 11/14/03), 860 So.2d 535 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2017The Defendant having met his burden to prove his statements involved matters of public interest and included matters which had been presented in judicial forums, the burden now shifts to Saucier to “demonstrate a probability of success on his claim.” Henry, 566 F.3d at 170 : •Article 971 establishes a burden-shifting analysis for weeding out frivolous claims. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Thinkstream, Inc. v. Rubin
green
2 sentences2017If this burden is 6 met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of success on the claim.” Id. 2017If this burden is met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of success on the claim." Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Aymond v. Dupree
green
1 sentence2015Thomas v. City of Monroe Louisiana, 36,526 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/18/02), 833 So.2d 1282 ; Aymond v. Dupree, 05-1248 (La.App. 3 Cir. 04/12/06) , 928 So.2d 721 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thomas v. City of Monroe Louisiana
green
1 sentence2015Thomas v. City of Monroe Louisiana, 36,526 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/18/02), 833 So.2d 1282 ; Aymond v. Dupree, 05-1248 (La.App. 3 Cir. 04/12/06) , 928 So.2d 721 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Seagrave v. Dean
green
1 sentence2012Seagrave, 908 So.2d at 45 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2011Rejecting the Swain evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards developed since its rendition for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause, 476 U.S. at 93 , 106 S.Ct. at 1721, the Court overruled Swain’s requirement of systemic exclusion, announcing in its place a three-step burden-shifting framework to be employed in evaluating an equal protection challenge to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
White v. Davis
green
2 sentences2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. 2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Manders v. Irwin
neutral
2 sentences2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. 2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wimberly v. Gatch
green
1 sentence2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lima v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver
green
2 sentences2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. 2008Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206 ; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103 , 52 So.2d 437 (1951) (setting forth as the well-settled rule that a party relying upon interruption or suspension of prescription bears the burden of proof); White v. Davis, 169 La. 101 , 124 So. 186 (1929); Manders v. Irwin, 118 La. 1048 , 43 So. 698 (1907) (stating that "the plea of prescription admits the debt, except in so far as prescribed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Shelton
green
1 sentence2008Alternatively, the defendant argues that if the state met its initial burden, then the *813 defendant would be left with an impossible task under the burden-shifting framework of State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La. 1993). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Duncan green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Sullivan v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Parke v. Raley green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.