11 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1990–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grandbouche v. Clancygreen1 sentence2026See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 727, 741 (2007) (remanding the case because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and had not made the “predicate factual findings” necessary to apply the correct standard); Grandbouche, 825 F.2d at 1467 (remanding for application of balancing test). | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Schwarzeneggergreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2010) (outlining a burden-shifting framework and requiring the party asserting the privilege to make a “prima facie showing of arguable [F]irst [A]mendment infringement”); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. | 1 | 1 |
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehartgreen1 sentence2026The Framework on Remand Mindful that “[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes,” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984), we follow the lead of the several federal district courts that have utilized a burden-shifting framework in like contexts. | 1 | 1 |
Riner v. Com.green1 sentence2026See, e.g., Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 321 (2004) (recognizing that changes to common law principles based upon public policy arguments are the province of the General Assembly). 32 As noted above, the text adopted by the General Assembly is inconsistent with the Restatement position advanced by Appian and Professor Perlman. 11 The statutory language, providing that a royalty remedy may be utilized “[i]f a complainant is unable to prove a greater amount of damages by other methods of measurement,” Code § 59.1-338, recognizes that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Seaborn v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026See Seaborn v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 408, 412 (2009) (“The presumption created in Kay Management has no application in parking lot cases.”); see also Edwards v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 2751-00-1, slip op. at 8 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2001) (“The presumption created in Kay Management has no application in parking lot cases.”). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 727, 741 (2007) (remanding the case because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and had not made the “predicate factual findings” necessary to apply the correct standard); Grandbouche, 825 F.2d at 1467 (remanding for application of balancing test). | 1 | 1 |
Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2024See Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins, 294 Va. 544, 558-59 (2017) (in a spoliation context, “[t]o allow such a severe sanction as a matter of course when a party has only negligently destroyed evidence is neither just nor proportionate” (quoting Brookshire Bros., Ltd v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 24 (Tex. 2014))); see also United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]anction analysis must encompass proportionality, and sanctions as extreme as witness exclusion must be proportional to the - 44 - The trial court’s ruling to exclude Pega’s damages evidence was particularly c | 1 | 1 |
Inteum Co. v. Nat'l Univ. of Sing.green1 sentence2024The ADA Motors court explained that a proper instruction must impose on plaintiffs the burden of proving not just any sales, but sales “attributable to the trade secret.”19 Id.; accord Inteum Co., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 884-85 . 20 Thus, Instruction 14 contravenes Virginia case law, VUTSA’s express language, and the Restatement’s own burden-shifting framework. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Sevane Rhynes, United States of America v. Michael Sevane Rhynesgreen1 sentence2024See Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins, 294 Va. 544, 558-59 (2017) (in a spoliation context, “[t]o allow such a severe sanction as a matter of course when a party has only negligently destroyed evidence is neither just nor proportionate” (quoting Brookshire Bros., Ltd v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 24 (Tex. 2014))); see also United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]anction analysis must encompass proportionality, and sanctions as extreme as witness exclusion must be proportional to the - 44 - The trial court’s ruling to exclude Pega’s damages evidence was particularly c | 1 | 1 |
Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Jerry Aldridgegreen1 sentence2024See Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins, 294 Va. 544, 558-59 (2017) (in a spoliation context, “[t]o allow such a severe sanction as a matter of course when a party has only negligently destroyed evidence is neither just nor proportionate” (quoting Brookshire Bros., Ltd v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 24 (Tex. 2014))); see also United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]anction analysis must encompass proportionality, and sanctions as extreme as witness exclusion must be proportional to the - 44 - The trial court’s ruling to exclude Pega’s damages evidence was particularly c | 1 | 1 |
Barkley v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2024See Egan v. Butler, 290 Va. 62 , 69 (2015) (“In a civil case, the erroneous exclusion of evidence is reversible error when the record fails to show plainly that the excluded evidence could not have affected the verdict.” (quoting Barkley v. Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 374 (2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen1 sentence2019In this way, the Batson framework "comports" with Title VII cases "holding that determinations at steps one and two of the [burden-of-production] framework 'can involve no credibility assessment' because 'the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage,' and that the burden-shifting framework triggered by a defendant's prima fac[i]e case is essentially just 'a means of "arranging the presentation of evidence." ' " Id. at 171 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 n.7 (quoting St. | 1 | 1 |
Blankenship v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018See Blankenship, 193 Va. at 591 , 70 S.E.2d at 337 (“[T]he burden was on the accused to produce evidence showing justification or excuse for the homicide.”). 2018See Blankenship, 193 Va. at 591 , 70 S.E.2d at 337 (“[T]he burden was on the accused to produce evidence showing justification or excuse for the homicide.”). | 1 | 1 |
El v. TEK SYSTEMS, INC.green2 sentences2011El v. Tek Sys., 311 F. Supp. 2d 516, 519 (E.D. 2011If he does so, he is entitled to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, but once the defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is pretextual.” El, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 519 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kim v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2026Kim, 293 Va. at 312-15 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Caplan v. Bogard
green
1 sentence2026We use a burden-shifting framework to assess this:6 “[T]he party seeking to establish that a particular way is a highway has the initial burden of presenting evidence of unrestricted access to the public.” Caplan, 264 Va. at 227 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2023McDonnell Douglas established a burden-shifting framework for analyzing causes of action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17. 411 U.S. at 802-03 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2019Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 , 509-10 & n.3, 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ) (citing Furnco Constr. 2019Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 , 509-10 & n.3, 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ) (citing Furnco Constr. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Purkett v. Elem
green
1 sentence2019In this way, the Batson framework "comports" with Title VII cases "holding that determinations at steps one and two of the [burden-of-production] framework 'can involve no credibility assessment' because 'the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage,' and that the burden-shifting framework triggered by a defendant's prima fac[i]e case is essentially just 'a means of "arranging the presentation of evidence." ' " Id. at 171 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 n.7 (quoting St. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hodge v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2018However, in Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338 , 228 S.E.2d 692 (1976), the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the constitutionality of the law dealing with presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mullaney, and found that Virginia’s law simply did not violate Mullaney. 2018However, in Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338 , 228 S.E.2d 692 (1976), the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the constitutionality of the law dealing with presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mullaney, and found that Virginia’s law simply did not violate Mullaney. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
1 sentence2018Connell continued to approach, and when he 5 The concurrence claims our reliance on Blankenship is unnecessary, and states that Blankenship is “likely no longer valid precedent.” The concurrence arrives at this conclusion in part based on its argument that the analysis in Blankenship is dependent upon a burden-shifting presumption that was deemed unconstitutional in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell
green
2 sentences2002Likewise, in United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 , 114 S.Ct. 2552 , 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994), the Court held that due process does not entitle a civil contemnor to a trial by jury. 2002Likewise, in United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 , 114 S.Ct. 2552 , 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994), the Court held that due process does not entitle a civil contemnor to a trial by jury. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hicks Ex Rel. Feiock v. Feiock
green
2 sentences2002In Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 , 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429 , 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not protect civil contemnors from a burden-shifting rule. 2002In Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 , 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429 , 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not protect civil contemnors from a burden-shifting rule. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1990Smith also contends that the trial court erred in granting Instruction No. 7, offered by the Commonwealth, which told the jury that it might infer malice “from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless, from all the evidence, [the jury has] a reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed.” This instruction, Smith argues, is violative of the rule enunciated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), that an instruction which constitutes “either a burden-shifting presumption ... or a conclusive presumption” is unconstitutional. 1990Id. at 524 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Security Trust Co. v. Thomas
green
2 sentences1990Based on the foregoing, this court adopts the burden-shifting rule as articulated by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Security Trust Co. of Rochester v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242 , 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1977). 1990Based on the foregoing, this court adopts the burden-shifting rule as articulated by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Security Trust Co. of Rochester v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242 , 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Landmark First Nat. Bank v. Gepetto's
green
1 sentence1990Bank v. Gepetto's, 498 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1986), and Weiner v. American Petrofina Marketing, Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1986) (adopting the burden-shifting rule for Florida, implicitly overruling the Florida case cited by the defendant, Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Barnett v. BARNETT BK. OF JACKSONVILLE
green
1 sentence1990Bank v. Gepetto's, 498 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1986), and Weiner v. American Petrofina Marketing, Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1986) (adopting the burden-shifting rule for Florida, implicitly overruling the Florida case cited by the defendant, Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Weiner v. American Petrofina Marketing, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Bank v. Gepetto's, 498 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1986), and Weiner v. American Petrofina Marketing, Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1986) (adopting the burden-shifting rule for Florida, implicitly overruling the Florida case cited by the defendant, Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.