7 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nevagreen2 sentences1996State v. Neva, 300 S.C. 450, 452 , 388 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1990) (emphasis added) (charge that "keeping a child out of state in violation of a custody order for a period in excess of seventytwo hours shall be prima facie evidence that the person charged intended to violate the court order" and further, that the presumption was rebuttable, was a burden-shifting instruction). *526 It is apodictic that the phrase "prima facie" [1] is anathema in a jury charge. 1996State v. Neva, 300 S.C. 450, 452 , 388 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1990) (emphasis added) (charge that "keeping a child out of state in violation of a custody order for a period in excess of seventytwo hours shall be prima facie evidence that the person charged intended to violate the court order" and further, that the presumption was rebuttable, was a burden-shifting instruction). *526 It is apodictic that the phrase "prima facie" [1] is anathema in a jury charge. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blassingamegreen1 sentence1989State v. Price, 289 S. C. 32, 344 S. E. (2d) 605 (1986); see also State v. Blassingame, 271 S. C. 44, 244 S. E. (2d) 528 (1978) (intent is an element of voluntary manslaughter). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklin
green
2 sentences1986Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. ___ , 105 S. Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed. (2d) 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana , 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed. (2d) 39 (1979). 1986Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. _ , 105 S. Ct. 1965 , 85 L. | 3 | 1985–1986 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1996In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that an instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his acts could be interpreted by a jury as either a burden-shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption. 1996In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that an instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his acts could be interpreted by a jury as either a burden-shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption. | 2 | 1986–1996 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences1996State v. Adams, 291 S.C. 132 , 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987); State v. Peterson, supra. State v. Neva, 300 S.C. 450, 452 , 388 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1990) (emphasis added) (charge that “keeping a child out of state in violation of a custody order for a period in excess of seventy-two hours shall be prima facie evidence that the person charged intended to violate the court order” and further, that the presumption was rebuttable, was a burden-shifting instruction). 1996State v. Adams, 291 S.C. 132 , 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987); State v. Peterson, supra. State v. Neva, 300 S.C. 450, 452 , 388 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1990) (emphasis added) (charge that “keeping a child out of state in violation of a custody order for a period in excess of seventy-two hours shall be prima facie evidence that the person charged intended to violate the court order” and further, that the presumption was rebuttable, was a burden-shifting instruction). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Key
green
2 sentences1992Cf. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301 , 345 S.E. (2d) 481 (1986) (wherein our Supreme Court noted that jury instructions creating a burden-shifting presumption are unconstitutional and admonished trial judges that it is best to never use words such as “rebuttable” in any jury charge), overruled in part on other grounds, Casey v. State, — S.C. —, 409 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991); State v. Key, 282 S.C. 413 , 319 S.E. (2d) 338 (1984) (wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because of a burden-shifting jury charge). 1992Cf. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301 , 345 S.E. (2d) 481 (1986) (wherein our Supreme Court noted that jury instructions creating a burden-shifting presumption are unconstitutional and admonished trial judges that it is best to never use words such as “rebuttable” in any jury charge), overruled in part on other grounds, Casey v. State, — S.C. —, 409 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991); State v. Key, 282 S.C. 413 , 319 S.E. (2d) 338 (1984) (wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because of a burden-shifting jury charge). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Casey v. State
green
1 sentence1992Cf. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301 , 345 S.E. (2d) 481 (1986) (wherein our Supreme Court noted that jury instructions creating a burden-shifting presumption are unconstitutional and admonished trial judges that it is best to never use words such as “rebuttable” in any jury charge), overruled in part on other grounds, Casey v. State, — S.C. —, 409 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991); State v. Key, 282 S.C. 413 , 319 S.E. (2d) 338 (1984) (wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because of a burden-shifting jury charge). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Patrick
green
2 sentences1992Cf. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301 , 345 S.E. (2d) 481 (1986) (wherein our Supreme Court noted that jury instructions creating a burden-shifting presumption are unconstitutional and admonished trial judges that it is best to never use words such as “rebuttable” in any jury charge), overruled in part on other grounds, Casey v. State, — S.C. —, 409 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991); State v. Key, 282 S.C. 413 , 319 S.E. (2d) 338 (1984) (wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because of a burden-shifting jury charge). 1992Cf. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301 , 345 S.E. (2d) 481 (1986) (wherein our Supreme Court noted that jury instructions creating a burden-shifting presumption are unconstitutional and admonished trial judges that it is best to never use words such as “rebuttable” in any jury charge), overruled in part on other grounds, Casey v. State, — S.C. —, 409 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991); State v. Key, 282 S.C. 413 , 319 S.E. (2d) 338 (1984) (wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because of a burden-shifting jury charge). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Price
neutral
1 sentence1989State v. Price, 289 S. C. 32, 344 S. E. (2d) 605 (1986); see also State v. Blassingame, 271 S. C. 44, 244 S. E. (2d) 528 (1978) (intent is an element of voluntary manslaughter). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cupp v. Naughten
green
2 sentences1984Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141 , 94 S. Ct. 396 , 38 L. 1984Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141 , 94 S. Ct. 396 , 38 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.