burden-shifting analysis in Maine

2024Section 1981 provides, “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (a). [¶19] In analyzing a claim under Title VII and section 1981 in which there is no direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply the three-step burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell‐Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2018The pa1iies agree that the burden-shifting analysis originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and adopted by the Law Court in .Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979), applies to retaliation claims under 5 M.R.S. § 4633(1). 11 64.

2015Human Rights Comm 'n, 408 A.2d at 1262 .

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2003A. Whistleblower’s Protection Act (count 1) The parties argue their positions under the burden-shifting framework adopted from federal law in DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227 , 719 A.2d 509 .

2003A. Whistleblower’s Protection Act (count 1) The parties argue their positions under the burden-shifting framework adopted from federal law in DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227 , 719 A.2d 509 .

2020Id. '1['1[ 16-22.

2020Gaudette, 2017 NIE 86, '1I 6, 160 A.3d 1190 .

2015In cases such as this, the court must "apply a three-step burden-shifting analysis to determine whether (1) the employee has presented prima facie evidence of discrimination; (2) the employer has presented prima facie evidence of a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for the adverse action; and, in response, (3) the employee has presented prima facie evidence that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual or untrue." Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, 9 [9[13 & 14, 58 7 A.3d 1083 .12 This analytical framework addresses the parties' burdens of production, but

2014In evaluating a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, the court must "apply a three-step burden-shifting analysis to determine whether (1) the employee has presented prima facie evidence of discrimination; (2) the employer has presented prima facie evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action; and, in response, (3) the employee has presented prima facie evidence that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual or untrue." Id. <[ 13. a.

2024See Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 14 , 45 A.3d 722 (“We follow a three-step, burden-shifting analysis to evaluate employment discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.”).

2013Furthermore, "a fact is material if it could potentially affect the outcome ofthe case." Id. 5 The Court applies a three-part burden shifting analysis to evaluate employment discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage. "[T]o determine whether (1) the employee has presented prima facie evidence of discrimination; (2) the employer has presented prima facie evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action; and, in response, (3) the employee has presented prima facie evidence that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual or untrue." Fuhrmann v. Staples the Of

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2022See McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ,r 14, 824 A.2d 48 ; see also Carnicella v. Mercy Hosp., 2017 ME 161 , ,r 16, 168 A.3d 768 (the three-step burden shifting analysis is ordinarily used in employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage).

2025We reject Bolduc’s contention primarily because his interpretation of the applicable burden runs afoul of the statutory presumption that “all property” acquired subsequent to marriage is marital property, 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)-(3) (2025), but also because it undermines the burden-shifting framework established to apply the nonmarital “increase in value” exception in 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(E), see Hedges v. Pitcher, 2008 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 942 A.2d 1217 . 10 credibility of that evidence and reach a conclusion which accepts the valuation offered by one or the other of the witnesses, or a differing valua

2025We reject Bolduc’s contention primarily because his interpretation of the applicable burden runs afoul of the statutory presumption that “all property” acquired subsequent to marriage is marital property, 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)-(3) (2025), but also because it undermines the burden-shifting framework established to apply the nonmarital “increase in value” exception in 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(E), see Hedges v. Pitcher, 2008 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 942 A.2d 1217 . 10 credibility of that evidence and reach a conclusion which accepts the valuation offered by one or the other of the witnesses, or a differing valua

2022Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 12, 19 , 263 A.3d 494 .

2022Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 12, 19 , 263 A.3d 494 .

2022With respect to the Equal Protection argument, "some evidence of actual disparate treatment is a "threshold requirement" of a valid equal protection claim." Ayala-Sepzilveda v. Municipality ofSan German, 671 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2012).

2016To that end, Robert relies on the burden-shifting framework providing that once a confidential relationship has been established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove that the transfer was “entirely fair and that it was not affected by undue influence.” See Albert v. Albert, 2015 ME 5, ¶ 9 , 108 A.3d 388 ; DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me.1995) (“When, however, a confidential relationship between the parties to a deed, gift, contract, or the like is shown to exist, the burden shifts.” (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 5 ,

2016To that end, Robert relies on the burden-shifting framework providing that once a confidential relationship has been established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove that the transfer was “entirely fair and that it was not affected by undue influence.” See Albert v. Albert, 2015 ME 5, ¶ 9 , 108 A.3d 388 ; DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me.1995) (“When, however, a confidential relationship between the parties to a deed, gift, contract, or the like is shown to exist, the burden shifts.” (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 5 ,

2016To that end, Robert relies on the burden-shifting framework providing that once a confidential relationship has been established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove that the transfer was “entirely fair and that it was not affected by undue influence.” See Albert v. Albert, 2015 ME 5, ¶ 9 , 108 A.3d 388 ; DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me.1995) (“When, however, a confidential relationship between the parties to a deed, gift, contract, or the like is shown to exist, the burden shifts.” (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 5 ,

2014See City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1264-65 (adopting this analysis in the employment discrimination context); see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1250-54; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 , 935-39 (2d Cir.1988), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 488 U.S. 15, 18 , 109 S.Ct. 276 , 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988).

2014See City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1264-65 (adopting this analysis in the employment discrimination context); see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1250-54; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 , 935-39 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam on other grounds, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988).

2014See City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1264-65 (adopting this analysis in the employment discrimination context); see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1250-54; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 , 935-39 (2d Cir.1988), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 488 U.S. 15, 18 , 109 S.Ct. 276 , 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988).

2014See City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1264-65 (adopting this analysis in the employment discrimination context); see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1250-54; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 , 935-39 (2d Cir.1988), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 488 U.S. 15, 18 , 109 S.Ct. 276 , 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988).

2012See Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir.2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); accord, e.g., Peterson v. City College, 32 F.Supp.2d 675, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook.

2012See Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir.2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); accord, e.g., Peterson v. City College, 32 F.Supp.2d 675, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook.