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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences2026See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 322-23 (1985) (“A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied . . . .”). ¶36 The dissent contends that Francis is inapposite because it concerned a burden-shifting presumption rather than a sequencing conflict. 1991See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jensengreen2 sentences1990Our Supreme Court in State v. Jensen, 153 Ariz. 171 , 735 P.2d 781 (1978) held that a burden-shifting instruction on malice given the jury by the court constituted harmless error where the trial court repeatedly emphasized to the jury that the state had the burden of proving the charge against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 1990Our Supreme Court in State v. Jensen, 153 Ariz. 171 , 735 P.2d 781 (1978) held that a burden-shifting instruction on malice given the jury by the court constituted harmless error where the trial court repeatedly emphasized to the jury that the state had the burden of proving the charge against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2 |
Vig v. Nix Project II Partnershipgreen1 sentence2026When the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate[e] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of its claim and each defense.” Vig v. Nix Project II P’ship, 221 Ariz. 393, ¶ 11 (App. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Orme School v. Reevesgreen1 sentence2026Rather, the moving party is only required to “‘point out by specific reference to the relevant discovery that no evidence exist[s] to support an essential element of the [non-moving party’s] claim’ or defense.” Id. (alterations in Thruston) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 310 (1990)). 4The County asserts this burden-shifting framework does not apply here because Taylor made his claim under public records law, not open meeting law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cannongreen1 sentence2021In State v. Cannon, 157 Ariz. 107, 107 (1988), the supreme court concluded the omission of a burden-shifting instruction entirely was not fundamental error because the jury had been instructed on the State’s general burden of proof. | 1 | 1 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen1 sentence2017See MacLean, 195 Ariz. at 246, ¶ 36 ; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973) (explaining the proper burden shifting analysis applicable to employment discrimination cases). | 1 | 1 |
MacLean v. State Dept. of Educ.green1 sentence2017See MacLean, 195 Ariz. at 246, ¶ 36 ; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973) (explaining the proper burden shifting analysis applicable to employment discrimination cases). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences1991See Garcia, 152 Ariz. at 247 , 250 n. 4, 731 P.2d at 612 , 615 n. 4. 1991See Garcia, 152 Ariz. at 247 , 250 n. 4, 731 P.2d at 612 , 615 n. 4. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences1990See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 1990See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen2 sentences1983The instruction in the case at bar is clearly distinguishable from those in Sandstrom and Mincey in that it creates merely a permissive inference; i.e., it allows — but does not require — the jury to infer intent from the commission of the act and therefore places no burden upon the defendant. 2 The test for the constitutionality of a permissive inference was outlined in County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 792 (1979): Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift 1983The instruction in the case at bar is clearly distinguishable from those in Sandstrom and Mincey in that it creates merely a permissive inference; i.e., it allows — but does not require — the jury to infer intent from the commission of the act and therefore places no burden upon the defendant. 2 The test for the constitutionality of a permissive inference was outlined in County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 792 (1979): Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hunter
green
2 sentences2021The State always has the burden of proof[.]” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, even with these attempts to clarify the shifting burden regarding self-defense, neither attorney ever directly stated that the burden-shifting instruction applied to both justification defenses. ¶18 As in State v. Hunter, the given instructions did not make clear that the State was required to disprove York’s claim of self-defense if he provided evidence to support it. 142 Ariz. 88 , 89-90 (1984) (concluding the given self-defense instruction constituted fundamental error because it was unclear that the State was requi 1991Hunter established the rule that giving an improper burden-shifting instruction regarding self-defense is fundamental error, holding that “[t]he instructions did not make it clear that ... the burden on the state was ... to disprove *183 beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted in self-defense.” 142 Ariz. at 90 , 688 P.2d at 982 . | 2 | 1991–2021 |
National Bank of Arizona v. Thruston
green
1 sentence2026Rather, the moving party is only required to “‘point out by specific reference to the relevant discovery that no evidence exist[s] to support an essential element of the [non-moving party’s] claim’ or defense.” Id. (alterations in Thruston) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 310 (1990)). 4The County asserts this burden-shifting framework does not apply here because Taylor made his claim under public records law, not open meeting law. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Coffin v. United States
green
2 sentences1992BURDEN SHIFTING The presumption of a criminal defendant’s innocence is an “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). 1992BURDEN SHIFTING The presumption of a criminal defendant’s innocence is an “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1992BURDEN SHIFTING The presumption of a criminal defendant’s innocence is an “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). 1992BURDEN SHIFTING The presumption of a criminal defendant’s innocence is an “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1991See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). 1991See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Mincey
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 153 Ariz. 171, 176 , 735 P.2d 781, 786 (1987); Mincey, 130 Ariz. at 396-98 , 636 P.2d at 644-47 . 1990See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 153 Ariz. 171, 176 , 735 P.2d 781, 786 (1987); Mincey, 130 Ariz. at 396-98 , 636 P.2d at 644-47 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Ronald Robinson
green
1 sentence1982The instruction here is not the burden-shifting instruction criticized in a line of federal eases, including United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir.1976), and Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d *395 751 (9th Cir.1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.