defamation claim in Delaware

2023See Organovo Hldgs., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 119 (Del. Ch. 2017) (noting that equitable courts traditionally will not exercise jurisdiction over a defamation claim); Preston Hollow Cap.

2023See Organovo Hldgs., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 119 (Del. Ch. 2017) (noting that equitable courts traditionally will not exercise jurisdiction over a defamation claim); Preston Hollow Cap.

2026Ch. 2017). 177 Cousins 8 v. Goodier, 283 A.3d 1140 , 1148 (Del. 2022). 34 action.”178 As long as the statements in the Section U5 are “substantially true,” the defamation claim must fail. 179 Likewise, opinions are also protected. 180 The distinction between opinion and fact is significant, because “[w]hile allegations of specific criminal conduct generally cannot be protected as opinion, broad brush-stroked references to unethical conduct, even using terms normally understood to impute criminal acts, may be understood by the reasonable viewer as opinion.”181 Here, both truth and opinion opera

2025In determining whether speech is actionable, courts must additionally consider the impression created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person.”). 119 Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 639 ; Samples v. Est. of Brown, 2024 WL 3249335 , at *5 (Tex. App. June 28, 2024) (“Opinions masquerading as fact are still opinions and may not form the basis of a defamation claim.”); Immuno AG, 77 N.Y.2d at 254-55 (court must first consider “the content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose,” …[r]ather than sifting t

2025Corbin contends that this statement is substantially true because “the Court of Chancery made factual findings demonstrating Plaintiffs did engage in conduct that is inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.”95 Corbin also contends that because of the Court of Chancery’s findings, plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating the falsity of the statement. 92 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). 93 Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1036 . 94 Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 21 N.Y.S.3d 6, 12 (

2024Capital Holdings LLC, 227 A.3d 531 , 536 (Del. 2011); Doe v. Cedars Academy, No. 09C-09-136, 2010 WL 5825353 , at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 27, 2010). °3 Ramunno v. Crawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998). +4 See Compl. (lacking the elements needed to establish a defamation claim); see also MTD § 8-11. 7 defamatory nature of the communication; (4) the publisher was at fault; and (5) the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result.”°> “At a minimum, a plaintiff in a defamation suit must identify the substance of the defamatory statements and whether they were actually published.”°° Mr. Brisco states t

2026Kraft v. Wisdom Trees Invs., Inc., 145 A.3d 969, 974 (Del.

2019C. § 111. 10 jurisdiction over a claim at law if the plaintiff has stated a bona fide claim over which Chancery had original subject matter jurisdiction.49 As well and thoroughly explained in Organovo, courts adhering to a common law tradition historically have reserved determinations of falsity and malice for the collective wisdom of a jury rather than cast a judge as the sole arbiter of defamation and libel.50 With this and other considerations in mind, Vice Chancellor Laster concluded in Organovo that the plaintiff’s defamation claim should be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdicti

2025The question of “whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of law.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 . 15 are capable of a defamatory meaning may a jury consider whether such meaning is ascribed to the words.”72 When considering whether a challenged statement is defamatory, the Court asks (1) “whether alleged defamatory statements are expressions of fact or protected expressions of opinion;” and (2) “whether the challenged statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.”73 Opinion statements are protected by the First Amendment and, therefore, are not actionable under a defamation claim.74

2025The question of “whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of law.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 . 15 are capable of a defamatory meaning may a jury consider whether such meaning is ascribed to the words.”72 When considering whether a challenged statement is defamatory, the Court asks (1) “whether alleged defamatory statements are expressions of fact or protected expressions of opinion;” and (2) “whether the challenged statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.”73 Opinion statements are protected by the First Amendment and, therefore, are not actionable under a defamation claim.74

2025Mac Isaac Adequately Pled that the Politico Article Headline Defamed Him The modern law of defamation is a reflection of society’s attempt to balance two important but often conflicting policies: on one hand, protecting a person’s good name and reputation, and on the other, encouraging freedom of expression.29 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that some erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected if the freedom of expression is to have the “breathing space” it needs to survive.30 However, “[a]lthough there is latitude, the speaker or writer does not ha

2020If the plaintiff is a public figure, the burden includes proving that the defendant made the statement with actual malice.® In this case, Plaintiff has pled that he was accused of engaging in criminal conduct; the accusation was false; the statement was published in a newspaper; a 2 Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978). 3 Td. 4 Wilmington Sav.

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).13 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.14 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the Town of Smyrna and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on 11 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 106

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).14 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.15 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the City of Dover and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on the immunity question presented here. 12 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Counci

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).13 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.14 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the Town of Smyrna and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on 11 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 106

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).14 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.15 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the City of Dover and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on the immunity question presented here. 12 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Counci

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).13 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.14 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the Town of Smyrna and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on 11 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 106

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).14 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.15 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the City of Dover and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on the immunity question presented here. 12 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Counci

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).13 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.14 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the Town of Smyrna and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on 11 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 106

2023Plaintiff argues that Defendant can be held liable because individual Department officers acted with willful and malicious intent within the meaning of § 4011(c).14 That provision, however, provides only for the personal liability of government employees and does not expose government entities to liability for acts of their employees for which they are otherwise immune.15 Since Plaintiff’s action is against the City of Dover and not any individual government employees, 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) has no bearing on the immunity question presented here. 12 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., v. Mayor & Counci

2025The question of “whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of law.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 . 15 are capable of a defamatory meaning may a jury consider whether such meaning is ascribed to the words.”72 When considering whether a challenged statement is defamatory, the Court asks (1) “whether alleged defamatory statements are expressions of fact or protected expressions of opinion;” and (2) “whether the challenged statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.”73 Opinion statements are protected by the First Amendment and, therefore, are not actionable under a defamation claim.74

2025The question of “whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of law.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 . 15 are capable of a defamatory meaning may a jury consider whether such meaning is ascribed to the words.”72 When considering whether a challenged statement is defamatory, the Court asks (1) “whether alleged defamatory statements are expressions of fact or protected expressions of opinion;” and (2) “whether the challenged statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.”73 Opinion statements are protected by the First Amendment and, therefore, are not actionable under a defamation claim.74

2019Ch. 2017). 92 Id. at 122 (“Viewing the Complaint charitably, the Company might be seen as having attempted to plead a trade libel.”). 93 Id. at 123 . 23 allegation of trade libel.94 Accordingly, the defamation claim was also dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction.95 To summarize, at common law, equity had no jurisdiction to hear defamation claims; such matters were reserved for determination by a jury at law.

2019Ch. 2017). 92 Id. at 122 (“Viewing the Complaint charitably, the Company might be seen as having attempted to plead a trade libel.”). 93 Id. at 123 . 23 allegation of trade libel.94 Accordingly, the defamation claim was also dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction.95 To summarize, at common law, equity had no jurisdiction to hear defamation claims; such matters were reserved for determination by a jury at law.

2025Mac Isaac Adequately Pled that the Politico Article Headline Defamed Him The modern law of defamation is a reflection of society’s attempt to balance two important but often conflicting policies: on one hand, protecting a person’s good name and reputation, and on the other, encouraging freedom of expression.29 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that some erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected if the freedom of expression is to have the “breathing space” it needs to survive.30 However, “[a]lthough there is latitude, the speaker or writer does not ha

2022At common law, truth was an affirmative defense, and the defendant had the burden of proving the truth of the statement.67 But Sullivan seemed to require the opposite.68 The U.S. Supreme Court settled this issue in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, when 62 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964). 63 Id. at 279-280 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or

2021Numerous courts have held that tortious interference claims grounded in the exercise of free expression on matters of public concern are 35 Id. at 1124 . 36 610 A. 2d 1341 (Del. 1992). 37 Id. at 1349 . 17 barred by the First Amendment.38 I find that Plaintiff’s claims for tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are derivative of his defamation claim, and as such are, like the defamation claim, non-actionable as a matter of law.

2017False Light Delaware courts have extended the doctrine of absolute privilege to all claims involving injury to reputation.78 In Hoover v. Van Stone79, the Delaware District Court applied the doctrine 78 Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F.Supp. 1118, 1124 (D.

2019Del. 1982). 9 Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d at 411 (Where the communication giving rise to the defamation claim was a Court of Chancery filing for a temporary restraining order, the court determined it was privileged.). °° Def.’s Mot. 8. 21 Williams v. Howe, 2004 WL 2828058 , at *4 (Del.

1992In Nix , the foundation of the plaintiff’s defamation claim was a verified complaint and supporting sworn affidavits which had been filed by the Nix defendants in another action. 466 A.2d at 410 .

2026There, the plaintiff publicly accused Bill Cosby of rape.141 Cosby’s attorneys declared the “story accusing Bill Cosby of rape is a lie” and publicly branded Dickinson as a liar.142 Dickinson sued Cosby for defamation.143 Cosby argued that the “gist or sting of the statements was not that Dickinson lied about the rape allegations, but simply that she was a liar,” which Cosby argued was substantially true.144 The Court disagreed and found Cosby’s repeated characterization of Dickinson’s rape allegation as a fabrication was not a 137 ZL Technologies, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d at 595 (cleaned up). 138 N.Y.

2026The defamation claim against Defendant Gardner must be dismissed. 23 Id. at 17. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.

2026The defamation claim against Defendant Gardner must be dismissed. 23 Id. at 17. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.

2026Sys., LLC, 2019 WL 6726305 , at *1 (exercising jurisdiction for compulsory counterclaims that included defamation). 175 D.I. 18. 176 Agar v. Judy, 151 A.3d 456, 470 (Del.

2025The question is whether the statement(s) complained of “can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”"* “[I]f the content and circumstances of a private communication are such that the message conveyed would be relevant to the process of self-governance if disseminated to the community, that communication is 4 Mathews v, Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951), "5 Td. at 335. 4© Cousins v. Goodier, 283 A.3d 1140 , 1148 (Del. 2022) quoting Page v. Oath, Inc., 270 A.3d

2025The question of “whether or not a statement is defamatory is a question of law.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 . 15 are capable of a defamatory meaning may a jury consider whether such meaning is ascribed to the words.”72 When considering whether a challenged statement is defamatory, the Court asks (1) “whether alleged defamatory statements are expressions of fact or protected expressions of opinion;” and (2) “whether the challenged statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.”73 Opinion statements are protected by the First Amendment and, therefore, are not actionable under a defamation claim.74

2025In determining whether speech is actionable, courts must additionally consider the impression created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person.”). 119 Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 639 ; Samples v. Est. of Brown, 2024 WL 3249335 , at *5 (Tex. App. June 28, 2024) (“Opinions masquerading as fact are still opinions and may not form the basis of a defamation claim.”); Immuno AG, 77 N.Y.2d at 254-55 (court must first consider “the content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose,” …[r]ather than sifting t

2025In determining whether speech is actionable, courts must additionally consider the impression created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person.”). 119 Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 639 ; Samples v. Est. of Brown, 2024 WL 3249335 , at *5 (Tex. App. June 28, 2024) (“Opinions masquerading as fact are still opinions and may not form the basis of a defamation claim.”); Immuno AG, 77 N.Y.2d at 254-55 (court must first consider “the content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose,” …[r]ather than sifting t

2025Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 167 (Del. Ch. 2003). 187 Ebersole, 180 A.2d at 470-72 ; Pathmark Stores, Inc. v. 3821 Assocs., L.P., 663 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Del. Ch. 1995). 23 Under Colorado law, the elements of a defamation claim are: “(1) a defamatory statement concerning another; (2) published to a third party; (3) with fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special damages or the existence of special damages to the plaintiff caused by the publication.” 188 Where, as here, the defamatory statement involves a matte

2025Corbin contends that this statement is substantially true because “the Court of Chancery made factual findings demonstrating Plaintiffs did engage in conduct that is inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.”95 Corbin also contends that because of the Court of Chancery’s findings, plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating the falsity of the statement. 92 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). 93 Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1036 . 94 Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 21 N.Y.S.3d 6, 12 (

2025Corbin contends that this statement is substantially true because “the Court of Chancery made factual findings demonstrating Plaintiffs did engage in conduct that is inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.”95 Corbin also contends that because of the Court of Chancery’s findings, plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating the falsity of the statement. 92 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). 93 Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1036 . 94 Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 21 N.Y.S.3d 6, 12 (

2025TREO’s partial motion to dismiss is DENIED.166 165 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 383 (Del. Ch. 1980) (the rule against claim splitting does not apply “where it appears that a plaintiff could not for jurisdictional reasons have presented his claim in its entirety in a prior adjudication”). 166 In its reply brief, TREO requests a stay for the first time.

2025In determining whether speech is actionable, courts must additionally consider the impression created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person.”). 119 Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 639 ; Samples v. Est. of Brown, 2024 WL 3249335 , at *5 (Tex. App. June 28, 2024) (“Opinions masquerading as fact are still opinions and may not form the basis of a defamation claim.”); Immuno AG, 77 N.Y.2d at 254-55 (court must first consider “the content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose,” …[r]ather than sifting t