burden-shifting presumption in Kansas

1986The court reasoned that this instruction might be interpreted by the jury as creating either a conclusive presumption or a burden-shifting presumption. 442 U.S. at 524 .

1981This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.” The latter instruction was approved in State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980), amid claims similar to those presented here that the instruction created “either a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent, or as a burden-shifting presumption, in violation of the rationale of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).” That instruction was later revised pursuant to the call for improvement voiced by the Court of Appeals in

2021Finally, Brown argues Kansas' criminal restitution scheme violates his jury trial rights under section 5 and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the scheme authorizes a district court judge to determine restitution damages. 4 After a thorough review of these issues, we conclude that Brown failed to carry his burden to prove intentional discrimination in the State's exercise of peremptory challenges, as required under the burden-shifting framework established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2021Finally, Brown argues Kansas' criminal restitution scheme violates his jury trial rights under section 5 and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the scheme authorizes a district court judge to determine restitution damages. 4 After a thorough review of these issues, we conclude that Brown failed to carry his burden to prove intentional discrimination in the State's exercise of peremptory challenges, as required under the burden-shifting framework established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2003The Kansas Supreme Court has adopted the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 36 L.

2003The Kansas Supreme Court has adopted the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 36 L.

1981This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.” The latter instruction was approved in State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980), amid claims similar to those presented here that the instruction created “either a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent, or as a burden-shifting presumption, in violation of the rationale of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).” That instruction was later revised pursuant to the call for improvement voiced by the Court of Appeals in

1981This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.” The latter instruction was approved in State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980), amid claims similar to those presented here that the instruction created “either a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent, or as a burden-shifting presumption, in violation of the rationale of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).” That instruction was later revised pursuant to the call for improvement voiced by the Court of Appeals in

1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 309 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert. denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980).

1981This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.” The latter instruction was approved in State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980), amid claims similar to those presented here that the instruction created “either a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent, or as a burden-shifting presumption, in violation of the rationale of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).” That instruction was later revised pursuant to the call for improvement voiced by the Court of Appeals in

2024Supporting their contention, the State cites State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 568-69 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), where our Supreme Court modified the burden shifting rule.

2024Supporting their contention, the State cites State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 568-69 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), where our Supreme Court modified the burden shifting rule.

2023App. 2d 180 , 324 P.3d 310 (2014)." The court's findings, to which the parties agreed, resolved the first two steps of the KPA's burden-shifting framework.

2020A cat's paw case is a slight variation of a Title VII vicarious liability case. 935 F.3d at 30 .

2019Bracken v. Dixon Industries, Inc., 272 Kan. 1272, 1276 , 38 P.3d 679 (2002).

2019Bracken v. Dixon Industries, Inc., 272 Kan. 1272, 1276 , 38 P.3d 679 (2002).

2013On appeal, the Allen Realty court rejected the district court’s burden-shifting framework as inappropriate. 14 Kan.

2004Under the burden-shifting analysis, although the prima facie presumption of unlawful intent ‘ “drops out of the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, . . ., the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the *439 plaintiffs prima facie case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” ’ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 , 147 L.

2004Under the burden-shifting analysis, although the prima facie presumption of unlawful intent ‘ “drops out of the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, . . ., the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the *439 plaintiffs prima facie case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” ’ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 , 147 L.

2004Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op Elevator C Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 553 , 35 P.3d 892 (2001).

2004Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op Elevator C Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 553 , 35 P.3d 892 (2001).

1997Summarizing its analysis, the Court stated that “neither our precedents nor historical or contemporary practice compel the conclusion that Kentucky’s burden-shifting rule violates due process.” 506 U.S. at 34 .

1997Thus, it held “that the Due Process Clause permits a State to impose a burden of production on a recidivism defendant who challenges the validity of a prior conviction under Boykin.” 506 U.S. at 34 . *489 Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion in Parke for the purpose of pointing out the difference between use of a burden-shifting formula in a sentencing matter and in a substantive criminal prosecution where the government would have the burden of proof and retain it throughout.

1986We reiterated the Sandstrom requirements in State v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 981 , 666 P.2d 706 (1983), holding that: “It has long been recognized that any instruction which shifts the burden of proof or of persuasion to the defendant is unconstitutional and is clearly erroneous.

1986We reiterated the Sandstrom requirements in State v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 981 , 666 P.2d 706 (1983), holding that: “It has long been recognized that any instruction which shifts the burden of proof or of persuasion to the defendant is unconstitutional and is clearly erroneous.

1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 309 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert. denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980).

1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 309 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert. denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980).

1981This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.” The latter instruction was approved in State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 267 , 606 P.2d 1022 , cert denied 449 U.S. 965 (1980), amid claims similar to those presented here that the instruction created “either a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent, or as a burden-shifting presumption, in violation of the rationale of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).” That instruction was later revised pursuant to the call for improvement voiced by the Court of Appeals in

1981App. 2d 705, 716 , 601 P.2d 375 , rev. denied 227 Kan. 927 (1979).

1979The Third Circuit considered a nearly identical instruction to that given in Robinson and reached the opposite conclusion in *715 United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 436 U.S. 919 (1978).

1979The Third Circuit considered a nearly identical instruction to that given in Robinson and reached the opposite conclusion in *715 United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 436 U.S. 919 (1978).